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With six articles focused on migration, the pres-
ent issue of the Romanian Journal of European
Studies precedes the publication of a specialist
Journal of Migration Studies, a new initiative in the
academic environment of Timiºoara.
Some of the articles in this issue were already pre-
sented at the International Colloquium “Romania
and the EU in 2007” held in Timiºoara on the 6th of
May 2005 through the joint efforts of the West
University, the School of High European
Comparative Studies and the Centre of Excellence
'Jean Monnet'.
I hope that all readers will enjoy this special issue.
Grigore Silaºi, Professor Editorial Board Coordinator
Foreword

Being a short-term migrant to Romania, I feel
honored to contribute to this journal's issue and
therefore would like to thank the editors for this nice
opportunity.
European studies as a subject, analyzing
European developments in the present, past and
future, certainly can't avoid the multi-facetted sub-
ject of study called 'migration.' Decision-making on
migration issues is still defended by Member States
as their prerogative as migration directly affects the
grounds on which European 'nation-states' have
been created. The reluctance of Member States to
transfer decision-making power to supranational
European institutions is maybe one of the most
important indicators that the European Union is
struggling hard on its way forward. Like in other
aspects of the integration process there are two (or
even more) velocities involved: while the polity and
trade area of the European Union have been expand-
ing quickly, the mental picture of a 'common Europe
and identity' for most citizens remains rather unde-
veloped and is often blurred by exaggerated expecta-
tions or already nearly destroyed by a growing EU-
pessimism. Although Europe's final borders and the
future neighborhood are currently discussed and the
'frontier' thereby slowly becomes demarcated, the
overall progress towards a stronger European self-
identification has been extremely limited. The conse-
quences of a globalizing world and the uncertainties
of the 'EU-project' are raising fears among European
citizens. The possible negative effects of globalization
and enlargement have often been illustrated by using
the picture of 'uncontrollable waves of migrants'
landing at Europe's shores and threatening the
income and social security of native citizens —
cheaper and cheaper, everywhere available Samsung
Editorial
Migration and European challenges
TV sets seem for our 'globalized European village'
less worrying. 
One can say that the fear of uncontrollable migra-
tions and resulting resentments against future fellow
(EU or non-EU) citizens and neighbors, unfortu-
nately, is and has been a close companion of the
European project. Policy-makers and EU bureau-
crats failed to prepare their constituency, maybe
should have given the enlargement more time and/or
neglected opportunities to make the whole 'project'
more socially sustainable and mentally manageable
for individual citizens. On the other hand, policy-
makers repeatedly have been quick to react to public
fears against potential immigrants (from the new
Member States or from elsewhere) and to gain votes
out of this fear-induced pre-form of xenophobia: they
quickly agree on restrictions — although destroying
hereby the original ideal of free movements between
new and old Member States and introducing a sec-
ond class of EU citizens. Unfortunately, however,
decision-makers seem rather incompetent and slow to
accept mid-term and long-term European realities
and neglect new historic opportunities to actively
prepare their citizens for Europe's severe transforma-
tions - resulting from extremely low fertility rates, a
quickly ageing European population, a decreasing
European competitiveness and an implosion of social
protection systems e.g. Of course, the solution can't
exist (solely) in increased immigration to Europe,
but to a certain extent Europe will be depending from
a labor influx in the near future. Despite this fact,
migrants from the new Member States or from Third
Countries still have to pay the negative side-effects of
restrictive policies that are based on election-inspired
rhetoric and a generally badly informed electorate
rather than these policies are fact-based and future-
inspired. 
In summary, Europe should (and is) more than a
political construct and trade bloc - it has to be filled
with a common dream and spirit and the EU citizen-
ry should be prepared by time to welcome and
include people from other countries: Polish plumbers
in France, Romanian agricultural workers in Spain
or retired Germans in Spain are an important feature
and first step of a Europe growing together and a
Europe that tries to deal with (rather than denies and
neglect) future challenges. 
Migration is crucial for Europe's future develop-
ment and an interesting subject for the discipline of
European studies. I am therefore happy to introduce
to a journal that is full of interesting articles, high-
lighting important features of the migration phe-
nomenon in Europe, and having a special focus on
Romania as a new Member State:
The bigger European picture is drawn by Ruspini
who questions and outlines the linkage between
national and supranational governance on the way
to a common immigration policy that will be the
underpinning framework of the evolving post-
enlargement space. The impact of international
organizations and mostly informal consultation
processes that led to the pre-construction of an area
of Justice, Freedom and Security is portrayed in the
article of Geiger. Baldwin-Edwards dedicated his
article to the next EU enlargement in line: the former
Yugoslavia and Albania as an area that was and part-
ly still is synonymous with voluntary and forced
'mass emigrations.' This year's 'Year of Worker's
Mobility', promoted by the EU Commission, in the
context of the whole European project is reflected in
the article of van Krieken. Paradoxically, although
the mobility of workers inside the EU is actually still
very low, the new (mostly unfounded) fear of mass
movements from the new Member states recently led
to the introduction of mobility restrictions inside the
enlarged EU. The challenge for the EU in the near
future certainly has to be to promote, encourage and
tolerate more mobility inside the EU and across its
external borders. Finally, two articles highlight the
case of Romania: Romanian emigration patterns and
the context of EU accession are portrayed by
Nicolescu and Constantin, while Ghetau in his con-
tribution analyzes the demographic impacts of
migratory movements on different regions and the
whole of Romania by focusing on intra-regional com-
parisons and changes in the sex and age.
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Martin Geiger,Guest Lecturer and Associated ResearcherSISEC, University of the West, Timiºoara,Guest Editor
This paper is a preliminary attempt at investigating the link between the post EU enlargement migration space and theongoing process of the forming of a common EU immigration policy, now in its second phase, the ‘Hague Programme’having been agreed upon in November 2004. The main subject I mean to discuss centres around a series of juxtapositionswhich are the result of an interrelation between the national and supranational levels of EU policymaking: ‘enlarge-ment(s) and restrictions’, ‘visible and invisible borders’, ‘pendulum and pillar’ defining the area of Justice, Freedom andSecurity, implemented since the meeting of the European Council in Tampere in October 1999. The theoretical frameworkin this paper relies upon the ‘pendulum model’ developed by Helen Wallace and includes a close study of the EU poli-cymaking process. The model shows how this process results in an uninterrupted oscillation between two dimensions ofgovernance – national and supranational – particularly in the field of immigration where prerogatives of national sover-eignty often tend to prevail. The conclusive argument advances the idea that the EU should involve all the qualifiedactors either from old or new member states or neighbouring countries in an effective ‘open method of coordination’,aimed at harmonizing immigration and asylum policy. 
Keywords: immigration, EU enlargement, borders, policymaking, European identity.
What is Europe? Is it a geographic, eco-nomic, political entity, a category of thought orrather the space of ‘freedom, security and jus- tice’ and for the movement of goods and citi-zens belonging to the European Union? Regard-ing people, is this movement indeed ‘free’, ‘just’
Forms and Features of the Post-Enlargement MigrationSpace
Paolo Ruspini, PhD Associate Fellow, Centre for Research in EthnicRelations, University of Warwick∗
∗ Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, e-mail: P.Ruspini@warwick.ac.uk, ph. (+4424) 7652 4869, fax (+4424) 7652 4324, home page:http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CRER_RC/staff/paolo. This paper first appeared in Italian as “Da dieci a venticinque: il nuovo spazioeuropeo”, in Fondazione ISMU, Decimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2004. Dieci anni di immigrazione in Italia, Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 317-330.
and ‘safe’ for all the citizens that live in thisspace?Since its foundation the transnational exper-iment named European Union (EU), has tried toprovide a political form to the ancient idea ofEurope. This has been attempted by establish-ing a set of rules opposing the entropy of theinternational system, setting up a common mar-ket, therefore continuing the process of politicalintegration sanctioned by Treaties. These ruleshave generated a dense network, which hasgrown up, surprisingly, beyond all proportions,entangling ‘goods and persons’, at times delay-ing the overall growth of the system. The geopo-litical space of the European Union has expand-ed or decreased because of historical social fac-tors and the political willingness, or not, of theruling coalitions of its member States.In more than forty years of its recent history,Europe has been a divided entity reproducingvariables of political thought and socio-econom-ic systems in contrast one with the other: Eastand West, a planned economy against the freemarket, totalitarianism and democracy. To agreat extent, they are dichotomies refuted fromthe historical overthrows of more recent years1. The collapse of the Soviet paradigm in 1991and the following gradual reunification of theEuropean continent have not only altered forev-er a vision of the world, but they have also
sparked movements of populations for longappeased, thus putting under discussion migra-tion regimes and the impermeability of Euro-pean borders. At the beginning of this process,Western European migration scholars startedoff on the wrong foot, sometimes lacking theknowledge and explanatory instruments neces-sary to comprehend the migration dynamics,generated from, up until then, a little studied oreven ignored reality. The intellectual curiosity,instilled by the ongoing epochal upheavals, hashowever prevailed on stereotypes and wide-spread misconceptions. The exchanges of scien-tific knowledge, which proceeded simultane-ously with each stage of European integration,has therefore intensified between East andWest, who represented, to each other, only untilrecently, two very distant worlds. The idea mooting this paper is the need tolook at the transformations of the EU migrationspace in the time that starts in the 1980s, goesthrough the 1990s, until the decisive appoint-ment of 1° May 2004, the day that sanctionedthe fifth and more imposing EU enlargement.The last date is actually a starting point for thecontinent that urges to look beyond, trying toidentify the empirical form and political fea-tures within today’s migration scenario of theenlarged EU.
The path of European integration is notstraightforward at all. The history of the Euro-pean Union has seen periods of acceleration fol-lowed by a slowing down, in the process of theformation of a common economic and politicalspace. It is true that this path, though still farfrom being completed, has never actually arrest-ed and it can be said that it has also reinventeditself in generating new political and institu-tional frameworks, which are the subject ofdeep interest on behalf of IR scholars, particu-larly those of the ‘neofunctionalist’ school. Social phenomena and political processes,often complementary, have propelled theenlargement of the common European space:the processes of globalisation and economicinterdependence on one side together with theevident impossibility to adopt national immi-gration policies without externalising the con-
trol of borders. Europe, or better, the EuropeanUnion, has therefore experienced an awareness,albeit unwillingly, which for some States provesto be a miraculous ‘panacea’ where for others itrepresents an improvident solution by which tomitigate the malaises and the stiflement suf-fered due to systems of national governance. What might seem a bold pragmatism in thislast statement, does not mean to convey a non-appreciation of the propulsive role of the ideasand the sometimes ideological afflatus lavishedover time by the advocates of European integra-tion. This paper is not aimed at a philologicalreconstruction of the development of Europeanintegration in the migration sphere, but, rather,it means to encourage thought and clues to amore complete understanding of the dynamics.Some contextualization is, however, necessaryin order to make a correct analysis. 
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1 ‘Enlargements’ and ‘restrictions’ in the European Union
The 1980s, starting point of our discussion,saw an acceleration of the political union withthe introduction of the concept of ‘variablegeometry’ and the publication of the ‘WhiteBook’ of the Delors Commission, whichincludes detailed proposals for realizing a com-mon market. The accession of Greece in 1981,together with that of Spain and Portugal in 1986gave us 10 EU member States. The same lastyear the European Single Act has been enacted.It modifies the Treaty of Rome by introducingthe ‘qualified majority voting’ for the harmo-nization of legislations. This Act, ferventlyencouraged by Kohl and Mitterand, opened theroad to the creation of a big common marketwithout frontiers, expected for the 1st January1993 (Motta, 2003). The Delors Plan, adopted in1989, prepared the setting up in three stages ofthe Economic and Monetary Union, while theSchengen Convention, which includes the totalabolition of border controls, was signed to on19th June 1990. The last objective was reachedonly in 1993, after the signing of the Treaty ofMaastricht (7th February 1992) that sanctionedthe freedom of movement for persons, goods,services and capitals. The historical reconstruction aside, thedevelopment of the European integrationprocess has been distinguished by two enlarge-ments to three southern European countries,only five years one from the other and by thesigning of the Schengen Convention that closesthe 1980s and smoothes the way for the impor-tant institutional turning points of the 1990s. It is interesting to note that the economic sit-uation of Greece, Spain and Portugal at the timeof their EU accession, compared with that of themember States was not so dissimilar to thatbetween the EU-15 and the new Central andEastern European (CEE) members in 2004. Cer-tainly, one should proceed with caution in mak-ing comparisons between socio-economic mod-els when taking into consideration their diversehistorical experience. In the case of CEE coun-tries, these models have been shaped over timeby planning mechanisms historically absent inthe West. It is worthy to note however, that cal-culations may be made through a fear, classifi-able as irrational, and emphasised then, as now,with the purpose of raising distinctions andtherefore restricting the freedom of movementof workers from the new member States, forsubsequently re-negotiable transitional periods,so as to avoid an imbalance in the labour mar-kets of the old member States. The scarce migra-
tory flow, once the freedom of movement forworkers of the three Mediterranean Countrieswas sanctioned (van Selm, Tsolakis, 2004), hasproved these fears to be groundless. On a contemporary level, restrictions haveproved worthless, considering by all the projec-tions, sector studies and econometric calcula-tions carried out before the 2004 Eastwardenlargement. Past and recent estimations how-ever, seem not to be enough to prevent a sort of‘domino effect’,  on the eve of the May 2004enlargement, where member States were urgedto apply the restrictions. The ‘invasion syn-drome’ and recurrent use of hyperbola like“big-bang” borrowed from astrophysics, inex-orably unmask the hypocrisies of nationalimmigration policies and the selfishness ofmember States when their own prerogatives ofnational sovereignty are at stake. In our opinion, it will be more interesting tolook at the eventual reproduction of returnmigration scenarios, such those regardingGreece, Spain and Portugal, when the internaleconomic conditions became competitive com-pared with those of the destination countries.They are hypotheses to be verified on theground of the characteristics of the CEE migra-tory regimes and the logics of the pre- and post-enlargement scenario.One observation must be added regardingthe openly evident contrast between the EU setstandards that advocate the freedom of move-ment for all the workers who live and reside inthe Union, and the distinctions exercised by themember States in reproposing the transitionalperiods. They seem to deny and contradict thefreedom of movement in selective terms, i.e.where the Union has accepted countries whoseeconomic development is inferior to the mem-ber States average, and where the relativemigratory potential was only ‘apparently’increased by virtue of projections based on theirhistory of emigration countries. It is actually worth remembering that, whenin 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined theUnion, the need to adopt restrictive measureswas not apparent, and again in 2004 for Maltaand Cyprus. Moreover, we should be wary ofmyopia, while writing analyses and forecastsbased only on wage differentials. It is worthremembering that migration is, in fact, a morecomplex phenomenon. The migratory potential,i.e. the intention to carry out a migratory proj-ect, sometimes does not materialize because ofthe existence of a series of multiple factors
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which characterise the job market2, the absenceof well-established ethnic networks or the pres-ence of cultural and linguistic barriers in thecountries indicated as probable destination(Kaczmarczyk, 2004). On the importance of seeing the bigger pic-ture, we cannot but be in complete agreementwith the statement made by Claire Wallace(1999): “Being poor is not enough to become amigrant”. 
With these issues in mind, the partial nega-tion of the Treaties’ postulate, which has sanc-tioned the freedom of movement, throws agloomy light on the EU Charter of fundamentalrights (i.e. the nucleus of the European Consti-tution) and raises questions on the compatibili-ty of any unborn political union with criteria ofdemocratic inclusion typical of a federal struc-ture.
A ‘Copernican revolution’ took place, withinthe EU, in the middle of the ‘90s, which wouldhave soon transformed the global migrationregime of the continent. In 1995, for instance,the Schengen Convention came into force tenyears after its signature, covering commonexternal borders, common rules in visas andasylum, control of external borders and freemovement of persons. The ‘Schengen Informa-tion System’ (SIS) has been established to matchfreedom and security. It is directed to the gath-ering and exchange of personal identificationdata and the description of lost and stolenobjects. Limited to the five 1985 founding States(France, Germany and Benelux), the Schengenspace has progressively extended to nearly allEU member States (with the exception of theUnited Kingdom and Ireland). Furthermore, thesouthern European member States, belonging tothe Mediterranean model born at the beginningof the 1980s, grouping common migratory char-acteristics and experiences, followed paths sim-ilar to those of the CEE countries, adapting theirmechanisms of borders control. The reactivecharacter of many of these legislations has sincebeen considered unsuitable for implementation,in its ignorance of historical contingencies andexisting immigration policies (Ke( pin´ska, Stola,2004).The need to satisfy parameters establishedfrom above, at the EU level, without the adviceof the directly interested countries, has pushedon several occasions to postulate policies thatare often inadequate in taking into account thehistorical characteristics of the CEE region andthe problems, as a consequence of populationmovements in the past century, which have aris-en in the displacement of ethnic minorities out-side their borders of origin. The management of
CEE ethnic minorities therefore, cannot be con-ceived on the basis of the Western Europeanexperience, because conditions are rarely analo-gous and the range of rights which the minori-ties of these regions aspire to and those that thegovernments of their countries of origin wouldbe willing to grant are much wider comparedwith Western European standards (Górny, Rus-pini, 2004). It may be that in the process of EU enlarge-ment, ad hoc meetings and exchanges of experi-ences at the EU level between all the actors con-cerned with the policy-making process, wouldhave been useful, including those of immigrantcommunities and ethnic minorities from East-ern and Western Europe. This would haveenabled migration experts of the candidatecountries to be actively and effectively involvedin the formation of immigration policy. Suchactive involvement would certainly have servedas a stimulus to facilitate a search for solutionsand compromises in the diplomatic controver-sies arose during the enlargement process.The above observations are not aimed at dis-claiming the important role of the ‘reactive’ ele-ment in spurring on the formation and harmo-nization of member and candidate countriesimmigration policies. This is certainly a firstgoal, though not definitive, however important,when such diverse starting premises are consid-ered. The alleged facts also testify to the influ-ence that politics, and not only market rules,give to the importance of shaping the flow ofmigration and to the space of that singularmodel of supranational political integration thatis the European Union. This (re)shaping has notalways occurred in the right and desired direc-tion, aimed at matching the general with thespecific interests of immigrant groups and eth-
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2 ‘Permeability’ and ‘impermeability’ of the enlarged EU borders
nic minorities. At any rate, the fact that policy-making process has started, is an important suc-cess in itself.On the basis of what is set out above, theimportance, therefore, of the role that the Schen-gen acquis or convergence criteria play in shap-ing the EU borders is self-evident. An unexpect-ed freedom of movement on behalf of CEE citi-zens towards the West generated by theremoval of the exit controls in the 1990s, hasbeen enjoyed. Many took advantage of the con-cession of temporary permits, staying perma-nently in Western European countries, in partic-ular where the geographic proximity, the histor-ical and cultural ties and the economic attrac-tion of the labour markets made the stay rea-sonable and employment possibilities moreadvantageous. Absence of exit controls togetherwith the adoption of liberal immigration poli-cies by several western European countries wasresponsible for a flow of migration towards theWest and may have often even sparked thisflow.Moreover, in the decade preceding thebeginning of the 1990s, the CEE migration terri-tory worked nearly exclusively according tointernal rules; population movements weremainly restricted to the CEE region, as a directconsequence of the lack of exit controls andpassport visas for accessing the West. Thesedynamics were functional to Western Europe.The region acted, in fact, as ‘buffer zone’between East and West and so it was until 1°May 2004. The Schengen barrier played the roleof propeller for CEE migratory flows for a longtime. Flows were circular, ‘incomplete’, trig-gered by the exploitation of wage differentialsat the time of the transition of the CEEeconomies and at the same time a backwardnessand the progressive decline of the borderingformer-Soviet republics.An ‘epos’ came about, made of peddlers,small ‘entrepreneurs’, asylum seekers, ethnicnetworks and dubious legal trading betweenbordering regions of Eastern Europe, the fasci-nating study and research of which hasremained unchanging regardless of the timewhich goes by. Therefore, what at first was tem-porary mobility, slowly became a transforma-tion towards settlement implying permanentstay. The rate of mixed marriages between Polesand Ukrainians, for instance, increased as aresult of the prolonged stay and the new andcontinuing flows from the East, thus demon-strating the significance of a particular kind of
flow within the overall character of migrationoriginating in the former Soviet Union (Górny,Ke( pin´ska, 2004).CEE countries will soon show characteristicsand profiles similar to Western Europe in theirway of experiencing the migratory phenome-non. Castles and Miller (1993) identified theconstant factors associating countries thatreached various stages of their immigrationexperience so as to include: 
 A dynamic process of migration, whichtransformed the temporary entry of work-ers and refugees into permanent settlerswho form distinct ethnic groups;
 The economic and social marginalizationof the immigrants;
 Community formation among immigrants;
 Increasing interaction between immigrantgroups and the local population;
 The imperative for the state to react toimmigration and ethnic diversity (Castles,1995: 293).These are stages which Castles and Millerhave found, through different sources, in all theWestern European countries, and that globalmigratory dynamics are gradually exporting tothe CEE region. This hypothesis can be verifiedon the grounds of how the enlarged migrationterritory is synthetically analysed herein. Theterritory is delimited by new borders, anddiverse migratory experiences will increasinglytend to converge until the similarities as listedby Castles and Miller will prevail over the dif-ferences. The debate in question is not the next con-vergence on migration, but, rather, it is the ques-tion of the identity of the European migrationterritory and its borders. The reshaping of thisterritory and the Eastward shift of the EU bor-der has actually generated dynamics of inclu-sion and exclusion to be carefully observed. In this regard, this research diverges fromthat which declares the superiority of the mar-ket laws on politics, supporting the ‘uninter-rupted’ porosity of the EU border without mak-ing any distinction between the time before andafter the EU enlargement (Favell, Hansen, 2002).There is no objection as far as the porosity of theborders in the fifteen years before the enlarge-ment is concerned. There is, rather, the convic-tion that migration dynamics and regional net-works have suffered meaningful consequencesbecause of the EU enlargement, and theyrequire political interventions to face the
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process of reshaping the borders and the ongo-ing mechanisms of enclosure. In other words, I would argue that factors ofinclusion and exclusion generated by the 2004enlargement created ‘visible’ borders, like theone between Poland and Ukraine, and equally‘invisible’ borders, as those generated by thesimultaneous existence of wage differentialsand the new boundaries of entry and mobility.The differences of socio-economic development,though inherent to the expansion processes,endanger the cohesion and social tissue of cul-turally and geographically similar communitiesand the well-established exchange and mobilitypractices between borders. As a matter of fact, it is not only question ofEast-West borders, but of North-South geopolit-ical spaces, as remarked some months beforethe Eastward enlargement, by some Maghrebcolleagues who complained at the insufficientattention given to EU processes of “inclusion”
on the Southern side of the Mediterranean.There is not doubt that the process of Europeanintegration is made of tight interdependentvariables (Wallace H., 2001), but one should notforget that the meaningful, though not com-plete, solution of the East-West differences with-in the EU enlargement, leaves the North-Southdifference unsolved. Though mistrusting the porosity of the CEEborders, it is difficult to imagine Europe as a‘Fortress’.  More realistically, the Union shouldstrive to re-establish an absence or “forever lost”socio-economic equilibrium. For example, theEU should aim at preventing an expansion ofthe bridge demarcating the border betweenNarva in Estonia and Ivangorod in Russia; twourban agglomerates which were a single city upuntil 1° May 2004 (Visetti, 2004). Metaphoricallyspeaking, this represents a deep moat betweenCatholicism and Orthodoxy, European Unionand Russia.
The pendulum fluctuates, attracted, as it is,by two opposite magnetic fields. Helen Wallace,herself, (1996: 13) sharply noticed the fluctua-tions resulting from the shifts in interests andloyalties in the process of policy coordination ofthe EU field of Justice and home affairs. Thesefluctuations happen during the policy forma-tion/harmonisation between the national andtransnational/supranational dimension. TheEuropean institutions on one side and thenational level governance on the other (with theminor ‘magnetic fields’ of the regional and localdimension) are two opposite poles in competi-tion for the overall field of decisional spaces.The probability that one or the other dimensionprevails and the policies adopted depend on thestrength of the two magnetic fields: if both sidesare weak, no coherent policy will emerge eitherat the supranational or the national level.Helen Wallace’s “pendulum” is based on aseries of premises, which we have indirectlypointed out, like the political inadequacy of thenational States, the impact of globalisation andthe specific features of the European region(Apap, 2004). The pendulum movements illus-trate, with precision, the opposite tensionsunder way during the process of European inte-
gration: its progresses at times regular, othertimes irregular, the fluctuations and the immo-bility. Wallace’s metaphor is also useful to illus-trate the contrast, which became more and moreintense from the second half of the 1990s, in thecreation of the EU immigration and asylum pol-icy between the intergovernmental and supra-national dimension. A contrast which, in thelight of the structural characteristics of themodel, does not anticipate a definitive solutionin favour of one or the other dimension, butrather a continuous fluctuation with sometimesthe prevailing of one, sometimes of the other,depending on the historical circumstances andthe political and economic interests at stake.In this context, some more precise informa-tion is necessary in order to contextualise thefluctuations in this field of policy. After theentry in force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the1990s saw the 1996-97 European intergovern-mental conference that prepared the Treaty ofAmsterdam. On 2nd October 1997, the treatywas signed and on 1° May 1999 came into force.The European Union became ‘a space of free-dom, security and justice’. Justice and homeaffairs acquired a wider field of action and morespecific objectives; the European institutions a
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3 The ‘pendulum’ of Helen Wallace and the ‘pillar’ of Justice and home affairs
more balanced role and a more effective anddemocratic method of work had been planned(CE, 2002a). Moreover, the European Commis-sion acquired wider prerogatives and a newTitle (IV) included in the Treaty encompassedfreedom of movement, immigration and asy-lum. The Schengen agreements were integratedin the legal frame of the acquis of the EuropeanUnion. Aims to be achieved are “free movementof persons” (EU and third country residents)and “security through the fight of crime and ter-rorism” (art. 2 of the Single European Act). Theintroduction of a scoreboard, the so-called“Scoreboard to Review Progress on the Creationof an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice inthe European Union” should guarantee theperiodic control of the work in progress.It is the beginning of the ‘communitarisa-tion’ of the immigration policies. The praxis ofintergovernmental consultation however, seemsto fade definitively on the horizon. In fact, in thefive years from the entry in force of the Treaty ofAmsterdam (2004), the decisions on immigra-tion and asylum will have to be adopted onlywith a qualified majority. Besides, the EuropeanCouncil will have to assure the effective free-dom of movement, the control of the bordersand the implementation of all the other meas-ures in the field of immigration and asylum(Geddes, 2003). In October 1999, a special European Councilgathered in Tampere with the aim to make theEU into ‘an area of freedom, security and jus-tice’. One of the priorities of the Tampere Coun-cil is the invitation to the EU member States toelaborate a common policy on asylum andimmigration. The aim of the common policy inthese specific fields implies the creation of “aharmonized and common way for immigrantsand asylum seekers to obtain entry to all EUStates” (CE, 2002b). The main intervention areasto reach these goals have been carefully listed(for instance, Górny, Ruspini, 2004: 251). In short, with the signing of the Treaty ofAmsterdam and the following meeting of theEuropean Council in Tampere, a new institu-tional revolution seemed to overturn from theirfoundations, the European institutions and startan unprecedented acceleration in the EUprocess of decisional coordination in the field ofasylum and immigration. Unfortunately, this isnot exactly true of the current situation. The subsequent European Councils, in theyears from 2001 to 2003, showed a deceleration(Laeken) in asylum and immigration policy, fol-
lowed by the determination to go on (Seville) oragain by the acknowledgment of the progressesmade with the approval of so long waited direc-tives, like the one on ‘family reunification’ or‘the status of third-country nationals who arelong-term residents’ (Thessaloniki). In fact, it isclear from the analysis of the documentationproduced in these and other venues, that themember States’ are determined not to abdicatefrom their own prerogatives of national sover-eignty by keeping control of such a sensitivefield as immigration. The resounding declara-tions of principle included in these documentsoften clash with the daily practices of thenational governments, urging the EuropeanCommission on more than one occasion, toinvite the member States not to adopt legisla-tions in the migratory field which might, to acertain extent, contrast or hinder the ongoingsupranational harmonization. The metaphor of the Wallace ‘pendulum’thus seems to find in these statements and in thecontradictory results listed so far, a reason ofbeing and a true confirmation. In spite of theefforts at harmonizing, it is however, legitimateto argue that progress in this area is, at the endof the day, the result of a combination of inter-governmental and supranational political deci-sions (Jordan, Stråth, Triandafyllidou, 2003). On 1° May 2004, the conclusion of the firstimposing phase of the process of the EUenlargement with the accession of 10 new mem-ber States, took place at the same time as theentry in force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Theenlargement, with the revision of the bordersand the external relations of the Union, hadraised hopes in the setting aside of anotheraspect of the member States sovereignty and theintensification of efforts for the common policyformation even in areas like immigration andasylum policy (Ruspini, 2002). In fact, the num-ber of directives adopted in this field is, all in all,scarce in comparison with the legislative pro-posals put forward since Tampere, while thedecisional mechanisms, at the moment, havenot been changed as originally expected. Theinability of the European Convention to imposethe qualified majority voting on national Statesas condicio sine qua non in some sensitive deci-sional fields of the new European Constitution3,showed unavoidable repercussions on theexpected deadline for the entry in force of theTreaty of Amsterdam. The agreement reachedby the European leaders on the so-called ‘TheHague Programme’ during the 4th and 5th
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November 2004 summit in Brussels, fixed thenew 2010 deadline for the adoption of commonpolicy solutions in the field of asylum andimmigration. The approval of this new agenda hasallowed the adoption of qualified majority deci-sions in the field of border controls, illegalimmigration and asylum starting from 2005.
The area of legal immigration remains insteadsubject to the unanimity rule and the right ofveto until the European Constitution is notapproved. There is a predominant feeling, thatcounterbalances, deceleration and distinctionson principles will influence future politicalchoices, allowing the ‘pendulum of Wallace’ tofluctuate again.
Having witnessed the conclusion of the firstphase of expansion of the EU migration space, itis interesting to note how the post-Tampereagenda will be effective and what the impactthis will have in the forming a common immi-gration policy. I would limit suggestions to afew remarks regarding the migratory phenome-nology of the enlarged EU and to the identifica-tion of variables while providing a view of thefuture scenario. For clarity’s sake I would firstfocus on a series of points. 
 The EU migration territory has beenenlarged and it will be further increased tothe Southeast;
 The ‘buffer zone’ between East and Westmoved further eastwards;
 The borders are not porous as before, atleast in this EU border zone;
 Russia and the former-Soviet republics arestill lacking suitable laws and infrastruc-tures to carry out the role of  ‘buffer zone’,long represented by the CEE countriesbefore the EU enlargement;
 Migrants coming from the former-Sovietrepublics and the extremities of the Asiancontinent travel in the huge geographicspaces of Russia and the Soviet former-republics looking for a landing place in theWest;
 Centrifugal migratory dynamics (towardsthe West) are added to centripetal dynam-ics (towards the ‘core’ of Russia) makingthe overall Eurasian migration spaceextremely fluctuating.In this context, the demographic and eco-nomic differentials between border regions ofthe post-Soviet universe spark the migratoryflows. The absence of controls in entry and thestrict controls in exit towards the West, some-times transform the transit in the post-Sovietspace in stay of indefinite length. According to
the most reliable estimations, 4/5 million immi-grants are irregularly present in the territory ofthe Russian Federation (Ivakhniouk, 2003). It isan irregularity-settling tank that should raisegreater interest from the EU side. At the southern borders of the Europeancontinent, the Mediterranean Sea separatesopposite poles of economic development. TheMaghreb presses to tighten closer ties with thecountries of the north side of the Mediter-ranean, while migrants coming from sub-Saha-ran Africa try desperately to move towards theSchengen space (Barros, Lahlou, et al., 2002).The Maghreb countries are therefore assumingcharacteristics of transit typical to migratoryphenomenology already seen in other geo-graphic areas of the European continent.Which is the EU answer to these dynamics?The concession of ‘facilitated transit’ settles con-troversies like the one involving the Kaliningradregion, the enclave between East and West ofthe enlarged Union, and allows the Russians ofIvangorod to visit their neighbours of Narva,but are only extemporaneous solutions for con-troversies of small or medium size intensity.These solutions certainly indicate the best prac-tices in facing similar cases in other EU zones,but their complexity and their limited opera-tional sphere show undoubtedly several limits. The ‘neighbourhood policy’ prepared for theEU expansion is still too vague. The Union hasplanned ad hoc budget lines for implementingthese policies by taking advantage of experiencegained from with other financial instrumentslike Phare, Tacis and MEDA (CEC, 2004). In anycase, though important, the problem not onlylies in identifying and displaying adequatefinancial instruments for policy implementa-tion. Overall, the policies proposed by the Euro-pean Commission, aimed at smoothing the wayfor the neighbourhood policy, still lack a real
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vision. They do not seem able to avoid themethodological superficiality and scientificvagueness of expressions like “ring of friends”to define the countries bordering the EuropeanUnion. It is actually not always a question of“friends”, if one considers the strongly authori-tarian regime of Alexander Lukashenko inByelorussia and his scornful and definite scarce-ly conciliating attitude, not only towards the EUbut also towards Russia.The existence of an unstable and uncertainworld on its doorstep should put pressure onthe EU to take political action, as well as eco-nomic measures, in order to meet the challengesand problems of the “neighbouring” areas.Closer to our immediate interests, i.e. immigra-tion policy, one should be thinking now aboutmultilateral solutions that can effectivelyinvolve all interested parties in the policy-mak-ing process. A solution could be to use the“open method of coordination” (CEC, 2001) forthe EU immigration policy, not only in ‘horizon-tal’ way, i.e. by involving all the actors at nation-al level in the setting up of immigration policy,but also in a ‘vertical’ way by involving the non-governmental and international organizations,the migrant associations and the ethnic minori-ties operating at transnational level. This coor-dination should be established by stimulatingparticipation in the process of harmonization onbehalf of all actors in the interested countries,old and new EU members and those neighbour-ing countries whose membership is probablynot imminent.The challenge of a further expansion isawaiting us: the expected 2007 participationextended to Rumania and Bulgaria, and possi-bly the one to Croatia in 2008 and that to Turkey
whose accession date has still to come. Turkeyseems to raise more problems, because of itsdemographic potential and, above all, its Mus-lim identity overlapping the East and the West.It is worth remembering that, only few yearsago, the fear that some million Turkish citizensresident in Germany were able to acquire, overtime, a double nationality and consequently asignificant electoral power, forced the adoptionof a compromise model in reforming the citi-zenship law. The new law adopted some ele-ments of jus soli, but the hypothesis of a doublepassport originally included in the reform sup-ported by the red-green coalition, has beenrejected. In the following years, advocated bythe Christian-democratic and social Christianparty a new debate started concerning nationalidentity and the concept of Leitkultur, a ‘domi-nant culture’ whose roots date back, accordingto the exponents of the two parties, to the Chris-tian tradition of Germany. The German case is only one example. Otherwestern countries are experiencing equallystrong conflicts on issues of identity which theSeptember 11 tragedy particularly exacerbated.The conditions of immigrant communities andethnic minorities living in the European Unionbecame harsher. The multicultural practices areconstantly under discussion and face more andmore difficulties in being really implemented(Rex, 2004). The Turkish issue is added to thiscomposite picture, forcing the European Unionto rethink itself, its identity and its borders.Finally, only when the debate on the identity ofthe European Union is entirely exhausted willthe practical problems of the national andsupranational political spheres aspire to a suit-able solution.
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In the course of an intensifying cross-border and trans-societal inter-connectedness the sovereignty of nation-states andespecially their capacity to effectively govern policy issues in a unilateral way have been eroded. In the mid-80s, trying todefend the concept of an imagined closed community of ethnically homogenous citizens European receiving states startedto co-ordinate their approaches in order to find multi-lateral solutions as an exit-strategy out of declining national regulat-ing capacities. Until today a complex, but somehow still embryonic, regional regime of inter-governmental collaborationhas evolved. In addition to nation-states, trans-state expert panels and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) havebecome the avant-garde in the promotion of new techniques to manage migration and asylum ‘in a more orderly way.’ With regard to theories of international relations, the article will outline why and how inter-governmental organisa-tions have become embedded as new ‘managers.’ The role and contribution of these organisations then will be evaluat-ed with regard to aspects of democratic transparency, accountability and policy effectiveness.In the EU (European Union) context, IGOs provide additional possibilities for negotiations but serve as well as a ‘fast-track exit strategy’ for individual Member states to avoid complex and rather slow common decision making processes.Characterised by low levels of policy transparency but a high involvement in the implementation of restrictive policies,it is questionable if IGOs respect the interests of EU citizens and immigrants. Rather, the approaches currently appliedby IGOs undermine the project of tolerant, more open-minded receiving societies. As will be argued, it is due to intra-organisational financial interests, the IGO´s own political struggle for global/regional or issue-specific (asylum/migra-tion) leadership as well as the power inequality between receiving and sending states that in the near future a new – morejust – global or regional framework for the movement of people is unlikely to be established.
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The following article focuses on theinvolvement of inter-governmental organisa-tions (IGOs) in the governance of migration flows, especially within the new approach to‘manage’ migration movements in a moreorderly and more effective way. The author is
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Introduction
concerned how the perspective on migratorymovements within this new management para-digm seem to have become generalised andsimplified, and this rather technocratic para-digm is mainly disrespecting the highly com-plex nature of (cross-border) population move-ments and the kaleidoscopic combination oftheir political, social and economic motivations,giving in reality every single migratory move-ment an unique individuality. It is intended tocritically evaluate this new management para-digm, generally subsuming (more economicallyand socially motivated) migratory and (morepolitically caused) refugee movements underone single category of population movements‘to be managed.’ The author therefore prefers touse the rather neutral and theoretically betterfounded term of ’governance.’The term governance, with regard to theo-ries of international relations, refers to a processthrough which a single policy actor (or a multi-tude of policy actors) intends to change thebehaviour of another actor (actor-oriented con-ceptualisation). Simultaneously governance canbe conceptualised as an intervention of one ormore actors in social systems with the aim toimpose a change on the specific setting within a
specific policy-area or part of the society con-cerned (setting-oriented conceptualisation).1In the following it will be revealed that, inaddition to nation states and their specialisedgovernment departments, increasingly non-state/private as well as trans-state (includingIGOs) actors take the place of these traditionalactors in shaping the way migration movementsare governed. In addition, the embryonic inter-national regime to govern (or manage) migra-tions, having emerged within the last twentyyears in Europe as well as in other worldregions, is characterised by the struggle of thesetraditional state actors in keeping the capabilityto solve their nationally experienced migration‘problem’ by joining forces with other govern-ments and thereby defend their regulatorycapacity. The intentions of non-state, trans-stateand traditional state actors to govern migrationmovements hereby include the intention to mit-igate the root causes leading to emigration inother (mostly non-European) countries; gover-nance is hereby directed towards (state) actorsin sending and transit countries as well as thespecific setting existing within the societies ofthese states.
The general discourse about globalisationencloses the paradigm of nation states that, inthe course of intensifying cross-border andtrans-societal internationalisation processes,have lost most of their former regulatory capac-ity, authoritative power and sovereignty.2 Whilenon-state organisations (NGOs etc.) are increas-ingly acting trans-nationally, far-reaching liber-alisations in the field of trade and financialtransactions have led to the fact that private cor-porations are able to effectively circumventnational regulations.3 National governments –with regard to the challenge to govern policyissues that hardly respect the territorial bordersof their polities – are confronted with the needto co-operate with other nation states and theiractors in order to find cross-border and trans-polity solutions and to co-ordinate their indi-vidual actions in a given cross-border policy-area with those of these foreign forces. 
In the field of environmental protection,trade or the use of nuclear power, this has led toa new quality of cross-border negotiations andbargaining. By collaborating on the internation-al level, national governments nowadays seek tofind solutions for problems they either cannotsolve due to their cross-border character or con-sist in issues that by unilateral action can only betackled in a less effective way than by multilater-
al action. Not least of all, governments, byintending to bridge and close widening gaps inthe implementation of policies by substitutingor combining unilateral action by/with multilat-eral efforts, aim at securing their former author-itative position or at pretending to still possessfull regulatory capacities.4Despite these new intentions for internation-al collaboration, state actors are struggling hardto keep up with new actors that have becomeinvolved in cross-border governance beyond the
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1. Bridging the gaps in policy implementation: From unilateralism to multilateralism and supra-nationalism inmigration governance
nation state: international non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs), private corporations andinter-governmental organisations (IGOs, beingformed by nation states). In addition to the terms of international orglobal governance, referring broadly to newforms of multilateral negotiations and bargainsin often over-lapping policy issues, the conceptof international regimes is mostly used todescribe a specific setting of implicit or explicitprinciples, norms, rules and decision-makingprocedures around which actors’ expectationsconverge in a given (and specific) issue-area.5
Regimes hereby can be conceptualised as institu-tional as well as normative arrangements tofacilitate co-operation and co-ordination amongrational, ego-centric and from each other inde-pendent policy actors with the aim to circum-vent or mitigate negative side-effects of solelyunilateral policy actions.6 In contrast to ad-hoc
agreements, international regimes are arrange-ments with a certain capacity to resist to/to copewith short-term shifts regarding the power rela-tions and interest constellations among theregime members.7 Within a regime, the inten-tions of actors to influence the governance ofpolicy issues can either be directed towards thesetting of the regime itself or towards otheractors inside or outside this collaborativearrangement.Embedded in the globalisation paradigm isthe assumption that migratory and refugeemovements are directly resulting from fadingnational regulatory capacities of receiving,
sending and transit countries. Already in the1980s, several states started with the project of anew international regime to govern migrationand refugee movements on the regional level(Europe as the main example), the UN SecretaryGeneral now again reinforced these intentionsby calling out a Global Commission on Migra-tion8 in order to discuss a new global, more justframework for the movement of people.Like will be outlined in the following chap-ters, Member states of the European Union (EU)have been successful in achieving a high level ofinstitutionalised collaboration with other (non-)European states in certain fields of migrationgovernance. Among EU Member states multi-lateral collaboration has now reached the levelto become even supra-nationalised (the shiftfrom inter-governmental collaboration towardsthe governance of migration and asylum issuesexercised by supra-national institutions of theEU). Inter-governmental organisations andcross-border expert panels have been crucial toachieve this high level of intra-EU as well as EU-overlapping international collaboration – theevolvement of a migration and asylum regimethat has become extended to neighbouringregions (like Northern Africa). However, it hasto be emphasised that this regime – establishedwithin the last twenty years – hardly can beregarded as an all-encompassing, completearrangement as it focuses until today nearlyexclusively on border controls, the restrictionand avoidance of further immigration to EUcore states.
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With the beginning of the 1980s and thenlater, with more emphasis, towards the end ofthe twentieth century, a trend in mid- and West-European receiving states gained momentum toseverely restrict and avoid further in-comingmigration and refugee movements. Followingdecades in that the former Federal Republic ofGermany, the Benelux-states, Switzerland andFrance have been in need to recruit foreignguest-workers, and refugees were able to bene-fit from a certain, ideologically founded open-ness (‘The free west’), the beginning of a globaleconomic crisis and the implosion of communistregimes in Eastern Europe and Asia led to a
turning point. Within the field of migration andasylum, as outlined by JOLY, LAVENEX andBLASCHKE, a new realism followed former morehumanitarian or economically-rationalapproaches. Being based on the scenario ofuncontrollable mass immigration from EastEurope, European receiving societies developedthe fear to become flooded with migrants andasylum seekers in a time when a profound crisisof their welfare systems started to evolve.9Especially against the background of theoutbreak of violent inter-ethnic conflicts, war-fare, mass displacement and the split up of themulti-ethnic republic of Yugoslavia, the threat
2. New realisms, the project of a European migration and asylumregime and the European Dilemma of decision-making
of an implosion of the Soviet empire and itssatellite states, potential Western Europeanreceiving countries acted, in a first step, unilater-
ally by imposing harsher immigration and asy-lum regulations and increased efforts to preventmass movements.10 Indeed, the more restrictiverealist approach of receiving states had a certainsuccess: the vast majority of refugees from theterritory of Yugoslavia, only granted with atemporary refugee status, returned shortlyafterwards; in addition, the common restrictivehard-line of EC Member states (European Com-munity) opened the floor for new multilateralapproaches with the goal to guarantee an effec-tive further restriction of in-coming migrationand refugee movements. Member states herebycoincided in their perception of migratorymovements as being a (potential future) threat,endangering the construct of ethnically homo-geneous nation states, their social cohesion andsecurity. Firstly, the development of an embryonicWestern European (EC) ‘control regime’ wasdue to the common perception among the mem-bers of the EC that multilateral action was nowneeded in order to prevent migration andrefugee movements from becoming out of con-trol and to allay native fears of deepening socialinequalities caused by immigration.11 Untiltoday consisting as an inter-governmental gov-ernance model, this regime provided the collab-orative background for a far-reaching ‘harmon-isation’ (a close substantial convergence) ofnational legislations concerning the possibilitiesfor so-called ‘Third Country Nationals’12 to getaccess, permissions to stay and work or asylumwithin the European Community/EuropeanUnion. Secondly - in addition to a shared need to col-laborate on the inter-governmental (multilater-al) level - the harmonisation process in the fieldof migration and asylum resulted from a sec-ond, (more functional) need, steming as a logi-cal consequence from the progress in Europeanintegration: following the Schengen Treaty(1985) and the Single European Act (1987), thenew freedom for EC citizens to circulate andmigrate between different Member states had tobe flanked by common regulations concerningthe controls of the external borders, their fortifi-cation.13 In this context, new Member states,like Spain – due to the policy pressure exercisedby core states like Germany or France – had toimplement foreigners’ bills that acknowledgedthe interests of these core states to realise a
restrictive governance of migration flows. Thisshows that the interests of some ‘partners’ with-in this multilateral bargaining process were ableto outweigh weaker parties.14In addition to the establishment of a collabo-rative arrangement (regime) in the field ofmigration control, following the Treaty ofDublin (1990), a regional regime to co-ordinateand harmonise the asylum policies evolvedamong the EC Member states. Intending to reg-ulate which Member is responsible to decideabout a possible asylum status, this regimeencloses the concept of so-called ‘Safe ThirdCountries’ as well as a list of states declared asbeing politically stable and free of politicallymotivated forms of persecution. To enforce theimplementation of control measures, the restric-tions on the access of unwanted migrants(including potential asylum-seeking migrants)in general, the regulations of Schengen andDublin enclosed the formulation of carrier sanc-tions for airlines and other transport companiesfailing to ensure that their passengers possessvalid documents and are allowed to enter theEC and/or that they do not overstay their visas.Although migration and asylum issues inthe Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) now were offi-cially transferred from the third (inter-govern-mental co-operation, Treaty of Maastricht, 1992)to the first pillar of EU decision-making (com-mon EU decision-making), EU Member statesremain reluctant to transfer substantial deci-sion-making powers to the supra-national level.So far, migration and asylum issues – as a poli-cy area in the intersection between the nationaland the European level – remain chiefly gov-erned by national governments and the coordi-nating mechanism of the European Council. TheEuropean Parliament, in contrast, does not thusfar possess any decision-making and politicallybinding power; actions of the Commissionremain limited to initiatives and proposalsdirected to the Council. Migration and asylum issues can be regard-ed as one of the last, but heavily defendedissues touching a decidedly sensitive part of thewhole Europeanization process and posing asevere dilemma for the development of a (sub-stantially advanced and effective) EuropeanPolitical Union. This sentiment continues toexist, despite the fact that with regards to coop-eration–theory, the step towards further inter-governmental co-operation and then supra-nationalization is likely to take place given thecongruent interests among EU member States,
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transit and even sending states.15 Given the factthat migration will be crucial for the futurewealth and development of European societiesthat now begin to experience a drastic decreaseof their native work force and a `greying´ oftheir population, a transformation of the currentrestrictive control regime seems advisable. In 2005, the EU Commission presented a firstversion of a Green Paper towards initiating acommon European recruitment scheme that isoffering immigrants new possibilities to workand live legally within the EU.16 Against thebackground of the current crisis of the EU (Rat-
ification of the EU Constitution) and a newwave of ‘Realpolitiken’ of individual EU Mem-ber states, however, it remains uncertain as towhen such a common approach could bereached, let alone implemented. At the moment,the inter-governmental governance model toavoid and restrictively control a further influx ofimmigrants and asylum seekers, in contrast,seems likely to gain momentum, given theshared perception of immigration to be closelylinked with the issue of terrorism (following thedevastating attacks of Madrid and London).
Despite the general discourse, arguing thatEuropean receiving states do only possess limit-ed regulatory capacity to effectively governmigration and asylum issues in the nationalcontext (often this discourse confuses herebythe issues of integration with those of illegalmigration, border controls and the fight againstterrorism), Europe as a regional context canserve as an example that migration in deed canbe effectively limited, although not completelyavoided. The exodus from East Europe and Asiain most cases has been governed effectively,restrictively limited/avoided in large parts andthe majority of migrants and refugees, comingfrom the crisis area of the Balkans, has returned.The main problem has more to be seen in failingnational policies to actively promote the equalparticipation of Third Country Nationals inEuropean societies and does – in contrast to thegeneral image of mass media and political dis-course – not consist in the fact that borders aretoo porous. However, migrants willing to crossborders can do so (even if these borders areheavily fortified/technologically secured) byrisking their lives and investing high amountsof money.The effectiveness in restrictively limitingmass movements is, in addition to the close pol-icy co-ordination among EC/EU Member statesand the harmonisation of national approachesand legislations, mainly due to the extension ofa collaborative institutional and normativearrangement towards main sending and transitstates in neighbourhood to the territory of the
EC (EU), especially the territory of the SchengenTreaty. Within the framework of various, partlyoverlapping, consultation and co-operationprocesses, Member states of the EC, starting atthe end of the 1980s, developed a commonapproach towards these neighbouring states toconvince them to closely co-operate with themin the restriction of further immigration. Simul-taneously, EC states within these processes havebeen successful in transferring vast extents ofthe costs for limiting and controlling migratoryand refugee movements to their neighbours.17Within the so-called ‘Budapest Process’(established in 1993, following the consultativeprocesses of Berlin and Vienna), representativesof Eastern and Central European post-commu-nist transformation countries (later as well fromthe territory of the Community of IndependentStates (CIS) and other transit and sending coun-tries) held informal meetings to discuss withofficials of EC and EFTA (European Free TradeArea, including Switzerland) Member statesmeasures to strengthen border surveillance andapproaches how the ‘migration pressure’ on ECstates could be reduced. For their co-operationin taking back rejected asylum seekers and ‘ille-gal’ (unwanted) migrants or (as safe countries)processing asylum seekers within their territoryand repatriate rejected persons to other neigh-bouring countries, these Central and EasternEuropean states were granted with financialand technical assistance.18However, given the highly informal charac-ter of these consultative processes and the fact
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that (officially) no resolutions of politicallybinding character were formulated, the effect ofthese forums on the evolvement of a regionalmigration and asylum regime can only beroughly estimated.19 The high significance ofthis process, however, becomes evident withregard of the development of this consultativeforums: until today there has been a continuousgrowth by incorporating more and more receiv-ing, transit and countries in these consultations,in addition, the consultative forum became rep-resented by the establishment of its own inter-governmental organisation, the InternationalCentre for Migration Policy Development(ICMPD) – therefore it seems likely that themember states of this organisation and forumregard the Budapest Process as a politically utileplatform for inter-governmental negotiations onissues of migration and asylum.20In retrospective, it can be assumed that thisinter-governmental political dialogue was ofcrucial importance not only for the East-wardextension of the EC-control regime (by avoidinga direct access and claim-making of migrantsand asylum seekers on EC/EU territory, theirprocessing on the territory of Eastern and Cen-tral European states and the repatriation andborder control measures of these states), butalso for the preparation of the EU-accession ofsome of these states. The new ten Member statesof the EU, following the Budapest process andother bilateral and multilateral negotiations,
adopted and implemented national regulationsthat went conform to the Schengen Acquis andthe interests of their more powerful EC/EU orEFTA neighbours.21 Their accession to the EUtherefore could be somehow regarded as beinga reward of their willingness for close co-opera-tion in these matters.The eastward extension of the EC migrationand asylum control regime was replenished tothe South by the set-up of consultative forumswith neighbouring transit and sending coun-tries of Africa, especially the Maghreb states. Inthe framework of the so-called ’Barcelona-Process’ (initiated in 1992) – the European-Mediterranean Partnership – issues of develop-ment aid, the promotion of human rights andthe establishment of a free trade area (to becomerealised between the Member states of the EUand their African counterparts in 2012) werelinked with the extension and intensification ofborder controls and cross-regional (mostlypolice) co-operation to impose strict limitationson migratory movements originating fromAfrica. Most African members of this processpromised to take back rejected asylum seekersand ‘illegal’ migrants after being expulsed fromEuropean territory, while approaches to grantmore possibilities for their citizens to accede toEU states on a temporary basis have been dis-cussed (mostly on a bilateral basis, for examplebetween Morocco and Spain), but, however, inmost cases not have been implemented so far.
These mostly informal consultative process-es on migration and asylum issues, mostlyembedded in broader and multiple issue-policyframes (like the European-Mediterranean Part-nership), with regard to international regimetheory, do not necessarily have to lead to long-term institutional and normative arrangements(regimes). In some cases, their policy outcomeand effect is limited to short-term/ad-hoc agree-ments without any politically binding character– however, the initiation of such consultativeprocesses is seen as a necessary step for thepreparation and initiation of a regime in a spe-cific issue area. 
Consultative processes, based on negotia-tions between government officials, scientificexperts and representatives of IGOs (as well asin some cases of actors of the civil society), canbe described with the concept of ‘policy net-works’ Policy networks are providing theframework for first contacts between decision-makers from different (national, scientific orpolitical) background, they serve in stabilisingand relativising actor’s expectations and arecrucial in establishing of a formal equilibriumamong actors that mostly differ greatly withregard to their capacities.22 In the context of pol-icy making processes that increasingly disre-
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spect national borders, policy networks providethe platform for harmonising states’/ actor’sunilateral approaches with those of otherstates/actors and the achievement of inter-gov-ernmental deals/bargains to achieve a multilat-eral/multi-party solution of a policy problem.23To initiate and promote learning processes(towards the achievement of a common stand-point) so-called ‘epistemic communities,’24 con-sisting in a trans-state dialogue of scientificexperts and certain renowned individuals (asstructures parallel to these networks), are of cru-cial importance. In addition, inter-governmentalorganisations often serve in stabilising and/orintensifying the collaboration among statestowards the establishment of a long-termregime. Sometimes these organisations are ontheir own a direct outcome of policy-networksand inter-governmental consultations (like inthe example of the ICMPD). In other cases,regimes are containing inter-governmentalorganisations as members or important stake-holders (being nearly equal to states). The newquality and character of governance, increasing-ly taking place ‘beyond the nation state,’becomes evident with regard to the fact thatpolicy networks/inter-governmental negotia-tions and international regimes have become setup by IGOs instead of individual state govern-ments.25The field of migration and asylum serveshereby serves as a remarkable example: themajority of today’s existing regional consulta-tive processes in deed have been set up and are(indirectly or directly) governed by inter-gov-ernmental organisations like the InternationalOrganisation for Migration (IOM), the agency ofthe United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) or the ICMPD (limited in itsactivities mostly to the regional context ofEurope). Each of these organisations hereby isacting simultaneously as a ‘forum organisation’(in organising trans-state policy dialogues andacting as the administrative co-ordinator or sec-retariat within these consultative processes26) aswell as a more technically oriented ‘serviceorganisation’27 (by supplying their memberstates with expertise and technical knowl-edge28). While UNHCR is providing receiving, tran-sit and sending countries with a broad reper-toire of support measures in the field ofrefugees and asylum seekers (consisting infinancial and technical support as well as policyadvice), the IOM is active in the field of
migrants’ voluntary return, repatriation andresettlement. Both organisations as well as theICMPD and other smaller organisations areaiming at a specific form of ‘capacity building’in their member states, they provide trainingsfor experts, decision-makers and practitioners(including border police officials) in the specificnational context, and support governmentstechnologically as well as financially in theirefforts to better ‘manage’ (or control) migrationand refugee movements.Especially in the context of Europe and inter-governmental negotiations on migration andasylum issues between EU Member states andAfrican, Asian or East European sending andtransit countries (including authoritarianregimes like in the case of Libya), the advantageof inter-governmental policy networks andorganisations can be seen in the fact that theyare officially not bound to the EU-frameworkbut allow, due to the membership of bothreceiving and sending countries, for informaland formal consultations without the need for‘official’ bilateral or multilateral talks. It seemslikely that modes of governance in the field ofmigration and asylum in Europe will still bebased on a multitude of European, bilateral andmultilateral approaches implemented by indi-vidual states and/or additional inter-govern-mental actors.29 Against the background oflengthy and complex EU decision-makingprocesses and the current crisis of the Europeanintegration process, IGOs and policy networkscan serve governments to circumvent some ofthese hurdles and find at least some short-term/ad-hoc solutions for their national ‘migra-tion problem.’ Contrary to the efforts of the EU-Commis-sion to construct a ‘more open’ regime (amongothers through the newly proposed ‘Hague Pro-gramme’ calling for national quota and immi-gration liberalizations), the field of migrationcurrently is simultaneously characterised by anew ‘re-nationalization:’ EU member States(like Italy and Spain), seeking to find such aquicker solution to their national migrationproblem, enter in rather questionable agree-ments (in some parts facilitated by IGOs) for therepatriation of illegal immigrants (for examplethe agreement between Italy and Libya, or therepatriation of unwanted migrants from theCanaries (Spain) to the Moroccan occupiedWest Sahara). Especially the inter-governmentalorganisation of IOM has developed into aregional (as well a global) key actor in the new
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‘management’ approach (see following sub-chapter), and has somehow become not only an‘assistant’ for its member states but rather aswell a ‘managing director’ in providing expert-ise and facilitating sometimes rather question-able formal and informal agreements.Despite the contradictions contained withinits institutional framework, Member states ofthe EU (with the help of IGOs) nonethelessattempt to communicate a ‘common restrictivemigration and asylum approach’ towardsneighbouring states and regions (among othersvia the newly established ‘European Neigh-
bourhood Policy,and its migration-related ini-tiatives). By incorporating transit and receivingstates a variety of non-state actors (includingprivate corporations like airline companies),and inter-governmental organizations andexpert panels outside the official EU frame-work, the EU and its member States to someextent hereby ‘peripheralize’ their regional ornational ‘migration problems’ to Third coun-tries and delegate a vast extent of responsibili-ties (for example given by the Geneva Conven-tion) to third states and the organisations suchas IOM, UNHCR or for example the Red Cross.
Although migration and refugee movementsin most cases are politically unwanted, the real-ities of Europe as well as other regions showthat migratory movements, in general, are hard-ly to be avoided. Despite accepting this reality,public and political discourse in most EU statesis concentrated in a daily reconstruction of theimage of a migration ‘crisis’ (mostly represent-ed as consisting in hordes of illegal migrantsarriving in boats at the coasts of Southern Spainor Italy). The fear of ‘uncontrollable’ migrationmovements hereby is directly linked to aspectsof a fading national identity (see for example thediscourse of the German Christian Democrats(CDU) in 2004) in an enlarging European Union,the postulation of a drastic decrease in publicsecurity, reflected by an increase in terroristactivities, being committed by not-enough-con-trolled illegal/non-enough-integrated immi-grants.Because the European Union’s efforts to cur-tail immigration thus far have not brought thedesired results, it must be asked whether theperspective on immigration issues should bechanged. According to GHOSH,30 the adopting ofa new ‘regulated openness’ could lead to a de-criminalisation and de-illegalisation of immi-grants by providing them with more opportuni-ties to live and work legally within the territoryof receiving states. Since the mid-1990s a new concept as well anew trans-national discourse (or philosophy)has evolved that is based on the generalassumption of migration as a problem that can
be brought to a solution by ‘managing’ migra-tion flows in a new, more orderly and rationalway. Migration movements are hereby regardedas an unavoidable fact and curtailing migrationseems inappropriate due to economic anddemographic reasons (for example the fact thatin certain sectors labour shortages exist (or areforeseeable) or receiving societies suffer from adrastic ageing of their native population andwork force). The long-term goal of states andinter-governmental actors is the establishmentof a new international governance model, beingbased on a close co-ordination between sending,transit and receiving countries, and consistingas a politically binding global regime (frame-work), embracing regional- and sector-specificsub regimes.31Problematically, the term ‘migration man-agement’ has now become the catch word of abroadly generalised discourse in policy-makingand scientific debate. Although managementhas become a generally used term – thanks alsoto the promotion of this term by representativesand advisors of IOM and IOM’s own scientificjournal (‘International Migration’) – however, sofar, no general turn in the perception of (and thepolitical response towards) the migration phe-nomenon has occurred (given for example thecase of the EU).32It is especially this inter-governmentalorganisation, the IOM, that due to its growingimportance in the regional (Europe) as well as inthe global context became heavily criticised forthe pragmatic and mostly technocratic imple-
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mentation of its management approach. Underthe slogan ‘Managing migration for the benefit of
all’33 IOM sees its intra-organisational responsi-bility and challenge in assisting its members –currently 105 governments - “in meeting the
growing operational challenges of migration man-
agement”.34 Against the background of an esti-mated operational budget of 640 million $US,35IOM sees itself as the globally leading interna-tional organisation in migration issues and asone of the most important focal points for dis-cussions on migration policy and management.In addition to the Mediterranean Transit Migra-tion Dialogue (MTM), the organisation is actingas the co-ordinating agency within the Manila-Process, the South American Migration Dia-logue, the Migration Dialogues in Southern aswell as in Western Africa and various other pan-els. IOM within these dialogues facilitatesexpert networks among stakeholders in receiv-ing, transit and sending countries and supportsthem to find “pragmatic and action oriented mech-
anisms” and to develop “institutions and infra-
structure for a humane, safe and orderly migration
management.”36In addition to IOM, also the UNHCR is earn-ing criticism for its move from a former exclu-sively humanitarian ideal and mandate to arather pragmatic/technocratic managementapproach: for most critics UNHCR, since theformulation of its ‘Convention Plus’ (2003),37moved in the direction to rather serve the inter-ests of receiving states (in avoiding the influx ofasylum seekers and refugees and to process asy-lum applications outside their territories) thanthose of refugees/asylum seekers. Similarly toIOM, UNHCR is increasingly regarded as a’implementation’ partner for receiving states
that, under current real politics, are more inter-est in control and prevention than an humani-tarian ‘management,’ centred onmigrants/refugees and their interests. While out of intra-organisational interests(to promote their international standing andsignificance as well as to defend their issue-spe-cific competence) IOM, UNHCR as well as otherinter-governmental organisations (like forexample the ICMPD) are competing with eachother for scarce resources and are trying to takeover the lead in consultative processes (espe-cially with regard to IOM), these organisationsat the same time are threatened to fall back tothe status of independent and involuntaryhenchmen of states seeking to achieve short-term solutions for their individual ‘migrationand asylum problems.’ Increasingly, the most important financialcontributors to these organisations (the G7-countries) link their payments to the implemen-tation of specific programs and measures, likethe prevention of illegal movements and borderenforcement. Instead of contributing to the set-up of a more adequate regime, based on therealisation of the benefits of migration, IGOs aremore likely to support the further existence oftraditional patterns of control. While some IGOs(like IOM) in the interests of potential receivingstates have to deal with (or manage) unwanted(‘illegal’) migrants and organise their return as‘pragmatic service providers,’ other IGOs (likeUNHCR) have to ‘manage’ refugees/asylumseekers by processing them outside the territoryof potential receiving countries (extra-territorialprocessing) and selecting the ‘really endangeredrefugees’ from ‘only’ economically motivatedmigrants.
Against the background of the Europeanframework of migration management that cur-rently consists of restrictive controls, one mustask if the efforts of international organisationsresult in a more orderly and more humanemigration management. Migration manage-ment must tackle highly complex issues andchallenges that result in a heightened need forinter-governmental and international coopera-
tion. Although IGOs like the IOM and regionalconsultation processes intend to establish aglobal framework for the orderly movement ofpeople, processes which de-link migration fromthe nation-state level, the `real´ problem behindmigration management does not exists in asurge of population movements that are lesspredictable as before; rather states and theirsocieties pose the main barrier to the develop-
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providers and managers in the orderly movement of people
ment of such an international framework. Thisoccurs within a general reluctance of states totransfer real binding power on questions ofnational sovereignty and security – such asmigration that touches the very fabric of nations– to other entities. Co-operation in migrationissues, so far, consists foremost in the transfer ofcontrol tasks to sending and transit states andthe granting of rewards to these states whoseco-operation in managing/control efforts arematched with development/financial aid orpolitical and military support. Regional migration management in theEuropean as well as other contexts suffers fromimmense differences regarding power andinterests between receiving, transit, and sendingcountries. Mostly the individual interests, orien-tations and expectations of the people migratingare somehow forgotten and are not taken intoaccount. The approach to manage migrationand to reduce illegal migratory movements by achange in perspective, so far, lacks from thesupport of European receiving states to actuallygrant more migrants the opportunity to enterthe EU and secure access to the labour marketunder circumstances of legality.While EU states continue to block immigra-tion - except those belonging to a ‘very fineselection’ of economically welcomed migrants -authoritarian states like Libya have now becomeincluded and accepted as partners to exercisecontrol. Tolerated by other EU states, Italy con-tinues with its approach and co-operates with aregime that is internationally accused of disre-specting human rights, internationally isolatingitself for decades, lacking any legal, democraticframework as well as the capability to deal withmigration in a humane manner.Italy’s actions occur due to the generaldilemma of the EU harmonisation process andthe general unwillingness of European andnational policy-makers to develop a `manage-ment approach´ based on a more realistic per-ception of the root causes of migratory move-ments: deepening economic imbalancesbetween Europe and migrant sending regionsand the pull-effect of European (informal)labour markets for foreign labourers. Quickfixes, resulting in the transfer of the perverseside-effects of failing policies to the shoulders ofmigrants, so far are the only remaining answer.Any long-term perspective of migration man-agement, has therefore to be said, is still miss-ing.
Inter-governmental organisations like theIOM could provide a solution to this situationby their engagement in the governance ofmigration and refugee governance. EuropeanUnion member states and other nation statesalready benefit from their involvement andtheir contribution to standard setting, technicalcooperation and (in)formal consultations.However, the role of organisations like IOMwithin this process is highly questionable.An institutional framework for the manage-ment of migration, based on IGOs as its dynam-ic actors, has its main constraint in that theseorganisations do not possess any formal man-date to deal with normative or regulatoryaspects of international migration. Informalmeetings and inter-governmental panels aremostly non-transparent, and the positions andstrategies of the ‘managers’ of migration (con-trol) remain unclear to the public and the elec-torate of member states.In- and outside the framework of the UNunfortunately no organization or committee, sofar, has a sufficiently broad mandate to claim tobe the `co-ordinator´ of migration managementon the global level. This applies also to the IOM,although this organisation does possess certainfinancial resources, is supported by a greatnumber of states and, seems to be the most like-ly candidate able to fill the institutional vacuumon the global level.It must be criticised that most approaches ofthe IOM, while intending to tackle the root caus-es of migratory movements in emigration coun-tries, have forgotten to pursue a change of per-spective in receiving states who are the mainfinancial contributors to the IOM. Migrationmanagement thereby is developing in anotherdirection than to direct orderly and humaneprocesses. The globally evolving institutionalregime is likely to be based on a pure utilitarianideology or political rationality where popula-tion movements will be allowed only when theyseem economically warranted. Migration man-agement in this sense remains limited to theworld-wide extension of control policies thatnation states are no longer able to exercise ontheir own. Although migration management was for-mulated to reduce the net-costs of migration,most residents of receiving societies still fear‘waves of immigrants’ and immigrants remainthe scapegoats for deepening social inequalitiesand rising crime rates. The need to import for-eign labourers, due to a rising demand in
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receiving societies caused by on-going econom-ic and demographic transformations in the nearfuture, has not resulted in a change of perspec-tive. Nor do politicians see the necessity `to pre-pare´ residents to face this near-future challengeor to accept a co-existence with immigrants.Migration management that remains limited tocontrol – as is thus far in the interest of all EUmember states – will further increase the costsand negative side-effects of increasing irregularmovements.Instead of de-politicising and technocrisingmigration issues by adopting the neutral term‘management,’ IGOs should engage moreactively in the protection of migrants´ rights. A
just system of migration management shouldnot only serve the purposes of wealthy receivingsocieties. `Managing migration,´ according toPAPADEMETRIOU,38 should not only intend to seek‘perfection’ as migratory movements resultmostly from individually made decisions thatdue to their nature are highly uncertain and farfrom being predictable. Rather, it should lead tointernational agreements that are truly bi-direc-tional and balanced and are based on moral anddemocratic values. Inter-governmental organisa-tions, when pursuing this approach, would pro-vide an escape out of antiquated national poli-cies and failing or missing common approachesin the context of the European Union.
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new international regime, Paper prepared for the commission on global governance, Geneva, 1993, 18 pp.; Ghosh, Bimal, Man-
aging Migration, Whither the Missing Regime?, Paper abstract, First Conference on International Management of Migration Flows,Maratea (Italy) 16-19 September 2004.31 Migration management hereby is seen to embrace the management of refugee movements (the prevention of refugee crises,the channelling of refugee flows, the processing of asylum claims etc.).32 See for example Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Managing rapid and deep change in the newest age of migration, In: Spencer, Sarah(Ed.), The politics of migration, Managing opportunity, conflict and change, The Political Quarterly, Special Issue 2003, pp. 39-58;Spencer, Sarah, Introduction, In: Spencer, Sarah (Ed.), The politics of migration, Managing opportunity, conflict and change, The Polit-ical Quarterly, Special Issue 2003.33 See the homepage of IOM: http://www.iom.ch34 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Dialogue on Migration 2004, available at:http://www.iom.ch/en/who/main_informal_consultations.shtml (05.05.2004).35 See International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Programme and Budget, available at: http://www.iom.int/ DOCU-MENTS/GOVERNING/EN/MC2143.PDF (05.05.2004).36 IOM-Homepage: http://www.iom.ch (05.05.2005).37 See Angenendt; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Convention Plus, to find at: http://www.unhcr.org(05.05.2005); Drüke, Luise, Flüchtlingspolitik auf supranationaler Ebene, Das UN-Flüchtlingskommisariat, die UN und die EG, In:Heinelt, Hubert (Hrsg.), Zuwanderungspolitik in Europa, Nationale Politiken, Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede, Opladen, 1994, 323pp., pp. 176-194. 38 See Papademetriou, pp. 53-55.
The Balkans constitutes one of the mostremarkable regions of the world for the com-plexity and extent of its recent refugee andmigration movements. Between 1990 and 2000,over 10 million people — out of a total popula-tion of some 80m in the Balkan peninsula1 —had moved. Furthermore, these populationmovements, unusually, had ramifications forsecurity within the Balkans and also for westernEurope, thus implicating both the EuropeanUnion (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organi-zation (NATO) (Widgren, 2000: 3). What haschanged in the intervening years?The Balkan region is complex, with severaldistinct categorizations of country according to
economic development, recent migration histo-ry, and formal relationship to the EU. Amongthe constituent republics of the former YugoslavFederation, one (Slovenia) has acceded to theEU, another (Croatia) is a candidate countryalthough its application was delayed until Octo-ber 2005 owing to unresolved war crimes issues(EC 2005a: 6). The remainder — Serbia andMontenegro (SCG), Bosnia and Herzegovina(BiH), Kosovo, and Macedonia (fYRoM) —might be characterized as having serious politi-cal structural problems; Macedonia, however,has achieved a degree of stability such that it isnow recommended as a candidate for EU mem-bership (EC, 2005b). 
Balkan Migrations and TheEuropean Union: Patterns and Trends
Martin Baldwin-EdwardsMediterranean Migration Observatory, Co-DirectorUrban Environment and Human Resources (UEHR) Research Institute, Panteion University, Athens
The Balkan countries exhibit a wide range of migration types, levels of economic development and formal rela-tionship to the EU. Four types of migration — forced migrations, ethnic migrations, trafficking and temporarymigration - are examined in some detail for the whole region. It is concluded that forced migration has generallyceased, although return of refugees remains a major issue; that ethnic migrations have largely discontinued, withthe partial exception of Roma; trafficking appears to be in decline; and that temporary migration has been anoption only for Romanians and Bulgarians. There is little evidence of a major problem with transit migration, bor-der controls are now operating efficiently, and all countries of the region are rapidly adapting to the EU acquis com-
munautaire. The prognosis is that migration patterns are becoming more “normal”, with trends of temporarylabour emigration and asylum-seekers from outside the region. The real problem is exclusion (of some countries)from the Schengen white list, and the existence of a Schengen wall comparable with the former Iron Curtain.
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There remain around one million refugeesand displaced persons in these countries, pre-dominantly in Serbia. Some refugees havereturned to the region, but not without prob-lems and recently at a dwindling rate (Blitz,2005; Philpott, 2005; ECRI, 2004a). With theexception of Croatia (and, of course, Slovenia),economic development is still at a low level,with per capita GDP ranging from €930 in Koso-vo, €2,230 in Serbia and reaching €5,745 in Croa-tia for 2003 (EC 2004: 13).  Informal economicactivity, organized crime and trafficking ofaliens are endemic in the region, and constitutea major threat to political stability and chancesof future EU membership. Of the remaining four Balkan countries, two— Romania and Bulgaria — are applicant EUcountries, and expected to accede in 2007; Alba-nia and Moldova, on the other hand, have eco-nomic and political infrastructure so far belowthe EU level, that their possibility of EU acces-sion is some way off. Nevertheless, in principleall Balkan countries are seen as possible futuremembers of the EU (EC 2004a: 5), with some sig-nificant reforms, especially concerning bordercontrols, being undertaken through the Stabi-lization and Association Process (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004a: 11-12). Stabilization and Asso-ciation Agreements are in force with Croatiaand Macedonia, in the final stages of negotia-tion with Albania, under negotiation with Ser-bia and Montenegro, and about to be discussedwith Bosnia and Herzegovina (EC 2005a: 10). In terms of economic development, per capitaGDP is extremely low for Moldova (€417 in2002), for Albania it is lower than all of formerYugoslavia other than Kosovo (€1,685 in 2003),and it is slightly above the average for theregion for Bulgaria and Romania (€2,257 and€2,317) (EC 2004b; Jandl 2003). The currentnumber of emigrants from Moldova is various-ly estimated at between 600,000 and 1,000,000persons (IOM 2003a: 4; Scanlan 2002: 16), consti-tuting 25-45% of current population. Humantrafficking has been, and remains, extensivefrom Moldova, with merely an estimated 80,000migrants working legally in their country ofdestination (Jandl, 2003). Albania is thoughtnow to have a minimum of 900,000 emigrants(Barjaba, 2004); however, official data from justGreece and Italy count over 1m Albanians withresidence permits, so an estimate of 1.1m (34%of the population) is more plausible. In the case of Romania, by far the largestcountry in the region with a population of some
22m, the statistical service seems to have beenunable to calculate emigrants from the censusdata. Nor are there any other state data on tem-porary migration (IOM 2003b). Comparing 1992and 2002 census data, a calculation of 800.000‘missing’ persons can be made2: this figure sitswell with recent IOM survey data, which sug-gest that 15% of the adult population hasworked abroad, with currently some 850,000persons still abroad, and only 53% with legalemployment (IOM 2005). Similar problems withdata exist in Bulgaria, where the census datashow only 196,000 emigrants between 1992-2001whilst other calculations suggest 600-700.000(IOM 2003c:17-18). Gächter (2002) in a detailedanalysis, suggests that high nett emigration —mainly of Turkish Bulgarians — occurred 1988-1995, with some 479,000 persons. From 1996-99,Bulgaria had a low level of nett immigrationwhereby emigration of Bulgarians was morethan compensated by immigration of othernationals (Gächter 2002: 4). Thus, a snapshot ofBulgarian emigration patterns would probablyshow less than 10% of the population abroad atany moment.Table 1, below, summarizes these data onpopulation and migration in the region.
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Table 1 
Crude Population data, Balkan region 
 GDP per
cap.
(€) 
Population
(millions)
Stock of 
recent 
emigrants¶ 
Emigrants/
population
(%)
2003 2003 Most recent 
data 
Albania 1,685 3.2 1.1 million 34 
BiH 1,897 4.2 *N/A  
fYRoM 2,121 2.1 N/A  
SCG 2,232 8.6 N/A  
Kosovo 930 1.9 N/A  
West.Balkans. 2,053 19.9 N/A  
Bulgaria 2,257 7.8 650,000 8 
Croatia 5,745 4.4 N/A  
Romania 2,317 21.8 850,000 4 
Moldova§ 417 600,000-1 
million 
25-45 
SOURCE: EC (2004b) 
Notes:
* Emigration data concerning nationals are not applicable for the 
former Yugoslav countries, owing to the complexities of refugees 
and returns, along with IDPs. See Tables 2 and 3, below. 
§ Data for Moldova are from Jandl (2003), IOM (2003a: 4), Scanlan (2002: 
16) 
¶ Estimated data from various sources (see text for details) 
Across the Balkans, we can identify fourvery different sorts of migration, which requireseparate treatments: 
 forced migrations, associated with war and‘ethnic cleansing’, including IDPs3; 
 ethnic migrations, which are of a voluntarynature but inspired either by racial exclu-sion [e.g. Turkish Bulgarian migration toTurkey] or sometimes by better opportuni-ties abroad [e.g. Greek Albanian migrationto Greece]; 
 trafficking. This is endemic in the region, butaffecting different countries rather different-ly;
 temporary or incomplete migration. This is themost common form of migration over thelast few years, and is particularly difficult tomeasure. Census data do not properly cap-ture the reality, and can overstate or under-state the extent and meaning of migrations.4Forced migrationsBy the end of the 1991-95 war, some 300-350,000 Croatian Serbs had left their homes inCroatia, mostly for Serbia or Bosnia (Ivanisevic2004: 351); from Bosnia, at the end of the 1992-95war, a massive estimated 2.6m people were dis-placed — more than half the pre-war popula-tion (Philpott, 2005: 1) — and about 1.2m foundrefuge abroad (Ivanisevic, 2004: 351). In Kosovo,350,000 people fled their homes as IDPs orrefugees in 1998, and in 1999 some 450,000 eth-nic Albanians fled to Albania, 250,000 to Mace-donia (fYRoM) and 70,000 to Montenegro. Withthe end of war in June 1999, 600,000 peoplereturned to their homes in Kosovo, only to befollowed by a reverse exodus of 230,000 Serbsand Roma who sought safety in Serbia andMontenegro. Two years later, conflict in Mace-donia in 2001 led to 150,000 ethnic Albaniansfleeing, mainly to Kosovo (UNHCR, 2001: 7).By end 2003, UNHCR calculated around540,000 refugees or asylum-seekers outside ofthe Yugoslav region, around half in Germany(Table 2). Within the region, there were some600,000 IDPs and over 300,000 refugees (Table3); IDPs were located mainly in Bosnia or Serbia
and refugees almost exclusively in Serbia.Owing to the ethnicized nature of these forcedmigrations over the last decade, the paradoxicalconsequence is that Serbia-Montenegro hasbecome not only one of the world’s leadingsource countries for refugees, but also one of theleading host countries for refugees.5
The dramatic reduction in refugee numbersis mainly the result of returns — one of the pre-ferred ‘durable solutions’ favored by UNHCR.Looking simply at the number of returningrefugees, these vary greatly across the region. Inthe case of Bosnia, by mid 2004 just under 1 mil-lion had returned, of which 440,000 were minor-ity returns, (Black and Gent, 2004: 11). Forreturns to Croatia, the figure is 110,000 (Blitz,2005: 363), with 6,600 from Serbia and 850 from
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Tableȱ2ȱ
Stocksȱofȱrefugeesȱandȱasylumȱseekersȱfromȱtheȱregion,ȱendȱ
2003ȱ[000s]ȱ
andȱlocatedȱinȱ[principalȱ
countries,ȱonly]:ȱ
Originatingȱ
from:ȱ
to
ta
lȱ
SC
G
ȱ
G
er
m
an
yȱ
U
SA
ȱ
Sw
ed
en
ȱ
U
K
ȱ
BiHȱ 300.0ȱ 99.8ȱ 38.7ȱ 61.8ȱ 25.8ȱ ȱ
Croatiaȱ 230.2ȱ 189.7ȱ 3.8ȱ 6.3ȱ ȱ ȱ
fYRoMȱ 6.0ȱ 1.4ȱ 3.2ȱ 0.1ȱ 0.3ȱ 0.4ȱ
SCGȱ 296.6ȱ ȬȬȬȬȱ 169.0ȱ 16.8ȱ 27.9ȱ 21.3ȱ
TOTALSȱ 832.8ȱ 290.9ȱ 214.7ȱ 85.0ȱ 54.0ȱ 21.7ȱ
SOURCE:ȱUNHCRȱ(2004)ȱ
Note:ȱ totalsȱdoȱnotȱ addȱupȱ becauseȱ onlyȱmajorȱ subcategoriesȱ
areȱshownȱhereȱ
Tableȱ3ȱ
StocksȱofȱrefugeesȱandȱIDPsȱinȱtheȱregion,ȱendȱ2003ȱ[000s]ȱ
ofȱwhichȱ[principalȱ
nationalitiesȱonly]:ȱ
ȱ
ID
Ps
ȱ
Re
fu
ge
es
ȱ
C
ro
at
ia
nȱ
Se
rb
ia
nȱ
Bo
sn
ia
nȱ
M
ac
ed
on
ia
nȱ
BiHȱ 327.2ȱ 22.5ȱ 19.5ȱ 3.0ȱ ȱ ȱ
Croatiaȱ 12.6ȱ 4.4ȱ ȱ 0.5ȱ 3.9ȱ ȱ
fYRoMȱ 0ȱ 0.2ȱ ȱ 0.2ȱ ȱ ȱ
SCGȱ 256.9ȱ 291.4ȱ 189.7ȱ ȱ 99.8ȱ 1.4ȱ
TOTALSȱ 596.7ȱ 318.5ȱ 209.2ȱ 3.7ȱ 103.7ȱ 1.4ȱ
SOURCE:ȱUNHCRȱ(2004)ȱ
Types of Migration in the Balkans
Bosnia in 2004 (UNHCR 2005a, Table 16). InBosnia, mostly affected by IDPs, in 2004 therewere some 20,000 persons returning to theirplace of origin (UNHCR, 2005b: 417). WithinSerbia, rather than returns the policy solutionfavoured is naturalization: UNHCR expects therefugee population of 275,000 at end 2004 tohalve through this mechanism, along with therecent closure of 58 refugee camps (UNHCR,2005b: 417). The apparently intractable problemlies with Kosovo, where fewer than 10,000 of the230,000 refugees who fled since 1999 havereturned, and there remain thousands of IDPswithin Kosovo or Serbia (HRW 2004a). Theincreased violence against minorities in Kosovoin March 2004, which created another 4,000IDPs (mainly Kosovar Serbs and Roma), is alsoexplicitly connected with 2,240 Kossovarrefugees in Macedonia (mainly Roma), who aredenied local integration (UNHCR 2005b: 416;HRW, 2003). However, 725 refugees returnedfrom Kosovo to Macedonia in 2004 (UNHCR2005b: 417).Although refugee return to the Balkanregion is a clear policy choice of the EuropeanUnion and its national governments, and the re-integration of ethnic minorities along withstrong legal protection of minority rights is seenas necessary legitimation for post-conflict soci-eties, there remain many unresolved fundamen-tal issues concerning refugee return. RichardBlack and Saskia Gent contribute the concept of“sustainable return”, with a range of factorsdetermining such (Black and Gent, 2004: 17).Similarly, Brad Blitz in his study of returns toCroatia suggests that different historical pathsof refugee flight and return lead to vastly differ-ent outcomes, with five scenarios of returnmigration. In particular, it seems that the major-ity of Serbian returnees are elderly, with a spe-cific type of return — the “return of retirement”(Blitz, 2005: 380). Other scenarios include “reset-tlement as ethnic colonization” (Bosnian Croatswho fled to Croatia), “displaced persons andrefugees returning from Bosnia” (CroatianSerbs who remained and did not flee to Serbiaapparently have had worse treatment), “settle-ment through repossession” (housing reposses-sion through judicial intervention), and a finalcategory of “no return”, where marginalizedformer tenancy holders6 lack support structuresand exist on the margins of Croatian society.Overall, the return of refugees has notundone the realities of ethnic cleansing, and it isnot clear that this should in fact be an objective
of international agencies. One obvious impedi-ment to refugee return has been housing:whereas 93% of claims had been sorted out inBosnia by June 2004 (ECRI 2004a: 14), restitutionof property rights does not mean return. Moreimportant, is the existence of jobs (Philpott,2005: 21). In Croatia, continued discriminationin the labor market and society is seen as one ofthe most outstanding impediments to re-inte-gration: Blitz contrasts the full incorporation ofCroats from Bosnia with the situation of the Ser-bian minority — the former as recipients of gov-ernment grants and aid and displacing Serbianlocal workers (Blitz, 2005: 381). As the Interna-tional Commission on the Balkans points out,multiethnic harmony and re-integration ofrefugees must be achieved at the local level,especially as the result of population move-ments has been to create regional concentra-tions of minority ethnic communities. This isparticularly visible in Macedonia, where localcommunities have become almost ethnicallyhomogenous (ICB, 2005: 32-33). To these reali-ties should be added the phenomenon of mas-sive urbanization, which has occurred acrossthe entire Balkan region: this obscures themeaning of international migration, and addi-tionally makes more spurious the goal ofrefugee returns. It may be that we have more orless reached the end of the road with this policysolution to forced migration in the Balkans.Asylum-seekers continue to be produced bythe Balkan countries, even from Romania andBulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro is now theleading producer of asylum-seekers in industri-alized countries, after massive declines in Rus-sians and Iraqis since 2003, although there is acontinued slow decline in numbers. Bosnia andHercegovina also continues to produce asylum-seekers, and the numbers have been increasingrather than diminishing; Bulgaria too producesrather more asylum-seekers than would beexpected from an EU candidate country, againwith significant increases over the last twoyears. Romania, Macedonia and Albania all con-tinue to produce significant numbers of asylum-seekers, but in continuous decline (UNHCR,2005c: Table 4). Ethnic migrationsThe Balkan region can be characterized as aregion dangerously affected by ethnic conflict,
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with difficult relations between dominantnational majorities and sizable ethnic minorities(Atanasova, 2004: 357). The wide distribution ofdifferent ethnic minorities constitutes not only aproblem of political management by  the state,but is also an issue of diaspora relations impact-ing on a national state’s relations with otherneighbouring states. One author (Tóth, 2003:201) describes the Hungarian diaspora in theBalkan region (in Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslaviaand Romania) as “kin-minorities” connected tothe “kin-state”: clearly inter-state relations areintimately affected by the presence of suchminorities.In the twentieth century, the solutionsfavored for managing the issue of large ethnicminorities have been ‘exchanges of [minority]populations’, forcible [often violent] assimila-tion into a national culture, and toleration ofethnic and regional difference within the broad-er framework of a socialist planned economy.The two Balkan countries outside of the com-munist bloc — Greece and Turkey — relied onthe first two mechanisms. On the other hand,most of the communist bloc in the Balkans andEastern Europe tolerated ethnic difference: theproblems came primarily with collapse of theirregimes, and the open hostility based on ethnic-ity which appeared subsequently.One ethnic group7 which ended up beingneither exchanged, assimilated nor toleratedwas that of the Roma. Although they had bene-fited from special measures in the early post-war communist bloc, and had actually achievedminority status by the 1980s, traditional preju-dices against them emerged and exploded intoviolence after 1989 (Crowe, 2003: 86). This trig-gered a new wave of Romani migrations fleeingpersecution, both in wartime and also from sta-ble countries such as Romania. Thus, Roma con-stituted a massive proportion of asylum-seekersfrom the Balkans over the 1990s, but have notbeen systematically recorded as Roma. In theperiod in the early 1990s of mass Romanian asy-lum-seeking, for example, more than 60% ofthem were Roma (Ethnobarometer, 2004: VII.3).Comparable data for other countries is notavailable, as UNHCR does not record ethnicityas such.Now, with the returns of refugees to Serbiaand other countries of the war-zone, there areserious and unreported issues concerningRoma. The vast majority of recent returnees toSerbia and Montenegro have been Roma(CNGOS, 2005: 16); in May 2005, Germany start-
ed to forcibly return members of certain minor-ity groups from Kosovo — mainly Bosnians,
Ashkali and Turks — whereas Roma and Serbsare spared deportation for the moment (Grupa484, 2005: 21). This has been done despite thewarning of independent observers that Serbia isnot yet a safe place for minorities (HRW 2005).Other than Romani migrations and refugeesfrom war-zones, the principal ethnic migrationsfrom Balkan countries since 1989 consist of thefollowing:
From Romania: emigration of ethnic Hun-garians, Germans and JewsOver the decade of the 1990s, these arerecorded as 105,000 Germans, 37,000 Hungari-ans and 3,000 Jews. Earlier periods saw muchlarger ethnic emigrations, though (Ethnobarom-eter, 2004:VIII). By 2002, the Romanian Censusshowed that only the Hungarians had retaineda significant presence of  just under 1.5m (6.6%,of total population) and almost exclusivelylocated in the region of Transylvania (Ethno-barometer, 2004: IV.4). Ethnic migrations havemore or less ceased since 2000.
From Bulgaria: emigration of ethnic TurksThe first pogrom against Turks began in1984, with a state demand that Turks “Bulgar-ize” their names; it was accompanied by the clo-sure of mosques and outlawing of Muslim reli-gious holidays . Many resisted, with an estimat-ed death toll of 300—1,500 Turks over one year(Crowe, 2000:107) and a reported 1,000 impris-oned (Atanasova, 2004: 364).  This had a knock-on effect for Roma, who were the victims offorced assimilation and violence in the 1980s.In 1989, after blaming ethnic Turks for aseries of bomb attacks, Prime Minister Zhivkovinvited those who “do not feel Bulgarian” toleave Bulgaria. Some 360,000 ethnic Turks left,and after pressure from the West and USSR,Zhivkov was forced to resign (Anagnostou,2005: 91; Warhola and Boteva, 2003). His succes-sors immediately rescinded the effects of thisethnic cleansing, with a l990 law on the restora-tion of Turkish names, which was utilized bysome 600,000 ethnic Turks in 1991 (Atanasova,2004: 364). Another law provided amnesty forvictims of the 1980s assimilation campaign,while two decree-laws and a 1992 law providedrestitution of the housing, property andemployment rights of those who had emigratedto Turkey but subsequently returned. An esti-mated 150,000 returned from Turkey after this
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reversal of policy (Atanasova, 2004: 364). Thus,Bulgaria has effectively escaped what manywestern commentators view as the dictates ofhistory and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans(Anagnostou, 2005), 
From Albania: emigration of ethnic GreeksThe number of ethnic Greeks in Albania was,and remains, highly contested. The range of fig-ures starts at 59,000 in the 1989 Albanian Censusand goes up to 300,000 claimed by the Greekgovernment (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004b: 51). Pet-tifer (2001: 4) gives a figure of 100,000, which isplausible. The number who actually migrated toGreece is also highly problematic to estimate,for several reasons. First, the ethnic Greekmigration was contemporaneous with mass ille-gal migration of ethnic Albanians as temporarylabour in Greece in the 1990s. Secondly, theGreek state did not systematically record thosewho had been given entry visas as ethnicGreeks. Thirdly, there are accounts of Albanianswith different ethnicities (e.g. Vlach) beingencouraged to assume a Greek “identity” andapply for special status, either in the Greek con-sulates or within Greece itself. Thus, by 20048the Greek state had surreptitiously issued some200,000 ‘ethnic Greek identity cards’ (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004c: 3), whilst there did not seem tobe significantly smaller ethnic Greek communi-ties still residing in Albania! It does not appear,therefore, that the ethnic composition of Alba-nia was much altered by the ethnic migration ofGreeks: the emigration of the general Albanianpopulation was much more important.Trafficking of migrants in the BalkansFor some time now, European policy-mak-ers, practitioners and academics have identifieda “Balkan route” for trafficking and/or smug-gling9 of migrants (e.g. Salt and Stein, 1997: 475-7; Budapest Group, 1999; IOM  2001), with clearlinks made between older drug traffickingroutes, their interruption by war and organizedcriminal gangs branching out into people-smuggling and trafficking (Kolakovic et al.,2001: 7-9; Budapest Group, 1999; Lindstrom,2004). Simultaneously, the United Statesembarked upon its global attack on trafficking,issuing an annual report and tiered classifica-tion (using unknown and rather suspect crite-ria) of how well other countries of the worldwere attempting to limit the phenomenon. Their
global estimates of the extent of trafficking start-ed out with a maximum estimate of 4m in 2002,reduced to 800.000 for both 2004 and 2005;again, the mechanism by which these figuresare reached are unknown, and should be treat-ed with extreme suspicion. Alongside methodological problems con-cerning the estimation of the extent of traffick-ing, there remain fundamental definitionalproblems concerning the issues of migration,prostitution and agency (Kelly, 2005:237). Theclear distinction between trafficking and smug-gling which is embodied in the UN protocols isnot so visible in practice, and it would be morecorrect to view them both as part of a continu-um of behaviours, changing over the migrant’sjourney in time and space. Essentially, measure-ments and interpretations of trafficking data arepractitioner-based, and inclined to view all ille-gal migrants as victims without agency, ratherthan as frequently willing participants in com-plex interactions with other persons and/orcriminal organizations in their migratory expe-riences. Yet another deficit is the focus of inter-national organizations on trafficking for sexualexploitation and of children, whilst ignoringother forms of exploitation (Kelly, 2005: 237). In the case of the Balkans, some of the mostdetailed investigation of any region in the worldhas been made since 2000, with research under-taken or financed by the IOM, the Stability Pactfor South Eastern Europe, the ILO, UNICEF andthe OSCE, amongst others. One of the mostauthoritative recent reports identified 6.256 vic-tims between January 2000 and December 2004,with the primary countries of origin as Albania,Moldova and Romania (and to a lesser extent,Bulgaria and Kosovo) and the primary coun-tries of destination or transit as being Croatia,Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro(Surtees, 2005: 12-17). Table 4 reproduces theirsummary data. Over the period 2000-2004, 90% of victimswere from only 5 countries (28% from Albania,26% from Moldova, 17% from Romania, 10%from Bulgaria and 9% from Kosovo). There isalso a significant number from the Ukraine(6%), but from other countries the numbersidentified and assisted are very small indeed.According to an earlier report (for the period2000-2003), first trafficking experiencesoccurred as minors for 65% of Albanians and50%  of Bulgarians, although most were 18-24 atthe time of identification (RCP, 2003: 14). Theidentified trends, confirmed by other recent
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reports (e.g. Rahmani,2005) are of decreasingvisibility or extent of traf-ficking and increased traf-ficking of minors — thelatter, especially withoutcrossing country borders(so-called ‘internal traf-ficking’).According to the Sec-ond RCP Report, around70% of assisted victimsfrom the SEE region (inother words, excludingthose originating fromother countries) are traf-ficked solely for sexualexploitation, along with another 10-20% for amix of sexual services and other employment.Table 5 below shows summary data for forms oftrafficking. Of the small proportion of personstrafficked for labour, begging or delinquency(11%), in some countries such as Albania andKosovo the majority were male and minors(Surtees, 2005: 13). The statistical data presentedfor the SEE region do not show gender or minor
status, but to date no males havebeen assisted as victims of sexu-al exploitation. Within the south east Euro-pean region, it is alleged that90% of foreign women workingin the sex business are victims oftrafficking, with 10-15% underthe age of 18 ((El-Cherkeh et al.,2004: 22). However, more recentreports note that raids on bars(the most prevalent form of anti-trafficking action) are no longerproducing results  and thatmany women offered assistanceas victims of trafficking denythat they are such, and say thatthey are working voluntarily(Limanowska, 2004: 50). Childtrafficking, not only for sexualservices but also for organizedbegging,10 is an increasing prob-lem across the region and alsowithin the EU (IPEC 2005 and2004 country volumes). Howev-er, the limited empirical evi-
dence suggests the following set of characteris-tics:
 ‘victims’ frequently do not see themselvesas such, and often refuse help
 ‘victims’ tend to come from seriouslyunderprivileged backgrounds, and are pre-ponderantly from ethnic minorities,including Roma
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Tableȱ4ȱ
Numberȱofȱidentifiedȱandȱassistedȱtraffickingȱvictimsȱ2000Ȭ04,ȱStabilityȱPactȱ
Countryȱofȱoriginȱȱ
ofȱvictimȱ 2000ȱ 2001ȱ 2002ȱ 2003ȱ 2004ȱ Totalȱ
Albaniaȱȱ 219ȱ 445ȱ 375ȱ 345ȱ 366ȱ 1,750ȱ
Moldovaȱ 319ȱ 382ȱ 329ȱ 313ȱ 300ȱ 1,643ȱ
Romaniaȱ 163ȱ 261ȱ 243ȱ 194ȱ 193ȱ 1,054ȱ
Bulgariaȱ 46ȱ 96ȱ 164ȱ 172ȱ 143ȱ 621ȱ
Kosovo,ȱProvinceȱofȱ 54ȱ 67ȱ 165ȱ 192ȱ 90ȱ 568ȱ
BiHȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 8ȱ 17ȱ 39ȱ 54ȱ
Serbiaȱ 0ȱ 1ȱ 10ȱ 13ȱ 21ȱ 45ȱ
Croatiaȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 1ȱ 1ȱ 6ȱ 8ȱ
Montenegroȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 2ȱ 3ȱ 5ȱ 10ȱ
fyRoȱMacedoniaȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 14ȱ 12ȱ 26ȱ
SEEȱcountriesȱsubtotalȱ 801ȱ 1,252ȱ 1,297ȱ 1,264ȱ 1,165ȱ 5,779ȱ
Ukraineȱ 68ȱ 97ȱ 104ȱ 47ȱ 41ȱ 357ȱ
Russiaȱ 7ȱ 22ȱ 21ȱ 5ȱ 4ȱ 59ȱ
Belarusȱ 8ȱ 9ȱ 1ȱ 2ȱ 1ȱ 21ȱ
Georgiaȱ 0ȱ 3ȱ 2ȱ 0ȱ 2ȱ 7ȱ
Otherȱȱ 3ȱ 0ȱ 5ȱ 11ȱ 14ȱ 33ȱ
Otherȱcountriesȱsubtotalȱ 86ȱ 131ȱ 133ȱ 65ȱ 62ȱ 477ȱ
Totalȱnumbersȱofȱvictimsȱ
traffickedȱinto,ȱviaȱorȱfromȱ
SouthȱEasternȱEuropeȱ
887ȱ 1,383ȱ 1,430ȱ 1,329ȱ 1,227ȱ 6,256ȱ
SOURCE:ȱSurteesȱ(2005:ȱ31Ȭ32)ȱ
Tableȱ5ȱ
FormsȱofȱtraffickingȱamongȱassistedȱSEEȱnationals,ȱ2003ȱandȱ2004ȱ
2003ȱ 2004ȱ
FORMȱOFȱTRAFFICKINGȱ
Nȱ %ȱ Nȱ %ȱ
Sexualȱexploitationȱ 824ȱ 65.2ȱ 864ȱ 74.2ȱ
Labourȱ 91ȱ 7.2ȱ 48ȱ 4.1ȱ
Beggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 51ȱ 4.0ȱ 75ȱ 6.4ȱ
Adoptionȱ 0ȱ ȱ 9ȱ 0.8ȱ
Sexualȱexploitationȱandȱlabourȱ 245ȱ 19.4ȱ 97ȱ 8.3ȱ
Sexualȱexploitation,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 10ȱ 0.8ȱ 27ȱ 2.3ȱ
Labour,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 11ȱ 0.9ȱ 2ȱ 0.2ȱ
Sexualȱexploitation,ȱlabour,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 1ȱ 0.1ȱ 0ȱ ȱ
Potentialȱvictimsȱ 31ȱ 2.5ȱ 43ȱ 3.7ȱ
TOTALȱ 1,254ȱ ȱ 1,164ȱ ȱ
SOURCE:ȱSurteesȱ(2005:ȱ33)ȱ
 ‘victims’ tend to be very young, and thetrend is increasing for minors
 the crossing of borders is not a necessarypart of trafficking
 sexual exploitation is not a necessary partof traffickingIn conclusion, we should note that the num-ber of persons identified by the Regional Clear-ing Point is very small relative to the extent ofmigration in the region (both voluntary andforced) and raises serious questions about thereal significance of the phenomenon of traffick-ing in the Balkans. The RCP Report itself notesthat it is only a standardized record of assis-tance, and there is no way of estimating theactual extent of trafficking: furthermore, highnumbers of assisted victims in a particularcountry may reflect pro-active policy to tacklethe phenomenon, rather than the existence of agreater problem than elsewhere (Surtees,2005:25). Trafficking and prostitution are large-ly demand-driven, and extremely problematicand extensive in UN-managed Kosovo, as wellas associated with supply side social and familyproblems in the countries of the region. Further-more, little if any evidence has been adduced toshow that trafficking is big business in theBalkans: rather, the evidence suggests that it is acottage industry (Nicholson, 2002: 4). This, com-bined with the increasing phenomenon of“internal trafficking”, might lead us to concludethat this is a problem of social policy, which hasdeveloped to extend beyond national borders. Thus, trafficking is not per se an issue ofmigration, but rather one of economic survivalstrategies on the part of both traffickers andthose being trafficked or smuggled; on the otherhand, the demand side of prostitution, cheaplabor and organized street begging is a signifi-cant socio-economic problem not only in theBalkans but also across Europe. These twoaspects –the supply side of underdevelopmentand unequal income distribution, and thedemand for sexual services, forced labor andinformal employment in EU countries and else-where — might be more appropriate foci forgovernment policies.Temporary or incomplete migrationsAlso known as circular migrations, these aretypical of voluntary population movementsfrom the CEE region since 1989 (Kaczmarczyk
and Okoloski, 2005: 18). They have two definingcharacteristics:  they are predominantly irregu-lar, with employment in the shadow economy;they do not conform to the definition of migra-tion. This ‘incomplete migration’ appears to beextensive in the CEE region, with very largenumbers participating, and mainly involvingsemi-skilled and unskilled persons. Owing to itsclandestine character, data and interpretation ofnumbers are highly questionable and problem-atic. In the Balkan region, three countries arepredominantly involved with this migrationtype — Albania, Romania and Bulgaria.The 1990s Albanian migrations to Greeceand Italy were clearly of this type, even if themass deportations by the Greek state constitut-ed a peculiar variant of the return strategy(Reyneri, 2001). Subsequent to the first Greeklegalization campaign, and after a legal opinionfrom the Ombudsman denouncing the deporta-tions as unlawful, Albanians found it increas-ingly difficult to engage in circular migration.With tighter and more aggressive, even violent,border controls, alongside the Greek state’sinsistence on full-time social insurance contri-butions for legal residence, by the early 2000sAlbanians living in Greece had adopted a typi-cal strategy of permanent settlement (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004b: 62). The early migrations hadbeen undertaken by men, later to be joined bytheir wives and children: after the 2001 immi-gration law, some 67,000 permits for familyreunification were given by the Greek state(Baldwin-Edwards, 2004c: Table 2). By 2004,official records indicated just over 400,000 adultAlbanians, up to 100,000 schoolchildren, andsome 200,000 classed as ethnic Greeks: althoughsome of these may have returned to Albania ormoved to Italy, there is no evidence to suggestthat this was in large numbers. Thus, Greekgovernment policy — by reinforcing the borderwith Albania — managed to change temporarymigration into permanent settlement for thegreat majority of Albanian migrants. In Italy, asimilar pattern has been noted, with a high pro-portion of Albanians taking Italian citizen-ship.11 By end 2004, ISTAT12 had recorded317,000 Albanians with residence permits, mak-ing them the leading immigrant nationality inItaly.The situation pertaining to Romanians andBulgarians is rather different from Albanians.This is not because of any massive difference instrategy by those migrants, nor because of dif-ferent treatment by receiving countries. It is,
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rather, the unintended outcome of the gradualincorporation of these two countries into the EUand Schengen regime. In the case of Romania,although circular migration had existed in thelate 1990s, primarily to Italy, it was with theremoval of the Schengen visa requirement in2002 that circular migration of Romanians as‘false tourists’ really took off. Travelling legallyunder 3-month Schengen tourism provisions, a2005 survey shows that around 9% of house-holds have one member abroad at any one time(around 850,000 people). Their destinations areprincipally Italy and Spain, with reports fromItaly of up to 2.5 million Romanians there, or(from Romanian authorities) of 1.4m in bothSpain and Italy. These extraordinarily highnumbers arise, as I show elsewhere (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006) from flawed interpretation ofinformation caused by imposing a traditionalview of migration on the complex and well-cho-reographed circular migration patterns. Thus,although many Romanians — up to 15% of theadult population — have participated in migra-tion, at any one time there is not such a largenumber abroad. The latest data show 249,000Romanians with permits in Italy, and 175,000 inSpain. There is also limited legal temporarylabor migration — primarily to Germany, butalso to Italy and Spain. Available data suggestthat this is well under 100,000 in total, per year(Baldwin-Edwards, 2006).
Bulgarian temporary migration has targetedGreece, Italy and Spain — but without the visi-bility of either Albanian or Romanian migra-tion. Furthermore, there is no consensus on theextent of emigration in recent years: one reportsuggests that it increased after 2001 when theSchengen visa requirement was removed(OECD-SOPEMI 2005: 165) whilst anotherclaims a stabilization over recent years (Belevaand Minev, 2005). A 2001 IOM survey suggeststhat the primary destinations for Bulgarian sea-sonal work at that time were Greece, Spain,Italy, Germany and the Netherlands (Guentche-va et al., 2003: 5). Unlike Romanians, whomigrated to Germany in large numbers as eth-nic Germans and also as contract workers, Bul-garians hardly appear in German immigrationdata. In southern Europe, Bulgarians are morevisible: from residence permit data, they consti-tute the second largest nationality in Greece (at59,000), and some 2% of the immigrant popula-tion in Spain (52,000), although have only asmall presence in Italy at 15,000. Given thatmany Bulgarian migrants are female andemployed as housekeepers, it is likely that theirillegal employment is considerably higher thanthe official data suggest. There is, however, aserious information deficit on temporary migra-tion movements of Bulgarian economicmigrants, compounded by their ease of travelwithin the Schengen zone.
Despite massive problems with data, it ispossible to discern some clear trends. First, theflight of refugees from the region has more orless stopped, with the partial exception of Serbiaand Montenegro. The continued asylum-seek-ing from the Balkans appear to be mainly byRoma, although there are no hard data, and thenumbers from Serbia — around 15,000 for 2000— are openly criticized by the European Com-mission (Frattini, 2005).Secondly, the issue of refugee returns is actu-ally dominating the scene, with serious issuesabout who is forcibly returned to where, and thereception and nature of voluntary returns. Evenfor candidate country Croatia, the EuropeanCommission has worries concerning returns tothat country; however, the Sarajevo Declarationof January 2005 committed Bosnia-Hercegov-
ina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro toresolve the issue of returns before the end of2006.Thirdly, ethnic migration looks like a phe-nomenon of the early 1990s, with the break-upof communist states. It has largely discontinued,although again there is a question mark aboutthe situation of the Roma. There is also a poten-tial, or actual, issue of asylum applications con-stituting the only route for unskilled or semi-skilled labour migration to the West; it is impos-sible to clarify to what extent this may haveoccurred, given the arbitrary way in whichsome EU countries evaluate asylum claims.Thirdly, trafficking figures for the regionshow a continuous decline: already small num-bers are getting smaller. Trafficking, illegalmigration and migration for employment have
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been hardly visible for most opf the formerYugoslavia, owing to their invisibility in thecontext of forced migrations.Fourthly, incomplete or circular migrationseems ultimately to have been an option foronly two Balkan countries — Romania and Bul-garia. The result of tighter border controls andthe Schengen zone has been to effect a two-tierstatus for border crossing — candidate countryor non-candidate country. Although intendedonly for tourism, the Schengen arrangementshave had a predictably aggravating impact onthe informal economies of Europe — particular-ly those of southern Europe.Several issues have not been explicitlyaddressed so far, and deserve mention. Immi-gration into, and transit migration through, theBalkans have been a continuous matter of con-cern by EU countries. This issue is also partlylinked with trafficking, but it is really only fromthe Ukraine that there is any evidence of a prob-lem. Data on immigration into the region are ofvery low quality, primarily because most of it isillegal. Information from Romania and Bulgariasuggests that it consists primarily of migrantsfrom within the CEE region, from CIS countries,and asylum-seekers and illegal migrants fromAsia. Numbers appear to be low, despite peri-odic hysteria in Western Europe about hordes ofChinese preparing to ‘invade’ Europe.One of the clear achievements in the regionsince the early 1990s has been the moderniza-tion and increased effectiveness of border con-trols, primarily achieved with EU moneys andexpertise. Information provided by ICMPD andothers suggests a fairly unambiguous improve-ment in border management, as shown byapprehension statistics (Futo et al., 2005). How-ever, as all countries of the region stabilize, itcan be expected that all types of voluntary
migration will increase — especially in the con-text of mass unemployment and poor qualityemployment.The ‘brain drain’ issue is one which certainBalkan countries worry over, most obviouslyCroatia. Although there clearly has been an exo-dus of skilled personnel, mass emigration fromthe Balkans has represented all sectors of socie-ty and arguably over-represented the lower-skilled. The primary issue is not how to dealwith past emigration, but how to encourage andfully incorporate possible returning migrantsinto modern economies. There is, so far, littleevidence that focused strategies are being devel-oped to address this issue; furthermore, the EUhas provided no guidance or incentives for bet-ter labor market and migration management. Alegalistic obsession with adaptation to the acquis
communautaire has dominated both financingand formal relations with potential and actualcandidate countries — to the detriment of otherfunctional economic issues (Baldwin-Edwards,2006).Thus, the Balkan region is rapidly becomingmore typical of semi-peripheral economies,with an increasing tendency for temporarylabor emigration and also attraction of smallnumbers of asylum-seekers — the latter, partic-ularly as legal systems adopt modern asylumlaws in line with the EU acquis. However, forthose countries not on the Schengen “whitelist”, the Schengen wall is almost as great a bar-rier as the former Iron Curtain, and excludeswhole generations in countries with pro-Euro-pean visions and aspirations for EU member-ship. There is an imperative for the EU to reformand adapt, as well as for the Balkan countries:this message is rarely heard within Europeanpolitical discourse.
Anagnostou, D. (2005): ‘Nationalist legacies andEuropean trajectories: post-communist liberalizationand Turkish minority politics in Bulgaria’, Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, 5/1Atanasova. I. N. (2004): ‘Transborder ethnicminorities and their impact on the security of south-eastern Europe’, Nationalities Paper, 32/2Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2006): ‘Migration policiesfor a Romania within the EU: navigating between
Scylla and Charybdis’, in G. Silasi and O. Simina(eds.): Migration, Asylum and Human Rights at the East-
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Notes
1 For the purposes of this paper, I follow the policy of the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB, 2005) and classify aswestern Balkans the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia andMontenegro. To these must be added the eastern Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. Since Turkey occupiesa very special and prominent place in relation to both migrations and the EU, I do not include it in this geopolitical scheme.2 Own calculation, using census data 2002 and births/deaths published in Constantin (2004:37).3 Internally displaced persons4 I am indebted to Beryl Nicholson for her astute comments on Albanian emigration and census figures, which also apply toalmost all voluntary migrations in the region.5 At end 2004, Serbia was ranked third in the world by UNHCR for its refugee to population ratio. 6 See HRW (2004b) for the landmark ECHR ruling which determined that tenancy rights to socially-owned property were ter-minated by war, thereby removing the property rights of all refugees from Croatia, who had occupied social housing inCroatia.7 There is much controversy about the existence (or not) of different Romani groups — including Egyptian Roma and Ashkali.See Marushiakova and Popov (2003) for clarification.8 By the end of 2005, the author was receiving reports that the Greek state had surreptitiously withdrawn or not renewed these3-year cards, and was threatening to deport those who could not prove their Greek heritage. 9 For the distinction, which increasingly is being questioned, see the UN protocols on trafficking and smuggling.10 See TDH (2003) for detailed research on Albanian children trafficked into Greece 11 This option is denied them in Greece, even for ethnic Greeks. Masked as a “problem” with Albania’s refusal to permit dualnationality, it is clearly a political strategy to retain a Greek presence in Albania.12 http://demo.istat.it/

The year 2006 has been designated as work-ers’ mobility year. This ‘move’ aims at raisingawareness and increasing understanding of — as it has been put — the benefits of both work-ing abroad and in a new occupation.1 Workingin new countries and/or sectors — it is claimed
Workers’ Mobility’: Europe’s Integration and SecondThoughts
Dr. Peter van KriekenInternational Law and Human Rights, Webster University, LeidenUNDP Chief Technical Advisor with the Lao PDR Ministry ofForeign Affairs in Vientiane, Laos
This contribution focuses on following four relationships(1) labour and capital . Moving labour may amount to a falsification of a market economy. Labour migration is of ben-efit in only very few cases (like that of highly skilled, innovation-prone experts). Most studies now explicitly deny bene-fits or, at best, doubt whether there are any benefits to labour-related migratory movements.(2) migration and social welfare policy. What is needed is a thorough review of the various social benefits systemsand its possible impact on migratory movements, be they intra-European or from third countries altogether. It is sub-mitted that before migration is offered as a release to many needy labour-markets, those markets should first come toterms with the need to re-power their unemployed, re-train them and gear them to full participation, before going for theeasy solution of depriving other countries of their potential. Moreover, free movement of labour is only possible with aflexible social welfare system in place, more geared towards the realities of the labour market and the need for Europeto remain/become competitative.(3) globalization and migration. It is argued that in the case of migrants staying at home, all parties might be betteroff — the individuals as well as the countries of origin and destination. This is because the transfer of industries, agri-culture and back-office jobs to low income or more productive countries would be much speedier, which ultimately sub-stantially benefits the global economic development. It is about moving capital, rather than moving people.(4) the impact of migration and the receiving community/society. This issue is related to the economic and societalconcept of trust, one of the key elements that should be taken into account whenever a migration policy is formulated orwhenever the possible positive or negative outcome of migration is being debated. Economies tend to boom on the basisof trust. Migration does not necessarily add to 'trust' , and may hence have a negative impact on growth.
Keywords: migration, welfare policy, globalization, European Union
— often provides workers with new skills andexperiences, benefiting both them and theiremployers. Current figures show that very fewEuropeans work abroad. The percentage ofEuropeans residing in an EU country other thantheir country of origin has consistentlyremained at around a mere 1.5% for the last 30years. And in 9 countries of the EU15, 40% ofworkers have remained in the same job for over10 years.2At first sight, focusing on workers’ mobilitylooks like a brilliant idea. It promotes the idea ofthe European house in which we move freelyand happily. It is about meeting with fellowEuropeans, meeting with complementary skills.Yet, looking into the issue more carefully shouldalso give rise to some second thoughts.Thoughts about individual well-being, aboutthe dialectics between labour and capital, aboutthe loss of human capital as migrant workersoften work in positions below their actual pro-fessional level (the engineer as taxi-driver, theprimary school teacher as orange-picker).3Regard should also be had to the social welfaresystem and the need to make ends meet. Butabove all, the idea behind moving workersaround is also about the challenge of a decreas-ing European population and the urge tobecome a fair partner in the globalizationprocess. It is, indirectly, also about the (non-)admission of migrant workers from outside theEU.The European Union focuses on the freedomof movement, — movement of goods, capital,services and, indeed, individuals. The EU15were on the way to accomplish these lofty ideasto some significant extent. Remarkably, the 15have given mixed signals as to the acceptance oflabour from the new member states. Hithertoonly Sweden has allowed unrestricted access to
its labour markets to the eight central and east-ern European countries that joined the EU inMay 2004. Several others have opened theirmarkets with restrictions on the number ofworkers (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu-gal), or on the benefits they can claim (UK, Ire-land). Belgium, Finland, Germany, France,Greece, Spain and Luxembourg have opted fora ‘transitional period’.4 A number of countries(Finland, Spain) are preparing to lift the restric-tions. Belgium and Portugal are also thought tobe debating the issue, but Austria and Germanyare expected to extend the restrictions (a quotasystem of sorts). Question-marks remain as toFrance’s and Luxembourg’s position.5At the same time, migrant workers from out-side the Union who have obtained a long-termresidence status in any EU15 country would beallowed to move freely under the Directiveagreed upon on the status of long term resi-dents. Such a long-term resident (a third coun-try national who has resided legally and contin-uously within its territory for five years- art.4.1), may reside in the territory of an EU MSother than the one that granted long-term statuson the following grounds: (a) the exercise of aneconomic activity in an employed or self-employed capacity; (b) the pursuit of studies orvocational training; (c) other purposes.6 Itwould appear that some review may be neces-sary as third country nationals now wouldappear to enjoy more freedoms than the fellowEU citizens from the new Member States.This contribution, therefore, focuses on fol-lowing four relationships1) labour and capital2) migration and social welfare policy3) globalization and migration4) the impact of migration and the receivingcommunity/society. 
As a matter of principle regard should behad to one of the overriding principles as laiddown in the preamble of one of the relevant ILOconventions. In this preamble, the need wasemphasized “...to avoid the excessive and uncon-
trolled or unassisted increase of migratory move-
ments because of their negative social and human
consequences, and considering that in order to over-
come underdevelopment and structural and chronic
unemployment, the governments of many countries
increasingly stress the desirability of encouraging
the transfer of capital and technology, rather than the
transfer of workers in accordance with the needs and
requests of these countries in the reciprocal interest of
the countries of origin and the countries of employ-
ment...”.This text is not new. It is taken from the 1975ILO Labour Migration Convention (C143), and
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1. Labour and Capital
it is herewith submitted that this text is not justvalid for relationships between Europe and theThird World, but is, most probably, also true forthe relation ship between the EU15 and the newMember States. Moving labour may amount to a falsificationof a market economy. Economists will submitthat labour is just one part of the means of pro-duction and the free movement of labour is inclu-sive in the globalization and EU-build-up, maybeas much as a condition for the proper functioningof a world-wide economy. Yet, economists tendto concentrate on the work, the production perse, and they conveniently forget that workamounts to only some 18-22% of the labourer’stime. The remainder goes to commuting, sleep,recreation, religion, social and/or political activi-ties. The same way the world’s economy wasshocked/surprised by the HDI, the human devel-opment index, an index that focused on the com-munity’s well-being, rather than the cold, anony-mous production and GDP figures, the world of
labour migration is also in need of a migrant /receiving community index. Such an indexshould include production, language skills, inte-gration, social, religious and politicaltension/well-being as well as the effect of themigratory movement on the community of ori-gin (brain-drain, broken marriages, remittances,holiday-behaviour, etc.). What we will mostprobably observe is that labour migration is ofbenefit in only very few cases (like that of highlyskilled, innovation-prone experts who truly havesome added value to offer). Most studies nowexplicitly deny benefits or, at best, doubt whetherthere are any benefits to labour-related migrato-ry movements. It is on the basis of these argu-ments (labour/capital; loss of human capital;costs to the community) that the 2006 workers’mobility equation deserves to be re-thought. TheCommission refers to increased awareness andunderstanding of the benefits of both workingabroad and in a new occupation. A lot dependson the meaning of the word ‘benefits’.
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In early May 2004, a conference on ‘Co-ordi-nation of Social Security in an Enlarged Europe’focused on a new employment regulation,under which unemployed people will be able toseek work in another EU country much moreeasily by ‘exporting’ their social welfare entitle-ments. Member states may allow unemployedpeople to bring their social welfare entitlementsfrom their home country to the EU countrywhere they are seeking work. This is an impor-tant piece of social legislation and it should havean impact on the employment, unemploymentand intra-European migratory movements, aswell as migration from third countries. This reg-ulation protects the social security rights of peo-ple who move, for whatever reason, private orprofessional, from one Member state to another.If the fight against unemployment is indeedconsidered to be a priority for the Union, thisnew regulation represents a major achievement.Of great relevance in this context is the levelof social services being provided in comparisonwith minimum salaries. In some countries (Den-mark, Germany, the Netherlands) the incentiveto actively look for a job is quite minimal as theunemployment benefits are sometimes as high,or even higher, than the salary of the job one
might be capable to perform. Moreover, manyable-bodied were removed from the labour mar-ket as ‘incapables’ under most generous inabili-ty screening cum benefits. Some European coun-tries enjoyed low unemployment figures, onlybecause they had such high ‘disability-‘figures.It took those countries almost a generation (thatis: over 20 years) to redress some of the illsinvolved.7 With or without the number of dis-ability-benefits receivers who, upon carefulscrutiny might be able, under certain conditions,to re-enter the labour market, the total numberof unemployed amounts to close to 10% (officialunemployment figure for the EU15 has nowdecreased to 8.5%). That means that in principlea great many unemployed should be availablefor many of the jobs now being offered to legalor illegal, regular or irregular immigrants.What is needed is a thorough review of thevarious social benefits systems and its possibleimpact on migratory movements, be they intra-European or from third countries altogether. Itis herewith submitted that before migration isoffered as a release to many needy labour-mar-kets, those markets should first come to termswith the need to re-power their unemployed, re-train them and gear them to full participation,
2. Migration and Social Welfare
before going for the easy solution of deprivingother countries of their potential.Apart from the impact of social welfare onthe participation in the labour market (yes, par-ticipation of men and women alike can bemanipulated), it is also of relevance to look intothe issue of access of fellow-Europeans or evenlong-term third-country nationals to the nation-al social welfare systems. As can now be sub-mitted, European borders are to a great extentdetermined by access to the social welfareoffice.In this respect it is to be noted that long-term(third-country) residents shall enjoy equal treat-ment with nationals as regards social security,
social assistance, and social protection as defined by
national law (art.11.1.d of the above quotedDirective). Art. 21 states that as soon as third-country long-term residents have received a res-idence permit in a second Member State, theytoo shall enjoy the benefits as defined underart.11.1.d. This amounts to a remarkably gener-ous approach, particularly in the light of thepresent restrictive approaches to citizens of thenew Member States themselves. Indeed, socialwelfare systems deserve a complete make-over,reflecting on the one hand community-member-ship and the place of work, and on the otherhand the public/private aspects of any socialsecurity insurance. In fact, once every EU-citi-zen has his/her own private social securityarrangement with either a public entity or a pri-vate insurance company, the place of work andthe risk of becoming unemployed is no longer ofgreat relevance: the person concerned will becovered, one way or another on the terms
he/she agreed upon with the provider of theinsurances. Many unemployment schemes allow theunemployed to enjoy benefits until they find ajob on their very own level. The present authorfails to understand why a former civil servant oruniversity lecturer should not be consideredable to work as a guard or a janitor. Of course,he or she may sign up to an unemploymentinsurance to prevent him/her to take up such ajob, but that then becomes a private matterbetween the insurer and the insured (and thecosts may be staggering of not prohibitive). A similar re-think needs to be carriedthrough for health insurances and pensionarrangements. Health insurances should partlyremain in the ‘public’ domain, as far as the pro-vision of minimum benefits is concerned,because the community as a whole has a utili-tarian interest in the health of its fellow com-munity-members. Everything over and abovethe minimum treatment should be a privatematter between the insurer and the insured. Asto migrant workers, it does not make a differ-ence where exactly the insurer holds office.Likewise, employers and employees should beentitled to verse funds in a foreign pension fundfor any EU employee, thereby assisting towardscreating a true European (pension-)market.Yet, the argument presented here is that freemovement of labour is only possible with a flexi-ble social welfare system in place, more gearedtowards the realities of the labour market and theneed for Europe to remain/become competitive.
Europe has during the last two centuriesmoved from mainly agriculture to manufactur-ing and to service industries. Today, thanks toeffective communication and transportation,most production can take place on far-awayshores. What is needed nearby are health, edu-cation, infrastructure and retail. Infrastructureentails construction (roads, offices, housing) butalso communication (trains, aircraft, cars, tele-com) and general upkeep (repairs, cleaning). Ofthe four mentioned here, health and educationare least prone to productivity increases. This
needs to be taken into account, also in view ofthe ageing debate.Coleman (Oxford) submitted at the Cairo+10UNECE/UNFPA Conference (Geneva, January2004) that there is no ‘solution’ to an ageingpopulation short of a return to much higherrates of population growth or mass age-specificeuthanasia. The problem is that the effect is notvery great and immigration is an inefficient wayof achieving this end. Immigrants themselvesage and the country then requires more immi-grants, as it were, to replace their number.
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Immigration cannot solve the problems of pop-ulation ageing except at rates of immigration sohigh that they would generate economicallyand environmentally unsustainable populationgrowth rates and permanently and radicallychange the cultural and ethnic composition ofthe host population. The population size conse-quent on the migration needed to preserve thecurrent potential in the UK would double to 120million by 2050 because the UK would beimporting 1.2 million persons per year. By 2100,up to five million new immigrants would beneeded every year and the UK populationwould have risen to 312 million.9Of course, the retirement challenge needs tobe addressed. Now that most experts agree thatmigration is not the answer, consideration mustbe given to (a) working up to the age of 65, 67 oreven 70; (b) working longer hours (40 instead of36); (c) salary decreases beyond the age of 55,possibly combined with less work (e.g. a 66%salary for a four-day working week, or a 50%salary for a three-day working week).10 MostEuropean Governments have understood themessage. The Trade Unions, however, generallyobject. It is worth explaining that non-migrationwould ultimately improve the salaries and sta-tus of their members.Apart from the idea that bigger populationsmeans more power (presumably through largerarmed forces or a stronger economy), there is inprinciple nothing wrong with decreasing popu-lations. Of course, people want to become rich-er, and the fear is justified that with less ‘pro-ducers’ less products will be on the market. It isthen forgotten that productivity has increasedsteadily over the last 500 years or so, and thereis no reason to suspect that productivity wouldsuddenly stop doing so. Yet, two important con-ditions then need to be met: (i) sufficient cre-ative and innovative engineering capabilitiesare to be available to replace labour with capital,that is to introduce new machineries; and (ii)qualified managers must introduce better pro-cessing and must continuously streamline pro-cedures. Innovation is the key word, andEurope should invest heavily in ensuring thatthe replacement of labour by capital will remaina major option. Subject to that conditiondecreasing populations might still enjoy grow-ing productivity. If only ‘space’ were not such ascarce commodity.11Alternatively, it should be appreciated that ayearly increase in a population by a mere 1%will result in doubling the population in 72
years. For Europe that would mean that by 2100the EU-25 will have one billion inhabitants andthat the global population will reach the 25 bil-lion mark by 2150. That having been stated, it is a fact thathealth and education are economic activitiesthat are not easily submitted to increased pro-ductivity ideas. Yet, most of Europe managed tospend additional funds for exactly health andeducation on – in my eyes non-productive –middle management. The percentage of ‘handsat the bed’ in hospitals as well as ‘teaching thepupils’ at schools have disturbingly changedover the last decades. If a revolution would beneeded these days, it should be about giving thehospitals back top the physicians and theschools back to the teachers.Moving agriculture, manufacturing andeven, for instance, back-office jobs to countriesoutside of Europe creates win/win situations.Subsidies should be considered as the scourgeof any international economic system. Thiscomes and goes at the cost of the economies ofmany developing or less developed countries.Countries that should be able to export theirproducts are now forced to export their work-force. It is about tomatoes, not about the toma-to-picker. Or, in other words, should the peoplemove to where the capital is, or, rather, shouldcapital move to where the people are? The recent Brazil/WTO case (on subsidies paidto U.S. cotton farmers) is of the utmost impor-tance in this respect. More than ever, the migra-tion ‘lobby’ should display an interest in suchcases as it should in the subsidy issue at large. Inthe absence of subsidies, more producers willmove production to low-income ‘good weather’countries. This is already true for the Dutchflower industry, an industry without subsidies,and perfectly suitable to make use of the global-ization processes, thereby benefiting producers,labour and consumers all at the same time.As for manufacturing it can be submittedthat once a manufacturer has reached the mar-gins of profit, and is e.g. faced with labourerswho demand an increase in salary, three alter-natives are available:— by hiring migrant labour (including ille-gals) the manufacturer can avoid thedemand/supply reality and can continueprofitable production, thanks to relativelylow labour costs;— by replacing labour with capital, the man-ufacturer can make a sound long-term
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investment, making use of the availableinnovation possibilities (thereby also pro-moting investments in innovative think-ing at large);— in the end the manufacturer can move thesite of manufacturing to a low-labour-costcountry.Of the three alternatives, the first is by far theworst scenario as it delays the introduction ofinnovative processes and procedures andbecause it delays moving the site by a couple ofyears, at the cost of the consumer. The introduc-tion of innovative ideas or machinery benefitsall, and the transfer of production is an obviousblessing for Third World economies as well aslow-cost Eastern European countries.12.It is probably even more surprising to learnthat also moving so-called back-office activities(keeping files, administration, accounting,auditing) to low income countries can be a veryprofitable exercise, that is: profitable to all. TheEconomist, in its 13 December 2003 issue, calcu-lated that the transfer of 1 dollar worth of backoffice work from the USA to India would giveIndia 33 dollar cents and the USA no less than$1.12, making a total profit of 45%. This, itshould be added, includes re-employment.13It is a well known yet staggering fact that thetotal of ODA (Official Development Assistance)covers a mere 35% of the total losses incurred byThird World countries because of those coun-tries not being able to export products to theNorth/West as a result of tariffs and otherexport/import hindrances. It should then beadded that the OECD has allowed the receptioncosts of asylum seekers who have come to theNorth/West to be considered as part of theODA. It could hence be argued that many coun-tries would be better off without developmentaid, but with their products having access to themarkets of the North/West.More research needs to be done into thealternative to non-migration. It is hereby sub-mitted that in the case of migrants staying athome, all parties might be better off — the indi-viduals as well as the countries of origin anddestination. This is because the transfer ofindustries, agriculture and back-office jobs tolow income or more productive countrieswould be much speedier, which ultimately sub-stantially benefits the global economic develop-ment. It is about moving capital, rather thanmoving people.The migration lobby, however, is increasing-ly focused on a new aspect that, in their views,
would justify migration: remittances. Even theWorld Bank appears to subscribe to the idea thatremittances represent a significant positive eco-nomic feature. Migrants provide huge flows ofremittances to their countries of origin, amount-ing to an estimated US$ 90 billion annually, orthe second largest source of external funding fordeveloping countries. However, the total lossesseem to become lost in the debate. Referenceshould be made to: (a) the use of the funds con-cerned; (b) the durability of those transfers; and(c) the impact of ‘dual loyalty’ on integrationand related processes (the loss of human capitalalready having been touched upon herein-above).a) Many of the funds made available throughremittances are used for consumption (cars, lux-ury goods, housing), often as part of a second-ary pension fund. Of course, more often thannot, the local economy benefits, but in someareas remittances used for the construction ofhousing often results in an increase in construc-tion costs, which in turn disadvantages thosewho do not have migrants in their family.b) The durability is questionable. Those whodo not marry someone from the samearea/country are not necessarily tempted toinvest in the country of origin of just one part-ner; often emphasis on educating the childrenresults in changing saving-patterns. In otherwords, the sustainability greatly depends onnewcomers, on ongoing migratory patterns.Once no new migrants are forthcoming, remit-tances are bound to decrease. It would be surre-alistic to insist on ongoing migration for thesake of remittances.c) The idea behind remittances portrays anongoing link between the migrant and the coun-try of origin. In the case of permanent migration(different from temporary migration) thiswould be contrary to an all-integrationapproach, whereby the migrant focuses for thefull 100% on the country of residence. It couldhence be argued that supporting the transfer ofsavings to the country of origin rather thaninvesting in the country of destination would becounterproductive to the all-integration-approach — although no results are availablefrom research – if any – into this linkage.What remains to be done in situ, on location,is mainly limited to education, health, retail andinfrastructure. The latter includes construction,communication and maintenance. Indeed,many of the jobs involved are the heavy anddirty ones, positions now often filled by
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migrants, legal and illegal. This is the case inspite of the significant unemployment rates inEurope as a whole. As usual, market mecha-nisms should be allowed to play its role. Thatmeans on the one hand that salaries for thesejobs need to be appealing, but also that socialwelfare benefits need to be at such a level thatactual work always acts as an incentive. 
In migratory circles it is well known that asalary difference of 30% and more will triggermigration. It could be submitted that the differ-ence between benefits and salaries should alsobe in the 30% range to make an impact on theindividual decision-making process.
The balance between nationals and fellow-Europeans on the one hand, and Europeans andnon-Europeans on the other is a most sensitive,even dangerous issue. Non-discriminationstands central whenever one deals with peoplewith a different background. Yet, the eyesshould not be closed to the realities of the ten-sion so often apparent in the Paris ‘banlieu’, theBritish Midlands, or Berlin Kreuzberg. Migration is more often than not lookedupon as result of external pressure: (1) econom-ics/ecology, (2) war, (3) persecution/repressionand (4) demography can all be causes for migra-tory movements. It is also of importance toemphasize that these four main causes are inter-related: war has an impact on the economy;demographic developments may have animpact on the ecological balance, and so on.Moreover, there is no need to explain that agloomy economic situation may result in ten-sions between the population at large and theauthorities, resulting in repression, or that afight on the control of certain natural resourcesmay result in war. It is also clear that an increas-ing population may put pressure on economicdevelopments (a 3% population increase wouldneed to be off-set by a 7% increase in GDP).Fairly new is the confirmation of the correlationof the so-called youth bulge and the likelihoodof armed conflict. It has been submitted by interalia population action international that in the caseof the 15-29 old representing more than 40% ofthe adult population (15 and above), this resultsin a significant likelihood of armed conflict: “our
analysis suggests that states where young adults
comprised 40% or more of all adults experienced civil
conflict sometime from 1990-2000, 2.3 times the like-
lihood of countries below that benchmark.”14 On thebasis of these figures it could be submitted thata decreasing fertility, combined with a slimming‘youth bulge’ may create a situation in whichpeace may become more likely. 
Apart from ‘migration’ as the result of exter-nal pressure, regard should also be had tomigration being the cause of tension and/or neg-ative developments. The Hmong in Laos; Indi-ans in Fiji; the big-city challenges, — it all addsup.15 Feller, in a January 2004 Amsterdamaddress stated: “...On all continents, mass influxes
of displaced persons have placed onerous burdens on
the physical environment [pollution, deforestation,
competition for natural food and water supplies], on
social systems [health, welfare, housing and employ-
ment and education] and can negatively impact the
demographic balance of a host population, antago-
nizing the host communities.  Similarly widespread
is the growing problem of irregular movement.  It is
not only a problem as between regions, but also for
popular destination countries within regions them-
selves...”.Indeed, more research needs to be undertak-en into the probability of migration per se creat-ing problems next to solving others. More thanever all the relevant disciplines should joinhands to tackle the various challenges on thisissue.This issue is related to the economic andsocietal concept of trust. In the opinion of thepresent author trust is one of the key elementsthat should be taken into account whenever amigration policy is formulated or whenever thepossible positive or negative outcome of migra-tion is being debated. Economies tend to boomon the basis of trust. In 1995 Fukuyama, bestknown for his ‘The End of History’ (1992) pub-lished an important book on ‘Trust’. Fukuyamaargues that for an economy to boom and for asociety to prosper aspects like trust and socialcohesion are indispensable. Societal develop-ments, interaction and group dynamics are farmore important than hitherto believed: “eco-nomic activity represents a crucial part of lifeand is knit together by a wide variety of norms,rules, moral obligations, and other habits that
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4. Migration and the Receiving Community
together shape the society (...); one of the mostimportant lessons we can learn from an exami-nation of economic life is that a nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to compete, is condi-tioned by a single, pervasive characteristic: thelevel of trust inherent in the society” [p. 7].“There are three paths to sociability: the first isbased on family and kinship; the second on vol-untary associations outside kinship such asschools, clubs, and professional organisations,and the third is the state. There are three formsof economic organisation corresponding to eachpath: the family business, the professionallymanaged corporation, and the state-owned or -sponsored enterprise. The first and third paths,it turns out, are closely related to one another:cultures in which the primary avenue towardsociability is family and kinship have a greatdeal of trouble creating large, durable economicorganisations and therefore look to the state to
initiate and support them.” [p. 62] In fact,Fukuyama displays his doubts concerning mul-ticultural societies. And indeed, in the migra-tion debate it is often forgotten that migrantworkers do not only come to work, but arehuman beings with their own life-style andtheir own interests, goals and ideas. It is here-with submitted that due to the substantial num-bers involved, actual segregation has in somecities taken place, is taking place in others or isabout to take place altogether. This is bound tohave a serious negative impact on interaction,intercultural relations and hence on trust, withall the negative results for society and the econ-omy at large.Keeping the above into account, it shouldbecome obvious that promoting workers’mobility does not necessarily amount to astraightforward win-win situation.
It should be quite obvious from the abovethat the present author is not necessarily keenon promoting workers’ mobility. Moderneconomies should strive for the transfer of capi-tal and goods rather than for the transfer ofhuman beings. Of course, in the absence of in-depth econo-metric studies on the impact of non-migration,forcing national economies on even a greaterscale to make use of innovation, outsourcingand the transfer of activities to low-incomecountries, it is no easy task to bring the ideahome. But the idea of importing a tomato-pick-
er rather than tomatoes simply does not soundright. Whoever has traveled the cotton fields ofUzbekistan, the USA and Western Africa willmost probably understand the issue at stake.Also, please meet and compare the peanutfarmers of Senegal and Georgia (USA). As longas the EU distorts in the most hypocritical man-ner possible the agricultural realities with subsi-dies and farm support amounting to more thanEuro 100 million per day (yes, per day), itshould not be too difficult to argue that effortsto make workers move may amount to a distor-tion in its own right. True innovative thinkingwould aim at innovation.
The Romanian Journal of European Studies 52
Notes1 The present author personally subscribes to that notion. After having spent a great many years with the UNHCR (1975-1995),the Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Webster University (1995-2005), he recently joined UNDP as a Chief Technical Advisorwith the Lao PDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vientiane, Laos. This contribution, as a matter of course, has been submitted atitre personnel and is based on his many years in various Twinning, Odysseus and Peer Review activities during the enlarge-ment process. Dr Van Krieken can be reached at peter.krieken@undp.org2http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/817&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan-guage=en (consulted January 2006).3 ) Migrants tend to work – at least during the first years – below their educational and skills levels. Recent studies in Canada haveindicated that for that country alone the loss involved would amount to some CND$ 5 to 55 billion on a yearly basis (the $5B
5. Concluding Remarks
53 The Romanian Journal of European Studiescomes from a Conference Board of Canada article and the $55B comes from Jeffrey Reitz at the University of Toronto; source,Ms Rosaline Frith, CIC).4 Two of the new member states, Hungary and Poland, have as a matter of retaliation imposed restrictions on EU15 workers. 5 Source: http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200601/13a724a3-888a-444c-8751-bd74beb3ce9e.htm (consulted January 2006).6 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, art. 14.2.7 Blair announced in January 2006 a ‘benefits shake-up’, aiming to get 1.7 million (of the total 2.7 million) incapacity claimantsback into work (BBC News, 24 January 2006). Again, it should be noted that these ‘incapacity claimants’ normally remain out-side the unemployment figures.8 This part is based on chapter B of the introduction to my The Consolidated Asylum and Migration Acquis, The Hague/Cambridge,2004, pp 19-22.9 Coleman also refers to the Korea Syndrome: The reductio ad absurdum of all this is what one might call the ‘Korea syndrome’: thelevel of immigration required in order to preserve the current potential support ratio in the Republic of Korea and its conse-quences for population growth. In order to preserve Korea’s present potential support ratio (10: 1) the population would needto increase to 6.2 billion people by the year 2050. Just by coincidence, this happens to be the entire population of the planet atthe present time, so we would all have to go there.10 By 55, statistically speaking, most parents can ‘breath’: children leave school, the mortgage has been paid off, and some heritagemoney may be coming in.11 Remarkably, the Netherlands, in 2002-2003, combined increased unemployment with increased productivity.12 In fact, many Western European firms prefer e.g. Romania to China because of the easy access, the short communication linesand the legal reliability. 13 India: labour: 0.10; profits retained in India: 0.10; suppliers 0.09; central government taxes 0.03; state government taxes: 0.01. Netbenefit to India: 0.33. USA: savings accruing to US investors/customers: 0.58; imports of US goods and services by providers inIndia: 0.05; transfer of profits by US-based providers in India back to US: 0.04; Net direct benefit retained in US 0.67; Value fromUS labour re-employed 0.45 – 0.47. Potential net benefit to US: 1.12-1.14. Source: The Economist, December 13th, 2003.14 This research excluded countries with persistent or recurring conflict. See: Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion: The Security
Demography; population and civil conflict after the cold war; Population Action International (Washington 2003), p. 48. See also the2002 WHO World Report on Violence and Health, p. 222.15 See for instance Hans Magnus Enzensbergers’ Aussichten Auf Den Burgerkrieg (1993).

This paper examines the integration mechanisms in the field of migration, focusing on migration flows, specific mecha-nisms and the institutional - legislative framework created in Romania for external migration administration. Theseissues have been approached in close connection with the orientations, requirements and trends materialized at the EUlevel, in the context of enlarging the Union towards the center and the eastern part of Europe. Subsequently an inquiryinto the social-cultural dimension is undertaken, highlighting the migrant's profile (emigrant, immigrant), the issuesrelated to the integration within the host country and the phenomenon perception by  public opinion and mass-media.
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In Romania before 1989 there used to be twomigration mechanisms: permanent migration,whose motivations were mainly political andethnic, and temporary migration, for studyingor working abroad, based only on Romania’s inter-governmental agreements with othercountries. After 1989, the main reasons behindmigration shifted from the ethnic and politicalreason to economic ones. One consequence isthe fact that temporary migration has increased
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1. Changes in East – West migration mechanisms
both in absolute terms and as per-centage in total number of migra-tions. To date, there are certain mecha-nisms through which migration isachieved at international level. Wewill emphasize those mechanismsthat are found at European level,namely those used by personsmigrating from Romania to theEuropean Union. a. Legal permanent migrationb. Legal temporary migration: (stu-dents; personnel/replacementmigration, refugees and asylumapplicants) c. Illegal transit migrationd. Illegal migration of persons fromCentral and East Europe (fromRomania)e.. Circulatory migration by meansof migratory networks (legal orillegal)a. Legal permanent migration repre-sent migratory flows leaving Roma-nia to third party countries in order to settle therethrough the following methods (see figure no. 1):— based on emigration visas within special pro-grams stimulating emigration of personsholding qualifications that are scarce in thereceiving country or other types of programs(such as the visa lottery). The EU does notrun this type of permanent emigration pro-grams. Romanian citizens that emigrate per-manently are aiming at countries that havesuch emigration policies and programsnamely Canada, Australia, New Zeeland andthe USA.— by marrying a citizen from an EU memberstate and changing the place or residence tothe country of their spouse. — possibly as refugees or political or war asy-lum applicants. In the past years this has notbeen the case of Romania, but of the formerYugoslavia states. b. Legal temporary migration refers to those relo-cating on the territory of an EU country for a lim-ited period of time (from several months to years).This is taking certain forms (see figure no. 2): b.1. On the one hand there are Central andEastern European (Romanian) students study-
ing in the European Union countries and whichlater on return (at least some of them) to thecountries of origin.b.2. On the other hand there are the Centraland Eastern European (Romanian) personnelleaving to work on labour contracts signedbased on bilateral agreements between states. b.3. Refugees obtaining the right to tem-porarily settle in a host EU country or personsapplying for asylum due to political reasons orwho are hiding behind such motivations. Thistype of migration is becoming more and morerestricted, and as far as Romanian citizensmigrating to the EU are concerned, its degree ofapplicability tends to reach zero level. c.Illegal transit migration is the mechanismthrough which persons from third party coun-tries, outside Central and Eastern Europe emi-grate to such countries, including Romania sothat they could further emigrate to the EuropeanUnion. This is a relatively new phenomena andit has been found that its main characteristics areillegality and the involvement of criminal organ-izations in human traffic. Transit migrationthrough Central and Eastern Europe (and thusthrough Romania as well) consists in a growingnumber of illegal emigrants, some of them meet-ing the criteria for which they apply for asylum,but who prefer not to do so in Central and East-
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ern Europe for different rea-sons, so that they could transitto the European Union. d. Illegal migration of persons
living in Central and Eastern
Europe (Romania) includes per-sons of Romanian nationalityleaving Romania and stayingillegally in an EU country –after the legal stay period (3months) expires, persons leav-ing as tourists but who, reach-ing the country of destination,perform lucrative activities onthe black market or personsentering and illegally stayingon the territory of an EU coun-try (see figure no. 4).e. Circulatory migration by
means of migratory networks. Cir-culatory migration refers to thealternative movement betweenthe country of origin and one ormore of the countries of desti-nation. Migrants leaving andworking abroad for a period oftime, return in the country, stayfor a period of time then leaveagain for work abroad. In thiscontext are formed  the migrato-ry networks, networks throughwhich those who want to tem-porarily migrate abroad receivehelp and support from previousmigrants (see figure no. 5).The intent to migrate abroadseeking a job is more likelyamong people living withincommunities with a high circu-latory migration rate. In areaswhere others have left before,more will leave, in places where other migrantshave succeeded and where the signs of successare apparent, migration will be higher. This way,are formed migratory networks when previousmigrants resort to members of their families ortheir friends and acquaintances in order to workabroad, supporting the migration process.  Informal networks and institutions of circula-tory migration are on the one hand the individ-uals’ innovating response to the dysfunctionali-ties of formal institutions such as: the labourmarket, the capital market, assurance of prod-
ucts and prices, labour force mediation abroadby the state and private agencies, while on theother hand they are the adjusting response of thecommunity to new situations entering in conflictwith traditional values (Lãzãroiu, 2002).As migratory processes intensify and legisla-tion changes, migratory networks will probablytend to change the functions that they had at thetime they were conceived, that of facilitatingtransport of labour force and capital and willfulfill functions for maintaining community sol-idarity. 
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Figureȱno.ȱ3.ȱȱTheȱmechanismȱofȱtransitoryȱmigrationȱinȱEuropeȱ
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Legislation regarding the migration phe-
nomena at the level of the EU. The legislationinfluencing the migration phenomena in the EUis tackled in Chapter 2 Freedom of Movement ofPersons and Chapter 24 Cooperation in the fieldof Justice and Internal Affairs. Within the twochapters, the types of legislation that influencesthe migratory phenomena in Europe are relatedto laws in three major fields:a. legislation regarding migration (directinfluence on migration)b. legislation regarding the labour market(direct and indirect influence on migration)c. legislation regarding mutual recognitionof degrees and qualifications (indirect influenceon migration).
a. Legislation regarding migration in EUFor a long period of time, the right to enterand live on the territory of an EU Member Statewas governed by national laws drawn up byeach Member State. One could enter and live onthe territory of a state based on an entry visaand a residence visa which were granted byeach state. Only in 1999, EU Member Statesdecided the formulation of a common policy
regarding migration and asylum to becomeeffective by 2004 the latest.  The common policyregarding migration includes aspects such as:free movement of persons, external border con-trol and the granting of visas, asylum, immigra-tion and the protection of third party nationali-ties’ rights and legal cooperation on civil mat-ters. The common policy in the field of migra-tion and asylum has in view the adoption of ajoint position of the EU member states, towardsthe applications for asylum coming from per-sons from third party countries, as well as thecontrol of illegal human trafficking. 
b. Legislation regarding the labour market in the
EUThe legislation and the regulations in thefield of the labour force interest us in the contestof migration in terms of two aspects: first beingthat of recruiting labour force from outside EUand second being the manner in which the leg-islation regarding the labour force in the EUmay influence east-west migratory flows once
the applicant countries in Central and EastEurope become EU members. The recruitment of labour from outside EUcountries’ border and outside the EU is the man-ner through which the European deficit in labourforce may be covered where there is such deficit.In this sense there are regulations that have con-sidered the recruitment of labour force from out-side the EU, which encourages replacementmigration1. Replacement migration in the EUfocuses on two major categories of personnel: onthe one hand – highly qualified personnel whichare deficient in the EU countries and on the otherhand the unskilled workers which are requiredfor the replacement of the local labour force, thatdo not want to perform any such works (in agri-culture for example). The replacement migrationthrough recruitment from outside the EU is notregulated at the level of the European Union,each member applying its own policy. The freedom of movement and equal treat-ment by banning any restrictions regardinglabour force for Member States citizens thatmay apply to Central and Eastern Europe statesafter joining to the EU, generate fear from theexisting Member States of massive migrationflows of labour force traveling from east to thewest, seeking better salaries and better workingconditions. This is why, separate agreements arenegotiated regarding the movement of theworkforce after joining to the EU with each ofthe applicant countries, requesting a certainperiod of transition for the liberalization of thework force movement. The transition periodwill generally range from 2 to 5 years and by nomeans can it exceed 7 years. 
c. Legislation regarding mutual recognition of
degrees and qualificationsEnsuring the free movement of persons andworkers requires the recognition of the degreesand professional qualifications. The mostimportant regulations in this sense, at the levelof the EU, are a group of directives creating thepremises a General System for the Recognitionof Degrees and Qualifications and anothergroup of directives regulating the recognition ofqualifications of various professions2. 
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It is being considered a new directive (a fifthdirective) intended to remain the single direc-tive, which would simplify the acquis estab-lished in the previous directives. It is being con-sidered the application of the principle of auto-matic recognition of degrees and degrees’recognition based on coordination of minimumtraining conditions. In order to facilitate degreerecognition processes two information net-works have been set up at the level of the EU,namely: ENIC (European Network of Informa-tion Center) and NARIC (National AcademicRecognition Information Centers).
Legislation regarding migration in Roma-
nia. Harmonization with the European acquis
communautaire. The first initiatives for the cre-ation of a new legislative framework in the fieldof migration took place in Romania at the begin-ning of the 1990’s. Subsequently, with Roma-nia’s application for joining to the EuropeanUnion, this activity has intensified so that, in thepast three years, there have been adopted manylaws and normative acts intended to ensure theadoption of the acquis communautaire. For mostdirectives within the two negotiation chaptersthat include legislation influencing migration(chapter 2 and chapter 24), Romania has startedadopting the corresponding legislation. Remarkable progress has been made by theRomanian legislation regarding the regime offoreign persons in Romania, the regime of therefugees and their social protection and the pre-vention and combating of human trafficking.On the labour force market there has been regu-lated the granting of work permits. Thus,according to the principle of free movement ofpersons, EU citizens and members oftheir families may work on Romania’sterritory without the requirement toobtain the work permit, unlike other cat-egories of foreign citizens. There are some aspects, where theRomanian progress was smaller: it isbelieved that there still exists discrimina-tion between EU and Romanian citizensowing to the fact that Romanians aregiven priority when being employed.Also as far as mutual recognition of pro-fessional qualification, Romania’s prepa-rations are thought to be at an earlystage.Box no. 1 presents the main legisla-tion regarding migration from Romania.
Progress was also reported with chapter 24.This way, immediately after the issuance of the2003 Country Report, the National Office forRefugees has issued and submitted a draftamendment for the Government Ordinance no.102/2000, eliminating all inconsistenciesbetween domestic legislation and the docu-ments included in the acquis in force to date andthe continuation of the monitoring and analysisof the evolution of the acquis for the preparationof draft laws and their initiation on time. Inaddition to such measures, G.O. no.102/2001was also amended through Government Ordi-nance 43/2004, updating the definitions of theforms of protection, eliminating differences inthe treatment of the refugees and those receiv-ing temporary protection, confers the NationalOffice for Refugees the capacity to take part intrials regarding asylum applications, and wellas other aspects. As far as the achievement of the objectivesrelated to the European Union accession is con-cerned, all requirements for closing negotiationson Chapter 24 have been met, except for aspectsrelated to the implementation of Dublin mecha-nisms and the EURODAC system in Romania3. 
Institutions involved in the management of
migration in Romania. Various institutions canbe involved in the monitoring and performanceof the migratory phenomena, playing differentroles. Taking them into account within theframework of international migration revealsthat they carry out their activity at different lev-els, as shown in table no. 1.For instance, at supra-national level, amongstate institutions involved in performing and
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Tableȱnr.ȱ1.ȱInstitutionalȱactorsȱinvolvedȱinȱinternationalȱmigrationȱȱ
Oȱ=ȱorigin;ȱD=ȱdestinationȱ
Level/Typeȱ
ofȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
institutionȱ
Stateȱ
authoritiesȱ
Privateȱ
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transport)ȱ
Internationalȱ
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(D)ȱ
Localȱ Localȱ
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governmentalȱ
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companiesȱ
(O)ȱ
Voluntaryȱ
organizationsȱ
(D)ȱ
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(D)ȱ
ȱSource:ȱ L©z©roiuȱ S.ȱ (2002)ȱ „Migraôiaȱ circulatorieȱ aȱ forôeiȱ deȱ munc©ȱ dinȱ Romania.ȱ
Consecinôeȱ asupraȱ integr©riiȱ europene”ȱ –“CirculatoryȱMigrationȱ ofȱ theȱLabourȱForceȱ inȱ
Romania.ȱConsequencesȱonȱtheȱEuropeanȱIntegration”ȱ,ȱwww.osf.roȱ
*ȱ IOMȱ =ȱ Theȱ Internationalȱ Organizationȱ forȱ Migration;ȱ ILOȱ =ȱ Internationalȱ Labourȱ
Organization;ȱUNCHRȱ=ȱUnitedȱNationȱHighȱCommissionerȱforȱHumanȱRightsȱ
monitoring migration there is the EuropeanUnion, and among voluntary ones there is theInternational Organization for Migration. At national level, in Romania, the main gov-ernmental institutions involved in the migrato-ry processes are the Ministry of Administrationand Interior, the Ministry of Labour, Social Soli-darity and Family, the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and the Ministry of Education andResearch. The main migratory policies in Roma-nia are implemented through many agencieswithin or independent of the above mentionedministries, agencies whose activity is difficult tocoordinate. For instance, the emigration andimmigration phenomena are dealt with by dif-ferent institutions, an in case that the same insti-tution is handling both aspects of the migratoryphenomenon, they are undertaken by different,specialized departments. There are also a number of non-governmen-tal institutions involved in running or gatheringinformation on migration, such as:  private com-
panies mediating labour contracts abroad, thelocal office of the International Organization forMigration in Romania, the representative officeof the United Nation High Commissioner forRefugees in Romania, the Foundation of theRomanian National Council for Refugees, theRomanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants,and others. It has been noted that a large part of suchinstitutions carry out their activity helpingrefugees and immigrants in Romania. An expla-nation would be that measures taken by theRomanian state have been considered insuffi-cient in his field due to financial difficulties onone hand (Romania is itself going through adeveloping period) and because there is still alarge difference between the legal provisionsand what is in fact achieved by the Romanianstate (IOM, Migration Trends, 2003). On theother hand, the low number of immigrants tar-geting Romania (around 200 persons per year)makes it difficult to test the legislation in thefield at a large scale.
The international experience in migrationadministration and monitoring demonstrates
the close relationship between the legislative-
institutional dimension and the social-cultural
one. The elaboration and adoption of laws, thecreation of institutions, the development of cor-responding strategies and policies representmajor components of this process, but their suc-cess cannot be separated from the manner inwhich the involved actors –governmental insti-tutions, non-governmental organizations, mass-media, communities, individuals – respond tothe so-called “behavioural challenges”, relatedto participation, communication, mentalitiesand attitudes. 
The migrant’s profile. Considering themigration a social phenomenon that directlyaffects a significant part of the population andhas complex implications on the entire society, itis vital to know and to emphasize the migrant’s
profile – the profile of the emigrant from Roma-nia and of the immigrant to our country. Thatwill enable an accurate development of themeasures related to the administration of
migration phenomenon and of the support pro-vided to the migrants.Within the dominant national tendency –namely labour migration, the most representative
category is currently represented by young men(18-35 years old), with an average education level,
as skilled workers from the big cities of Romania and
Bucharest, its capital.
The villages’ migration potential should not beignored either; relating to this issue DumitruSandu has suggested the metaphor of the“hydrographical network” (“community repre-sents the spring of migration) and the transitionfrom the factorial approaches to the structuraland typological ones, that makes possible toidentify types of villages based on the dominantcultural profile and the experience regardingthe international circulatory migration (Sandu,2004).Various studies have also stated a series ofhypotheses regarding the selective migration
flows, according to which the minority ethnicalor religious groups show a higher mobility levelthan the one of the majority Orthodox Roman-
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ian population (Sandu, 2000, Diminescu,Lãzãroiu, 2002).Even if at present Romania distinguishes onthe background of international migration as anemigration country, with a labour market lessattractive to the immigrants, being more inter-esting in terms of transit possibilities to thedeveloped countries (briefly, « More ‘Out’ than‘In’ at the Crossroads Between Europe andBalkans », according to the suggestive title of anIOM country report from the autumn of 2003),is expected that the attractiveness of Romaniawill increase due to the EU integration perspec-tive and thus  Romania will become even animmigration country.Up to now, the immigrant’s dominant profile –a refugee, an asylum seeker, an immigrant forlabour, study or business purposes – is based onmen’s preponderance (as it happens with theasylum seekers who have proven to be especial-ly young men, aged between 21-30 years). Yet,when the total number of immigrants is takeninto account, the gender based structure is quitewell balanced. 
Aspects regarding the integration within
the host country society. The migrant’s domi-nant profile – an emigrant/immigrant from/inRomania – involves a series of specific aspectsregarding the integration within the host coun-try society. 
In general terms, for an immigrant the integra-tion consists in the knowledge of the languagespoken in the host country (reading, writingskills), the access to the educational system andto the labour market within the respective coun-try, the opportunity of increasing professionalmobility by attending to a higher level of edu-cation and professional qualification, equity infront of the law, cultural and religious freedom,the respect towards the laws and the traditionsof the country he/she lives in. At the same time,for the host society the integration of themigrants supposes tolerance and openness, theconsent of welcoming the immigrants, theunderstanding of the advantages and chal-lenges of a multicultural society, providing anunrestricted access to information related to theadvantages of integration, tolerance and inter-cultural dialog, respecting and understandingthe status, tradition and culture of the immi-grants, as well as the respect towards the immi-grants’ rights (IOM, 2003a).As far as the particular case of Romania is con-cerned, given the lack of previous expertise in
this field, the still low number of immigrantsand refugees and the limited financialresources, it has been noticed that the servicesand the assistance for integration are not fullysatisfactory, despite the diligence within the lastyears for the alignment to the international stan-dards.A special issue envisages the vulnerable
groups, especially the non accompanied minors, forwhom a reconsideration of the interviewingprocedures and an adequate training of the civilservants are necessary, since malpractice couldhave major traumatic effects. Besides the integration of the immigrants, amultiple faced challenge for the Romanian soci-ety is represented by the reintegration of the
Romanians who return to their home country afteran external migration experience. It focuses oncertain specific categories, such as the Roman-ian students and graduates from foreign univer-sities, the Rroma people, the victims of traffick-ing in human beings, the unaccompaniedRomanian minors, the repatriated people, etc.On the whole, the issues related to the rein-tegration of the Romanians who come back totheir home country vary according to the edu-cational level, their qualification, family status,duration of their stay abroad etc., complexsocial and psychological aid oriented pro-grammes being necessary, so that re-emigrationbe not the sole solution to such people(Lãzãroiu, 2002).Finally, besides the integration/ reintegrationon its territory, Romania must also care for cer-tain aspects related to the integration of Romanian
emigrants within the host countries. In this contextthe role of Romanian authorities should consistin the contribution to promoting and increasingof an accurate, objective image on the entireRomanian Diaspora, that may represent a valu-able share to the enrichment of the scientific andcultural patrimony of the host countries, as wellas in preserving the connection between theDiaspora and the mother- country. A specialaspect refers to the support that the Romanianstate must grant and that it actually grants tothe large Romanian groups living outside thecountry’s borders due to historical reasons (inthe Republic of Moldova, as well as in Ukraine,Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia) who need,besides the support for the preservation of theircultural identity,  support  at international level,regarding the recognition of their rights withinthe respective countries.
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The public opinion and mass-media. TheRomanian public opinion perceives the migra-tion phenomenon mainly as labour migration.A large number of people believe that migrantsearn money from a paid job and only a smallpart of the public opinion think that they obtainmoney from theft and begging. Yet, the resultsof the opinion polls mentioned in this studyreveal a wrong perception – in some points - ofthe negative aspects that accompany the Roma-nians’ external migration, which proves that thepublic opinion finds it difficult to distinguishbetween certain objective hardships related tothe travel within the Schengen space and theviolation of the law, between the groups per-forming illegal activities and the affiliation to asocial, ethnic or religious minority, which leadsto the creation of stereotypes, to attitudes thatfeed delinquency, intolerance and xenophobia.This perception could be set right by means ofjoint, coherent efforts of mass-media, publicadministration and civil society. Up to present, one cannot say that mass-
media has brought its necessary contribution tothe accurate rendering of external migrationphenomenon, with all its aspects and to the cre-ation of an adequate social behaviour withrespect to both migration itself  and the integra-tion/ reintegration process. It has beenremarked that migration is not systematically
rendered and assessed, in its entire complexity,the emphasis being put on the narration of cer-tain negative, sensational facts and less on the
orientation of the migrants within an universethat makes them face numerous risk and uncer-tainty components, on the prevention and com-
bating delinquency, clandestine traveling andcorruption related to visa granting. To a consid-erable extent, the partial and sometimes wrongcoverage of the migration phenomenon bymass media is the result of the shortage of special-
ized journalists in this field; therefore is highlyrecommended the organization of trainingcourses with respect to the investigation andassessment of migration.Our study appreciates and supports the pro-posals converged in various documents regard-ing migration (especially the IOM’s)  with refer-ence to the introduction in the academic curricula of
subjects specialized on the study of the migration
phenomena (labour economics, law, medicine,health policy, sociology, education sciences,etc.), as well as the creation of a national migration
research center (to be set up by the RomanianGovernment in partnership with IOM, UNCHRand other international organizations), of some
faculties or departments of inter-disciplinary studies
on migration, so as to build up the necessaryexpertise in public policies, social assistance,human resources and migration management.
Apart from the economic, social, demo-graphic implications, migration phenomenon inthe perspective of Romania’s accession to theEU brings about specific requirements regard-ing the establishment of a new legal and institu-
tional framework for migration management. Asmigration mechanisms Romania - EU change,legislation gets rapidly in line with the acquis
communautaire, whereas its implementation viainvolved institutions is slower, but progressive.An important progress has been recordedafter 2000 in legislation regarding the foreign-ers’ regime in Romania, the status and theregime of refugees, preventing and combatingthe trafficking in human being, work permits,whereas lower progress occurred in the legisla-tion envisaging the mutual recognition ofdegrees and qualifications, discrimination of EUcitizens as compared the Romanians in getting a
job in Romania by giving priority to the Roman-ian citizens.The elaboration and adoption of laws, thecreation of institutions, the development of cor-responding strategies and policies representmajor components of this process, but their suc-cess cannot be separated from the so-called“behavioural challenges”, related to participation,communication, mentalities and attitudes,which envisage all actors involved – govern-mental institutions, non-governmental organiza-tions, mass-media, communities. Major changesshould occur in the way that public opinion per-ceives migration related phenomena as well asin the contribution which should be brought bymass-media to the prevention and combatingdelinquency, clandestine travelling and corrup-tion and to the orientation of the migrants with-in an universe that makes them face numerousrisk and uncertainty components.
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4. Concluding remarks
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Notes
1 Replacement migration refers to migration based on work force recruitment from outside the European Union for qualifica-tions that are deficient within the Union and for jobs and qualifications that are not sought by the local people.2 Among those the main are: Directive 89/48/CEE, Directive 92/51/CEE, Directive 1999/42/CE and Directive 2001/19/CE.3 The Dublin mechanisms refers to a set of norms based on which it is appointed the member state responsible for processingasylum application in the situation where a person has transited more than one member states and has submitted an asylumapplication. Generally the state where that foreign persons has entered the European space is responsible. For such purposes,there have been established an European database with fingerprints of all persons that have illegally entered, are illegally stay-ing or apply for asylum in the member states – EURODAC. This database prevents the submission of several asylum applica-tions successively or concomitantly in many member states. In this situation, the respective person, being also identified basedon the Dublin mechanism, is returned to the member state that have implemented for the first time the fingerprint of therespective foreign person.

The economic and social transition has overturned the demographic landscape of Romania. The fall in birth rate, theupsurge in mortality rate and the international migration have deeply deteriorated the demographic panorama of thecountry. The population decline and the increase of population ageing can be viewed as the most noticeable immediateobjectification of this deterioration. Within this context of a veritable breaking, a strange restructuring of internal migra-tion flows between urban and rural areas could be observed and quantified. Under the pressure of economic and socialfactors and changes  defining the transition-crisis, including the (mostly painful) economic reforms Romania experiencedafter 1989, the traditional rural-urban migration flows started a continuous  downward trend and, by 1997, for the firsttime in Romania's social history, the two streams reversed as magnitude. During the following years the movement con-tinued and reinforced. This paper presents these dramatic changes, their origin, their characteristics and their conse-quences on population number, population age and sex structure. The analysis at regional level is privileged.
Keywords: components of population change; internal migration (with change of permanent residence); Urban-Ruraland Rural-Urban migration; age and sex composition of migrants; migration by regions of development; return migra-tion; international migration 
La démographie de la Roumanie a connudes changements profonds dans les années 1990et qui continuent de se manifester dans cettepremière décennie du nouveau siècle, soit par dynamique propre, soit par l’action d’un contextesocio-économique en plein évolution. Une partiede ces changements sont communs avec ceux quiont eu lieu dans l’ensemble des pays de l’espace
Migrations et incidence sur larépartition spatiale de la population en Roumanie au niveau nationalet régional*
Vasile GheþãuDirecteur, Centre de Recherches Démographiques de l’Académie Roumaine
Introduction
* Version révisée et améliorée du papier presenté au colloque international “Migrations, crises et conflits récents dans les Balkans”, Bel-grade, 27-29 octobre 2005. Vasile Gheþãu (vasile.ghetau@digicom.ro).
central et est européen se trouvant en transitionpolitique, économique et sociale, après l’effon-drement du communisme. Il s’agit, surtout, de lavéritable chute de la natalité et, avec certainesexceptions, de la recrudescence de la mortalité.Mais, on peut saisir des particularités nationalesimportantes, provenant de la manière dont lesreformes politiques et économiques ont étéconçues et appliquées, de différences dedéveloppement économique, social et cultureldes pays, ainsi que de facteurs de nature his-torique.  Un examen même sommaire du degré de ladétérioration de la situation démographique enRoumanie par rapport aux autres pays de larégion montre une position médiane, tant en cequi concerne la dimension de la baisse de lanatalité, ainsi que la magnitude de la détériora-tion de la mortalité (Council of Europe, 2005).Un déclin démographique bien installé encoreen 1990, alimenté par migration externe néga-tive dans toute la période et par baisse naturelledepuis 1992, et l’accélération du vieillissementdémographique définissent les l’essence del’actuel paysage démographique de laRoumanie. Ce paysage est le résultat du con-texte politique, économique et social qui a mod-elé la population et les phénomènes démo-graphiques après 1989 et ce contexte a été, dansson essence, un contexte de crise. Criseéconomique, surtout, mais aussi crise sociale.Entre les recensements de janvier 1992 etmars 2002 la population de la Roumanie aconnu une baisse de 1129 milles habitants, çaveut dire un recul de 5 p.100. La baisse naturellea contribué avec seulement 27 p.100 à cettebaisse, la contribution majeure revenant à lamigration externe. Une contribution négative dela migration n’est pas surprenante, elle étantprésente en Roumanie et avant et après 1989.Mais, l’élément surprise a été représenté par lamagnitude de la baisse par migration et lanature de cette migration. La partie connue sta-tistiquement (immigrants et émigrants légaux,enregistrés)  n’a contribué qu’avec 12 p.100 a labaisse générale de la population, ce qui laisseentrevoir qu’en proportion de plus de 60 p.100(environ 700 milles habitants) la baisse bu nom-bre d’habitants du pays s’est produite par unenouvelle composante de la migration interna-tionale. Il s’agit de roumains partis à l’étranger(avec ou sans visa) et qui non pas été déclarés /enregistrés au recensement de 2002. Cette nou-velle composante de la migration internationale
en Roumanie est peu connue statistiquementmais on sait que sa dimension a connu unaccroissement sensible après 2001, date à laquelle les visas d’entré ont été supprimées pourles roumains pour presque tous les payseuropéens. Cette migration est, essentiellement,une migration pour travail.La baisse de 1,1 millions d’habitants est doncle résultat des évolutions conjuguées de labaisse naturelle et de la baisse par migration.Dans les deux cas la crise économique et socialeque la Roumanie a traversée et traverse encoredans son passage du régime totalitaire vers l’é-tat de droit, démocratie et économie de marché,a joué le rôle majeur, même si des différencespeuvent être signalées d’un phénomène démo-graphique à l’autre. La recrudescence de la mor-talité aussi bien que la migration externe néga-tive sont l’expression directe de la crise. Dans lecas de la natalité, la situation est beaucoup pluscompliquée. Il s’agit d’un phénomène avec unedétermination complexe, d’une façon générale,et - dans le cas de la Roumanie - des facteursspécifiques peuvent être identifiés. La politiquepro nataliste de l’ancien régime a maintenud’une manière forcée la natalité à un niveau rel-ativement élevé avant 1990 et il était bien évi-dent que l’abrogation des réglementationsrestrictives en matière de contraception et d’a-vortement  conduira automatiquement à labaisse de la natalité. Et ce recul a eu lieu surtouten 1990 et 1001. Il est fort probable que les fac-teurs de crise ont accentué la baisse. Si l’analyse de la dynamique démographiqueest poussée vers le niveau régional, on pourraconstater que ce que nous voyons au niveaunational est en fait le résultat des dynamiquesrégionales différentes ou un rôle importantrevient à une autre variable – la migrationinterne. Cette composante a connu en Roumaniedans les années de la transition des évolutionsd’exception, pas tellement au niveau de ladimension globale, qu’au niveau de la structuredes flux migratoires entre régions et entre l’ur-bain et le rural, les facteurs déterminants étant –essentiellement – les multiples facettes de la criseéconomique et sociale que la Roumanie a traver-sé.  Cette communication se propose justementd’analyser les changements que la migrationinterne a connu après 1989, au niveau de la direc-tion des flux, de la structure par âge et sexe desmigrants, ainsi qu’au niveau des conséquences
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sur le nombre et la structure de la population parrégion et par milieu urbain / rural.
Un regard rapide sur les régions de
développement en Roumanie. Caractéristiques Les unités territoriales agrégées de laRoumanie sont les départements (judetze) et les
régions de développement. Il y a 41 départe-ments et la municipalité de Bucarest, la Capitaledu pays. Ces unités sont groupées en huitrégions de développements. Voici la carte de cesrégions (dans l’Annexe 1 on peut trouver unecarte plus détaillée):Les huit régions de développement ne sontpas homogènes par caractéristiqueséconomiques et démographiques (voir Annexe2). La superficie des régions est équilibrée poursept de huit régions – 12-14 p.100 de la superfi-cie nationale, la seule exception étant la région8-Bucarest (composée de la ville de Bucarest etdu département entourant la ville)  qui a un peumoins de 1 p.100 du territoire national. Le nom-bre de la population s’inscrit entre 1,9 millionsdans la région 5-Ouest et 3,7 millions dans larégion 1-Nord-Est. Le degré d’urbanisationvarie entre 41 p.100 dans la région 3-Sud et 60p.100 dans la région 7-Centre (sans prendre enconsidération la région 8-Bucarest, avec 91 p.100
de  population urbaine), dans le contexte ou laRoumanie a un degré d’urbanisation faibleparmi les pays européens.Les régions ont un profile économique et undegré de développement économique dif-férents. Les régions 1-Nord-Est et 3-Sud ont été
et continuent d’être  moins développées parrapport aux régions 5-Ouest, 7-Centre et 8-Bucarest. Le déclin des activités économiquesindustrielles, peu performantes et grandes con-sommatrices d’énergie, a affecté  l’ensemble desrégions mai avec une dureté plus forte lesrégions 1-Nord-Est et 3-Sud. On peut mêmeremarquer un accroissement du décalage entreces régions et les régions 5-Ouest et 7-Centre(plus 8-Bucarest), les investissements privilé-giant ces dernières. Comme corollaire, le niveaude vie est plus élevé dans ces régions.Malgré le fait que les profiles démo-graphiques des régions ont connu un rap-prochement sur le fond de la détérioration de lasituation démographique générale, un nombrede particularités se conservent. La natalité estplus élevée dans la région 1-Nord-Est, tandisque la mortalité reste plus élevée dans lesrégions du sud et de l’ouest.
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         Région 1. Nord-Est      Région 5. Ouest 
         Région 2. Sud-Est      Région 6. Nord-Ouest 
         Région 3. Sud      Région 7. Centre 
         Région 4. Sud-Ouest     Région 8. Bucarest 
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Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIȱ
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1.3. Urbanisation (Ro=55)
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1.4. Densité de la population (Ro=91) 
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Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIIȱ
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1.6. Contribution de l'industrie au PIB
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1.7. Contribution de l'agriculture au PIB
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1.8. Revenu total par personne/mois-2002 
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Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIIIȱ
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1.9. Taux brut de natalité (Ro=9,8)
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1.10. Taux brut de mortalité (Ro=12,3)
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1.11.Taux d'accroissement naturel 
(Ro= -2,5)    
-4.5
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
S S-O O B N-O S-E C N-E
3 4 5 8 6 2 7 1
 -
 p
. 
1
0
0
0
 h
a
b
. 
-
1.12. Taux de mortalité infantile 
(Ro=16,7)
0
5
10
15
20
25
B N-O C S-O O S-E S N-E
8 6 7 4 5 2 3 1
 -
 p
. 
1
0
0
0
 n
a
is
s
a
n
c
e
s
 -
ȱ
6
7
5
4 3
1
2
8
71 The Romanian Journal of European Studies
Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIVȱ
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1.13. Indicateur conjoncturel de fécondité 
(Ro=1,23)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
B O S-O S S-E C N-O N-E
8 5 4 3 2 7 6 1
- 
p
a
r 
fe
m
m
e
 -
1.14. Population de 60 ans et plus
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1.15. Espérance de vie à la naissance - 
Femmes, 2001-2003 (Ro=74,8)
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1.16. Espérance de vie à la naissance - 
Hommes, 2001-2003 (Ro=67,4)
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Dynamique de la population au niveau
régional. Composantes des changementsEntre les deux derniers recensements  - jan-vier 1992 et mars 2002 –la population de laRoumanie  a connu une baisse de 5 p.100. Lerecul est général, dans toutes les huit régions,mais des différences significatives existent en cequi concerne la magnitude de la baisse,  lesrégions les plus touchées étant 5-Ouest, 7-Cen-tre et 6-Nord-Ouest. Les données de stockfournies par les deux recensements, combinéesavec les données de flux sur les naissances, lesdécès et les changements de domicile (résidencepermanente) permettent d’estimer la contribu-tion des trois composantes – croissancenaturelle, migration interne et migrationexterne - sur la dynamique régionale de la pop-ulation (tableau 1) 
Ce qu’on peut constater au niveau régionaln’est que le résultat combiné des mouvementsdifférents comme sens et intensité de la crois-sance naturelle, de la migration interne et de lamigration externe.Voici les principales observations:— la croissance naturelle a été positive seule-ment dans la region1-Nord-Est, sonapport étant de +2,5 p. 100 entre 1992 et2002;— la migration interne a favorisé les régionsplus développées – 5-Ouest, 8-Bucarest et7-Centre; les régions fournisseurs de pop-ulation ont été surtout 1-Nord-est et 6-Nord-Ouest;— la migration externe a été négative danstoutes les régions, et plus particulièrementau Centre et en Ouest.  Quelques précisions s’imposent. Le degréplus faible de développement économique de larégion 1-Nord-Est a maintenu dans cette régionune natalité plus élevée et qui a été la com-posante principale de la croissance naturellepositive dans cette région Les régions 3-Sud et4-Sud-Ouest sont proches comme niveau dedéveloppement de la région 1 mai elles ont unestructure par âge plus détériorées, ce quiexplique la mortalité plus élevée et une natalitélégèrement plus faible dans ces deux régionspar rapport à la région 1. Une croissancenaturelle positive et un niveau de développe-ment plus faible ont déterminé une propensionplus forte vers  migration dans la région 1. Et ladestination de cette migration ont été lesrégions plus développées et surtout les régions5-Ouest et 8-Bucarest; sans l’apport positif de lamigration interne la dimension de la baisse de lapopulation dans ces deux régions aurait été sen-siblement plus grande.      En ce qui concerne la migration interna-tionale, elle englobe aussi bien la migration àlong terme, légale et connue, que  la migrationtemporaire pour travail, cette dernière com-posante connaissant une véritable explosiondans la deuxième partie des années 1990 etnotamment a partir de 2001, comme suite de lasuppression du visa d’entré dans les pays del’ouest. La migration externe nette a été négativedans toutes les régions mai on s’attendait que leniveau soit plus élevé dans les régions moinsdéveloppées, ou les facteurs de push sont plusforts. Mais, les données montrent que lesrégions avec les pertes les plus importantes depopulation par migration externe sont lesrégions 5-Ouest et 7-Centre, régions plus
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Tableauȱ 1.ȱ Roumanie.ȱ Changementȱ duȱ nombreȱ deȱ laȱ
populationȱ 1992Ȭ2002ȱ etȱ composantesȱ duȱ changementȱ parȱ
régionȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ
dontȱ:ȱȱ
Régionȱ
ȱ
Croissanceȱ
totaleȱ
croissanceȱ
naturelleȱ
migrationȱ
interneȱ
netteȱ
migrationȱ
externeȱ
netteȱ
I.ȱCroissanceȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱetȱsesȱcomposantesȱ–ȱenȱmilliersȱ
1.ȱNordȬEstȱ Ȭ77,4ȱ +92,4ȱ Ȭ52,6ȱ Ȭ117,3ȱ
2.ȱSudȬEstȱ Ȭ115,0ȱ Ȭ21,4ȱ +1,2ȱ Ȭ94,7ȱ
3.ȱSudȱ Ȭ180,3ȱ Ȭ93,0ȱ Ȭ15,4ȱ Ȭ72,0ȱ
4.ȱSudȬOuestȱ Ȭ126,7ȱ Ȭ60,0ȱ Ȭ6,4ȱ Ȭ60,4ȱ
5.ȱOuestȱ Ȭ153,3ȱ Ȭ68,2ȱ +43,5ȱ Ȭ128,6ȱ
6.ȱNordȬOuestȱ Ȭ169,6ȱ Ȭ44,1ȱ Ȭ20,8ȱ Ȭ104,7ȱ
7.ȱCentreȱ Ȭ178,7ȱ Ȭ21,4ȱ +8,2ȱ Ȭ165,4ȱ
8.ȱBucarestȱ Ȭ128,1ȱ Ȭ88,2ȱ +42,3ȱ Ȭ82,2ȱ
Roumanieȱ Ȭ1129,1ȱ Ȭ303,8ȱ 0,0ȱ Ȭ825,3ȱ
ȱ
II.ȱCroissanceȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱetȱsesȱcomposantesȱ–ȱtauxȱp.ȱ1000
1.ȱNordȬEstȱ Ȭ20,8ȱ +24,9ȱ Ȭ14,2ȱ Ȭ31,6ȱ
2.ȱSudȬEstȱ Ȭ39,6ȱ Ȭ7,4ȱ +0,4ȱ Ȭ32,6ȱ
3.ȱSudȱ Ȭ52,0ȱ Ȭ26,8ȱ Ȭ4,4ȱ Ȭ20,7ȱ
4.ȱSudȬOuestȱ Ȭ52,9ȱ Ȭ25,0ȱ Ȭ2,7ȱ Ȭ25,2ȱ
5.ȱOuestȱ Ȭ75,3ȱ Ȭ33,5ȱ +21,4ȱ Ȭ63,2ȱ
6.ȱNordȬOuestȱ Ȭ60,0ȱ Ȭ15,6ȱ Ȭ7,4ȱ Ȭ37,1ȱ
7.ȱCentreȱ Ȭ68,4ȱ Ȭ8,2ȱ +3,1ȱ Ȭ63,3ȱ
8.ȱBucarestȱ Ȭ55,9ȱ Ȭ38,5ȱ +18,5ȱ Ȭ35,9ȱ
Roumanieȱ Ȭ50,8ȱ Ȭ13,7ȱ 0,0ȱ Ȭ37,1ȱ
ȱ
III.ȱChangementsȱ1992Ȭ2002ȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ
1.ȱNordȬEstȱ Ȭ2,1ȱ +2,5ȱ Ȭ1,4ȱ Ȭ3,1ȱ
2.ȱSudȬEstȱ Ȭ3,9ȱ Ȭ0,7ȱ 0,0ȱ Ȭ3,2ȱ
3.ȱSudȱ Ȭ5,1ȱ Ȭ2,6ȱ Ȭ0,4ȱ Ȭ2,0ȱ
4.ȱSudȬOuestȱ Ȭ5,2ȱ Ȭ2,4ȱ Ȭ0,3ȱ Ȭ2,5ȱ
5.ȱOuestȱ Ȭ7,3ȱ Ȭ3,2ȱ +2,1ȱ Ȭ6,1ȱ
6.ȱNordȬOuestȱ Ȭ5,8ȱ Ȭ1,5ȱ Ȭ0,7ȱ Ȭ3,6ȱ
7.ȱCentreȱ Ȭ6,6ȱ Ȭ0,8ȱ +0,3ȱ Ȭ6,1ȱ
8.ȱBucarestȱ Ȭ5,4ȱ Ȭ3,7ȱ +1,8ȱ Ȭ3,5ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Roumanieȱ Ȭ4,9ȱ Ȭ1,3ȱ 0,0ȱ Ȭ3,6ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱpubliéesȱparȱl’INSȱ
(InstitutȱNationalȱdeȱStatistique).ȱȱINS,ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005ȱ;ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ2001ȱ;ȱ2003ȱ;ȱ
2004aȱ;ȱ2005cȱ;ȱ2005d.ȱ ȱ
développées. L’explication n’est pas difficiled’être trouvée. Ces régions ont eu et continued’avoir une structure ethnique de la populationplus hétérogène par rapport au Nord-Est et auSud et la mobilité est plus forte dans ce milieuhumain.  Au Centre et dans l’Ouest on a eu uneimportante minorité allemande qui a émigré. Lamigration actuelle de ces régions est composée,presque en totalité,  de roumains. Par rapportaux ethniques roumains du Nord-est et du Sud,les roumains de l’Ouest et du Centre ont unepropension plus élevée de migrer vers les paysde l’Europe occidentale (vers l’Allemagnesurtout), et qui peut s’expliquer  par la proxim-ité géographique, le maintien des liaisons et descontacts avec ceux qui ont quitte ces régions, unniveau plus élevé de qualificationprofessionnelle et d’éducation.D’autre part, en examinant la géogra-phie de la migration  en Roumanie onpeut saisir des mouvements envagues: du  Nord-Est on part vers leCentre et l’Ouest, tandis que du Cen-tre et de l’Ouest on part vers l’é-tranger (pour que le circuit soit com-plète, on peut saisir plus récemmentun autre vague, de la République deMoldova vers la région Nord-Est).   Pour faire une remarque de syn-thèse sur la migration interne enRoumanie après 1989, on pourraitdire que la migration interne a connuun accroissement, dans un contextede libre circulation de l’individu,d’une véritable chute des activitéséconomiques industrielles, surtoutdans les villes, de la restructuration dela propriété agricole (la terre) et de l’a-griculture. De plus, la criseéconomique et sociale a eu une contri-bution essentielle, liée à la dureté et auxrigueurs de la transition à l’économie demarche, mais aussi à la façon dont les reformesstructurelles ont été adoptées et appliquées.L’industrialisation massive des années 1950-1970 a encouragé et stimulé la migration rural-urbain. Les conséquences démographiques etéconomiques de cette politique n’ont pas tardéd’apparaître: la main d’œuvre dans l’agricul-ture est devenue déficitaire et la populationrurale est entrée dans un fort processus de vieil-lissement et de féminisation. Devant une tellesituation, l’ancien régime a introduit, dès ledébut des années 1980, des mesures restrictives
visant la migration vers les villes, surtout versles grandes villes, ce qui a conduit à une réduc-tion significative de la migration interne avecchangement de domicile. Dans les années 1980on avait autour de 10 migrants p.1000 habitants,par rapport à 15 dans les années 1970. Dès queles restrictions ont été éliminées, à la fin de 1989,le nombre de migrants a explosé en 1990 – 34 p.1000. C’était l’épuisement d’un stock, de ceuxqui vivaient et travaillaient pratiquement dansles villes et qui pouvaient obtenir seulement unvisa de résidence temporaire (et pas de rési-dence permanente – domicile). Après 1990 lamigration interne annuelle s’est située à 11-13 p.1000, avec une légère tendance d’augmentationen 2002-2004 (tableau 2). 
Restructuration des flux migratoires entre
l’urbain et le rural. DimensionUn changement spectaculaire connu par lamigration interne en Roumanie après 1989 etqui mérite d’être analysé est la naissance et laconsolidation d’une nouvelle configuration dela migration interne entre l’urbain et le rural(tableau 2). Il s’agit d’un changement dont lescauses et les mécanismes peuvent être détectésmais qui est peu connu comme implicationséconomiques et démographiques, à long termesurtout. 
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Tableauȱ2.ȱRoumanie.ȱMigrationȱinterneȱavecȱchangementsȱdeȱdomicile,ȱ
1985Ȭ2004.ȱ
Volumeȱetȱstructureȱparȱmilieuȱsocialȱ
Migrantsȱ Fluxȱentreȱmilieuxȱsociauxȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱAnnéeȱ
Milliersȱ Tauxȱ–ȱ
p.1000ȱ
Urbainȱ
>ȱ
Urbainȱ
Urbainȱ
>ȱRuralȱ
Ruralȱ>ȱ
Ruralȱ
Ruralȱ>ȱ
urbainȱ
1985ȱ 196,1ȱ 8,6ȱ 20,0ȱ 6,5ȱ 16,1ȱ 57,4ȱ
1989ȱ 192,9ȱ 8,3ȱ 19,2ȱ 6,4ȱ 18,9ȱ 55,4ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
1990ȱ 786,5ȱ 33,9ȱ 18,1ȱ 3,5ȱ 8,5ȱ 69,8ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
1991ȱ 262,9ȱ 11,3ȱ 20,2ȱ 10,1ȱ 19,4ȱ 50,3ȱ
1992ȱ 293,2ȱ 12,9ȱ 24,3ȱ 13,7ȱ 22,8ȱ 39,2ȱ
1993ȱ 240,2ȱ 10,6ȱ 25,4ȱ 14,6ȱ 25,0ȱ 35,0ȱ
1994ȱ 266,7ȱ 11,7ȱ 25,6ȱ 18,4ȱ 25,5ȱ 30,5ȱ
1995ȱ 289,5ȱ 12,8ȱ 26,1ȱ 20,8ȱ 28,0ȱ 25,1ȱ
1996ȱ 292,9ȱ 13,0ȱ 27,4ȱ 23,4ȱ 24,5ȱ 24,7ȱ
1997ȱ 302,6ȱ 13,4ȱ 25,0ȱ 26,8ȱ 25,6ȱ 22,6ȱ
1998ȱ 276,2ȱ 12,3ȱ 26,0ȱ 28,5ȱ 23,6ȱ 22,0ȱ
1999ȱ 275,7ȱ 12,3ȱ 26,5ȱ 30,7ȱ 21,7ȱ 21,0ȱ
2000ȱ 244,5ȱ 10,9ȱ 23,7ȱ 33,8ȱ 23,0ȱ 19,5ȱ
2001ȱ 284,3ȱ 12,7ȱ 27,5ȱ 27,9ȱ 20,0ȱ 24,6ȱ
2002ȱ 320,8ȱ 14,7ȱ 25,8ȱ 30,1ȱ 21,6ȱ 22,4ȱ
2003ȱ 331,7ȱ 15,3ȱ 27,3ȱ 30,2ȱ 19,3ȱ 23,1ȱ
2004ȱ 369,9ȱ 17,1ȱ 26,1ȱ 31,8ȱ 21,1ȱ 21,1ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005ȱ
Le flux rural-urbain a dominé, depuis tou-jours, largement, la migration interne enRoumanie. Mais, le début des années 1990 mar-que la naissance d’une dynamique différente dedeux flux (urbain-rural et rural-urbain) -  crois-sance considérable de la composante urbain-rural et  recul massif du flux opposé, rural-urbain, de manière que en 1997, pour la pre-mière fois dans l’histoire sociale de laRoumanie, le flux urbain-rural a dépassé le fluxrural-urbain. Les tendances se sont maintenueset dans les années suivantes (figure 2), même siaprès 2000 la migration rural-urbain a connu un
revirement. Un tel changement impose un nom-bre d’observations.Dans un contexte de libre circulation de l’in-dividu, un renversement de la dimension de lamigration entre l’urbain et le rural ne peut con-stituer que le résultat d’un complexe de facteurssocio-économiques très forts, dont l’origine setrouve dans les changements que la sociétéroumaine a connu après 1989. Les conditions devie dans les villes se sont détériorées consid-érablement, par l’apparition et l’expansion duchômage, la baisse des revenus salariaux, l’éro-sion du pouvoir d’achat, l’explosion des coûtsrelatifs au logement. Pour certaines catégories
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Figure 2a. Roumanie. Migration interne 
urbain > rural et rural > urbain, 1991-2004
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Figure 2b. Roumanie.  Structure de la migration interne 
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
de la population urbaine une force de pressionest ainsi parue et développée, force qui visaitl’abandon de la ville et la migration dans lerural. Quelles catégories de la populationurbaine ont été les plus exposées à cette pres-sion?  Celles qui étaient venues dans l’urbaindans les années d’industrialisation massive etqui  ont été directement touchées par la chutedes activités industrielles après 1989 et toutesles conséquences de cette chute (au recensementde 1992, 40 p.100 de la population urbaine étaitnée en rural). D’autre part, un facteur favorisantla décision de retour dans le rural  est paru, laloi du fond foncier, par laquelle les coopérativesagricoles de type soviétique ont été liquidées enbonne partie et la terre a été retournée auxanciens propriétaires. L’action conjuguée desfacteurs poussant vers le départ de l’urbain etdes facteurs encourageant le retour dans le ruralpeut expliquer la dynamique de la migrationentre l’urbain  et le rural  dans les années 1990 etle renversement de deux flux après 1996.Quelle structure par âge ont eu les migrantsde l’urbain vers le rural (table 3)?
Les migrants de l’urbain vers le rural con-stituent une population plus jeune que la popu-lation rurale. Environ 55 p.100 des migrantssont entre 20 et 50 ans, poids nettementsupérieur à la proportion de la même popula-tion dans le rural – 34 p. 100, ce qui devrait êtreun avantage du point de vue démographique etéconomique, si on tient compte que la popula-tion rurale est sensiblement plus âgée. D’autrepart, il n’est pas sans intérêt d’observer que lesmigrants dans le rural  (années 1993-2003) sonten proportion de 56 p.100 des personnes mar-iées, poids plus élevé par rapport au poids des
mariés dans la population urbaine et rurale en1992 (50 et 52 p.100, respectivement). Si onajoute que la proportion de la population âgéede moins de 15 ans était, en 1992, de 24 p.100  enurbain et de 21 p.100 en rural, on pourraitavancer l’hypothèse que la décision de quitter laville pour la campagne a été plus forte dans lapopulation urbaine adulte, mariée et avecenfants,  ou le choque de la transition a été  plusdur.
Migration urbain-rural intra- et inter-
régionale. Origine et destination.Un dernier aspect sur lequel nous nous pen-chons dans les lignes suivantes est celui de lafaçon dans laquelle la migration urbain-rurals’est développée au niveaux des régions dedéveloppement, compte tenu de leurs  carac-téristiques économiques et démographiques,déjà mentionnées.  Le tableau 4 nous offre desdétails.     Evidemment, au niveau de chaque région leflux urbain-rural a deux composantes en ce quiconcerne la région d’origine desmigrants: de l’urbain de la même régionet de l’urbain des autres sept régions.Le poids de la première composante est,au niveau des huit régions, dans lesannées 1992-2003, de 74 p.100 del’ensemble de migrants urbain-rural,seulement un quart revenant auxmigrants de l’urbain des autres septrégions Une telle situation n’est pas sur-prenante. La propension de migrer durural vers l’urbain du même départe-ment et de départements voisins ouproches (dans la même région) a été,avant 1990, naturellement, plus forteque la propension de migrer versd’autres régions, plus lointaines (pourdes  raisons évidentes: facilites plus grandes detrouver un emploi et un logement  à travers lesapparentés et les amis, coûts plus faibles, possi-bilité de maintenir des contacts plus étroitesavec les apparentés restés dans le départementd’origine). Si nous regardons la migration de laperspective de la région de destination, nousretrouverons les mêmes poids: 74% provient del’urbain de la même région et 26% de l’urbaindes autres sept régions         Un examen de la structure des immigrantsen rural par régions, montre que la proportion
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Tableauȱ3.ȱRoumanie.ȱStructureȱparȱâgeȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱruraleȱ1992ȱetȱdesȱ
migrantsȱurbainȬrural,ȱȱ1993Ȭ2004ȱ
ȱ
Groupeȱd’âgeȱ
Populationȱruraleȱauȱ
recensementȱduȱȱ
7ȱjanvierȱ1992ȱ
Migrantsȱdeȱl’urbainȱ
versȱleȱrural,ȱ
1993Ȭ2004ȱ
Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ
Moinsȱdeȱ20ȱansȱ 29,3ȱ 29,2ȱ
20Ȭ29ȱansȱ 13,0ȱ 20,9ȱ
30Ȭ39ȱansȱ 10,2ȱ 18,3ȱ
40Ȭ49ȱansȱ 11,1ȱ 15,8ȱ
50Ȭ59ȱansȱ 14,4ȱ 9,6ȱ
60ȱansȱetȱ+ȱ 22,1ȱ 6,2ȱ
Source:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005.ȱ
des migrants de l’urbain de la même région a lesvaleurs les plus élevées – plus de 80 % - dans lesrégions  plus développées 6-Nord-Ouest,  7-Centre et 8-Bucarest. Nous pensons que l’expli-cation se trouve dans le fait que dans ces régions(et la région 5-Ouest) le développement de typeindustriel d’avant 1990 a été plus fort que dansles autres régions, ce qui a permis un absorptionsupérieure du potentiel migratoire existent dansle rural de ces  régions.  Et c’est ici l’explicationdu fait que dans les nouvelles réalitéséconomiques d’après 1989 dans ces mêmesrégions le mouvement de retour de l’urbain versle rural de la même région a eu les valeurs rela-tives les plus élevées. Ensuite viennent, commepoids, mais à grande distance, les venus derégions voisines, de l’Ouest pour la région
Nord-Ouest (7,4%),   de l’Ouest pour la régionCentre (5,1%)  et du Sud pour la région Bucarest(7,3%).  On ne peut pas saisir le même schémadans le cas des régions Nord-Est et Sud. Seule-ment 65% des venus dans le rural du Nord-Estproviennent de l’urbain de la même région, desproportions importantes revenant à l’urbain dela région Ouest (10%) et de la région Centre(8,2%). Autrement dit, le pouvoir d’absorptionde l’urbain de cette région, moins développée, aété plus faible dans le passe et la migration deson rural a été une migration de distance pluslongue par rapport à la migration rural-urbaindes régions plus développes Nord-Ouest, Cen-tre, Ouest et Bucarest.   Le cas de la région Sud,elle aussi ayant une proportion plus faible desarrivés dans le rural de son propre urbain, est
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différent. La région Bucarest est une ”enclave”dans le territoire de la  région Sud et la migra-tion du rural de cette région vers Bucarest a étéextrêmement fort dans le passe, ce qui pourraitexpliquer la force du flux de retour Bucarest-rural de la région Sud – 20% de l’ensemble desarrives.Au niveau agrégé, les poids des migrants del’urbain vers le rural de la même région et versle rural des autres sept régions constituent aussiles poids des arrivés dans le rural de la mêmerégion et dans le rural des autres sept régions (ladouble facettes) – 74 et 26 p.100. Un regard surla structure des départs de l’urbain vers le ruralpar régions de destination (tableau 4. section B)apporte des renseignements complémentairessur la migration urbain-rural, par la mise en évi-dence des structures différentes de la géogra-phie des départs vis-à-vis de la géographie desarrivées, au niveau régional. Tandis que dansl’ensemble des arrivés dans le rural, au niveaurégional, on trouve une prédominance nette etgénérale du flux de l’urbain de la même région,la composition régionale des départs de l’urbainmet en évidence quelques particularitésrégionales significatives et qui provient de l’o-rigine régionale de la migration rural-urbaindans le passe. Dans les régions moins dévelop-pées Nord-Est et les trois régions du sud lesdéparts de l’urbain ont eu comme destination lerural de la même région dans une proportiontrès élevée – 80-90%, parce que les opportunitésde trouver un emploi dans les villes de la mêmerégion ont été plus faibles dans le passe et rapi-dement occupées par des migrants de leur pro-pre rural. Ces régions n’ont pas constitué, dansle passe, des régions d’attraction des migrantsoriginaires du rural des autres régions. Le cas leplus éloquent est celui de la région Nord-Est.Les migrants de l’urbain de cette région sontpartis en proportion de 90% vers le rural de larégion, d’ou ils sont venus dans le passé, parceque l’urbain de cette région moins développéen’a pas attiré les migrants du rural des autresrégions que dans une mesure très faible. Le casde la région Nord-Ouest, une région plusdéveloppée mai ayant elle aussi une forte pro-portion de migrants dans le rural provenant deson propre urbain – 85%,  est plus nuancé. Lesbesoins de main d’œuvre dans l’urbain de cetterégion ont pu être satisfaits en bonne mesurepar son propre rural, trois de six départementsqui composent la région ayant un faible degréd’urbanisation et deux de ces départements
ayant une croissance naturelle supérieure à lamoyenne nationale dans le passé.Les régions qui présentent une autre géo-graphie des destinations des migrants de l’ur-bain sont Bucarest, Ouest et Centre. La régionBucarest est composée seulement de la ville(municipalité)  de Bucarest et le départemententourant la Capitale (Ilfov), qui a un fort carac-tère rural. D’autre part, la région est située aucentre de la région Sud, une des plus grandesrégions du pays et ayant le plus faible niveaud’urbanisation. La région Bucarest est la régionla plus développée  et elle a constitué un poled’attraction pour toute la moitie du sud dupays. Dans ces conditions, il n’est pas sur-prenant que seulement 27% de ceux qui ontquitté la région Bucarest (la Capitale, en effet)sont partis dans le rural du départemententourant la Capitale tandis que 40% ont eucomme destination le rural de la région Sud. Cequi attire l’attention est  la proportion relative-ment élevée des migrants vers le rural de larégion plus lointaine Nord-Est (presque 14%,plus que dans les régions plus proches Sud-Estet Sud-Ouest). Les régions Ouest et Centreretient elle aussi l’attention par les poids rela-tivement plus faibles des migrants urbains versleur propre rural – 53 et 70%. Dans la régionOuest on peut trouver des valeurs importantesdes migrants vers le rural de la région Nord-est– 17%, et de la région Sud-Ouest – 12%, cesdernières deux régions étant moins développéeset fournisseurs, dans le passé, de migrants versl’urbain de la région plus développée Ouest. On peut résumer les caractéristiques de lamigration urbain-rural par région par les remar-ques suivantes:• en proportion de trois quarts la migrationrégionale urbain-rural dans les années 1992-2003 (environ un million de personnes) est com-posée par des flux intra-régionaux et seulementun quart représente des  flux inter-régionaux;essentiellement, cette migration est une migra-tion de retour, sa géographie étant similaireavec la géographie de la migration rural-urbaindes années 1950-1990;• au niveau des départs de l’urbain vers lerural, dans les régions plus développées Centreet Ouest la migration de retour dans le rural aune composante plus importante de migrationinter-régionale, sur des distances plus longues,vers les rural des régions moins développéesNord-Est et Sud-Ouest, régions qui ont fournidans le passé, a large échelle, des migrants versl’urbain des régions plus développées;
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• les migrants urbain-rural de la région laplus développée - Bucarest, ont comme destina-tion majeure la région entourant Sud, mais aussila région plus lointaine et moins développéeNord-Est;• dans les régions moins développées Nord-Est et celles du sud du pays le flux urbain-ruralest constitué en proportion de 80-90%  de fluxintra-régionaux; par rapport aux régions plusdéveloppées, dans ces régions moins dévelop-pées la migration vers l’urbain a été  composéedans le passé surtout par des migrantsprovenant leur propre rural;• parmi les immigrants en rural, la propor-tion de ceux qui viennent del’urbain de la même région estde 75-85%; c’est l’expression dela nette prédominance du mou-vement rural-urbain dans lamême région dans le passé;seulement dans les régionsmoins développées Nord-Est etSud le poids des venus de l’ur-bain des autres régions est plusélevée; dans la première de cesrégions le sous-développementa poussé les migrants de sonpropre rural vers l’urbain desrégions plus développées, surdes distances plus longues; quant à la régionSud, l’attraction a été exercée dans le passé par laville de Bucarest (origine du fort flux de retourdans le rural de la région Sud après 1989); • enfin, il est bien évident le fait que la régionNord-Est détient une position particulière, soitqu’il s’agit de l’origine des immigrants dans sonrural (une proportion plus grande d’immigrantsd’autres régions), soit qu’il s’agit des départs deson urbain (presque en totalité vers son proprerural); le sous-développement et une forte crois-sance démographique peuvent expliquer cetteparticularité.
Effets de la migration sur la structure par
sexe et âge de la populationLa restructuration de la migration interneentre l’urbain et le rural n’a pas apporté deschangements significatifs dans la structure parsexe de la population urbaine et rurale, parceque la structure par sexe des migrants urbain-rural ne diffère pas de la structure par sexe de lapopulation rurale.  De 1992 à 2005, environ un million de per-sonnes ont quitté les villes pour s’établir en
rural. Ça ne signifie pas que l’urbain a gagnécette population, parce que, dans la même péri-ode, un nombre similaire de personnes ont quit-té les villages pour s’établir en villes. C’est n’estqu’à partir de 1997 que la balance migratoire estfavorable au rural  (+200 milles personnes entre1996 et 2005). Mais, cet apport positif a été large-ment contrebalancé par la baisse naturelle  etpar la migration externe nette négative. Lamigration urbain-rural n’a pas eu un effet béné-fique direct sur le nombre de la populationrurale mais elle a contribué sensiblement à ladiminution de la détérioration de la structurepar âge  en rural (tableau 5).
Dans un contexte de détérioration généralede la structure par âge après 1989, la dimensionde cette détérioration est considérablement dif-férentielle et favorable au rural, parce que lesmigrants de l’urbain vers le rural ont eu unestructure par âge plus jeune que la populationrurale (tableau 3). La proportion de la popula-tion jeune a connu une baisse nettement plusforte en urbain. Le poids de la  populationadulte-jeune (20-39 ans) est resté stationnaire enurbain et a connu un accroissement en rural,tandis que la population adulte-agée (40-59 ans)a été en baisse en rural et en augmentation enurbain. Enfin, le poids de la population âgée (60ans et plus) a été en hausse générale, en urbainet en rurale, mais l’accroissement a été plus forten urbain,  même si le degré de vieillissementreste considérablement plus élevé en rural.   
Remarques finalesLa Roumanie se trouve dans son 16-èmmeannée de détérioration de la situation démo-graphique. Le recul massif de la natalité, unemigration externe négative (et en hausse) et le
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Tableauȱ5.ȱStructureȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱurbaineȱetȱruraleȱparȱgroupesȱd’âge,ȱ1992ȱetȱ2005ȱ
Groupeȱd’âgeȱ Totalȱ Hommesȱ Femmesȱ Totalȱ Hommesȱ Femmesȱ
ȱ Urbainȱ1992ȱ Urbainȱ2005ȱ
0Ȭ19ȱansȱ 32,7ȱ 34,1ȱ 31,3ȱ 22,5ȱ 23,9ȱ 21,2ȱ
20Ȭ39ȱansȱ 33,4ȱ 33,0ȱ 33,8ȱ 33,6ȱ 34,4ȱ 32,8ȱ
40Ȭ59ȱansȱ 22,3ȱ 22,8ȱ 21,8ȱ 28,5ȱ 28,2ȱ 28,7ȱ
60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ 11,6ȱ 10,1ȱ 13,1ȱ 15,5ȱ 13,5ȱ 17,3ȱ
Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ
ȱ Ruralȱ1992ȱ Ruralȱ2005ȱ
0Ȭ19ȱansȱ 29,3ȱ 30,3ȱ 28,2ȱ 25,5ȱ 26,4ȱ 24,7ȱ
20Ȭ39ȱansȱ 23,2ȱ 25,4ȱ 21,0ȱ 28,8ȱ 31,0ȱ 26,6ȱ
40Ȭ59ȱansȱ 25,4ȱ 24,7ȱ 26,2ȱ 21,7ȱ 22,1ȱ 21,3ȱ
60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ 22,1ȱ 19,5ȱ 24,6ȱ 24,0ȱ 20,5ȱ 27,4ȱ
Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ
Source:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ2003.ȱ
maintien de la mortalité à des valeurs élevéespour un pays européen se trouvent à l’originede cette détérioration. Le déclin démographiqueet l’accroissement du vieillissement démo-graphique  sont les évolutions qui concrétisentdans l’immédiat la détérioration. La stabilité dunombre de naissances et le recul assez impor-tant de la mortalité par âge (mais très faible auniveau du nombre de décès et du taux brut demortalité) durant les dernières années peuventdonner l’impression d’une diminution de ladétérioration de la situation démographique. Laprudence s’impose. On peut détecter desmécanismes propres à la dynamique interne dela construction  démographique qui préfigurentune reprise plus forte de la détérioration àl’avenir, par la baisse du nombre de naissancesle moment ou les générations nées après 1989arriveront à l’age du mariage et de la maternité.Et cet horizon n’est pas loin, tout étant unequestion de terme moyen (United Nations,2005 ; Ghetau, 2004). De plus, la dimension de lamigration externe après l’admission de laRoumanie dans l’Union Européenne reste unegrande inconnue.  Dans ce contexte négatif, lamigration interne et, surtout, la surprenantephysionomie des flux migratoires entre l’urbainet le rural sont elles aussi une réaction à la criseéconomique et sociale dans laquelle se trouve laRoumanie et aux changements rapides et pro-fonds, douloureux en bonne partie, que le paysconnaît dans la phase actuelle de son évolutionhistorique. La restructuration de la migrationinterne trouve donc l’explication causale dansles réalités économiques et sociales de la transi-
tion. Certaines de ses conséquences semblentêtre favorables au rural. Mais, des questionsgraves se posent. Et si une bonne partie desmigrants retournés en rural a continué leurmobilité vers les pays de l’Europe occidentale àla recherche du travail, poussée par la pauvreté,le niveau de vie très bas, le spectre du chômageet les incertitudes de l’avenir? (Selon certainesestimations, le nombre de roumains se trouvantaujourd’hui dans les pays de l’Europe occiden-tale pour travail pourrait atteindre 1,5-2 mil-lions de personnes). La dimension et le poids dela population active dans l’agriculture sont touta fait inhabituelles en Roumanie (30% de la pop-ulation active du pays et 35% de la populationoccupée, à la fin de 2003) (INS, 2004a; 2004b).L’entré dans l’Union Européenne produira unvéritable choc dans l’agriculture roumaine,morcelée, faiblement dotée de moyens tech-niques  et ayant une productivité très faible(Ciutacu, Constantin et Luminita Chivu, 2002).De quelle manière sera affectée la populationrurale et la migration interne? Quelles motiva-tions pourra-t-on avoir la continuation de lamigration urbain-rural dans un rural ayant déjàune énorme population active agricole? Quellesperspectives pour une  population agricole quisera obligée de  réduire ses dimensions par lesdurs mécanismes de l’économie de marché?Pourra-t-il l’urbain absorber cette populationdans des activités industrielles et dans les serv-ices ?   Toutes ces questions, et on pourraitajouter d’autres,  montrent la complexité de lasituation et conduisent à la réflexion et à l’ac-tion.
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Annexeȱ2.ȱRoumanie.ȱȱProfileȱéconomiqueȱetȱdémographiqueȱdesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ
*ȱ41ȱdépartementsȱplusȱ laȱMunicipalitéȱdeȱBucarestȱ;ȱ**ȱMunicipalitéȱdeȱBucarestȱplusȱunȱdépartementȱ (Ilfov)ȱ;ȱ ICF=indicateurȱ
conjoncturelȱdeȱlaȱfécondité.ȱ
ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱINS,ȱ2004aȱ;ȱ2004bȱ;ȱȱcalculsȱdeȱl’auteur.ȱȱ
Régionȱdeȱdéveloppementȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Roumanieȱ
(Ro)ȱ
1ȱ
NordȬ
Estȱ
2ȱ
SudȬEstȱ
3ȱ
Sudȱ
4
SudȬ
Ouestȱ
5ȱ
Ouestȱ
6ȱ
NordȬ
Ouestȱ
7ȱ
Centreȱ
8ȱ
Bucarestȱ
I.ȱDonnéesȱgénéralesȱ
Nombreȱdeȱ
départementsȱ
ȱ
42*ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
7ȱ
ȱ
5ȱ
ȱ
4ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
2**ȱ
Superficieȱ–ȱkm2ȱ 238931ȱ 36850ȱ 35762ȱ 34453ȱ 29212ȱ 32034ȱ 34159ȱ 34100ȱ 1821ȱ
Superficieȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ 100ȱ 15,5ȱ 15,0ȱ 14,5ȱ 12,3ȱ 13,4ȱ 14,3ȱ 14,3ȱ 0,8ȱ
Populationȱ1.07.2004ȱ
Ȭȱmilliersȱ
ȱ
21673,3ȱ
ȱ
3738,6ȱ
ȱ
2850,3ȱ
ȱ
3342,0ȱ
ȱ
2317,6ȱ
ȱ
1939,5ȱ
ȱ
2738,5ȱ
ȱ
2539,2ȱ
ȱ
2207,6ȱ
Populationȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ 100ȱ 17,2ȱ 13,2ȱ 15,4ȱ 10,7ȱ 8,9ȱ 12,6ȱ 11,7ȱ 10,2ȱ
Populationȱurbaineȱ–ȱ
enȱ%ȱ 54,9ȱ 43,6ȱ 55,5ȱ 41,4ȱ 47,2ȱ 63,7ȱ 52,8ȱ 60,0ȱ 90,6ȱ
Densitéȱ–ȱparȱkm2ȱ 90,9ȱ 101,5ȱ 79,7ȱ 97,0ȱ 79,3ȱ 60,5ȱ 80,2ȱ 74,5ȱ 1212,3ȱ
II.ȱDonnéesȱéconomiquesȱ–ȱ2002ȱ
ProduitȱInterneȱ
BrutȱRégionalȱȬȱ%ȱ
dansȱleȱPIBȱnationalȱ
ȱ
100ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
12,3ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
11,3ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
12,4ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
8,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
9,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
11,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
12,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
21,1ȱ
ProduitȱInterneȱ
BrutȱRégionalȱȱ
parȱhab.ȱ–ȱmoyenneȱ
nationaleȱ=ȱ100ȱ
unîtesȱ
ȱ
ȱ
100ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
71,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
85,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
80,0ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
79,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
108,3ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
94,1ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
108,0ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
208,2ȱ
ȱ
Contributionȱ(enȱ%)ȱ
auȱPIBȱ:ȱ
- industrieȱ
- agricultureȱ
ȱ
ȱ
28,1ȱ
11,4ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
26,2ȱ
18,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
28,4ȱ
14,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
31,6ȱ
14,4ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
33,7ȱ
11,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
26,8ȱ
13,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
26,8ȱ
14,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
34,8ȱ
11,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
21,9ȱ
0,7ȱ
Revenuȱmoyenȱtotalȱ
parȱpersonneȱ/ȱmoisȱ;ȱ
moyenneȱnationaleȱ=ȱ
100ȱunîtesȱ
ȱ
100ȱ
ȱ
88,9ȱ
ȱ
95,8ȱ
ȱ
93,7ȱ
ȱ
93,8ȱ
ȱ
102,6ȱ
ȱ
103,0ȱ
ȱ
106,0ȱ
ȱ
127,9ȱ
III.ȱDonnéesȱdémographiquesȱ–ȱ2003ȱ
Tauxȱbrutȱdeȱnatalitéȱ
–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ 9,8ȱ 11,5ȱ 9,8ȱ 9,4ȱ 9,1ȱ 8,9ȱ 10,0ȱ 10,2ȱ 8,3ȱ
Tauxȱbrutȱdeȱ
mortalitéȱ–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ 12,3ȱ 11,5ȱ 11,8ȱ 13,6ȱ 13,3ȱ 12,9ȱ 12,4ȱ 11,3ȱ 11,4ȱ
Tauxȱ
dȇaccroissementȱ
naturelȱ–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ
Ȭ2,5ȱ 0,0ȱ Ȭ2,0ȱ Ȭ4,2ȱ Ȭ4,2ȱ Ȭ4,0ȱ Ȭ2,4ȱ Ȭ1,1ȱ Ȭ3,1ȱ
Tauxȱdeȱmortalitéȱ
infantileȱ–ȱp.1000ȱ
naissancesȱ
16,7ȱ 20,1ȱ 18,2ȱ 19,3ȱ 15,1ȱ 15,6ȱ 14,2ȱ 15,1ȱ 10,4ȱ
ICFȱ–ȱp.ȱfemmeȱ 1,23ȱ 1,51ȱ 1,27ȱ 1,27ȱ 1,23ȱ 1,18ȱ 1,28ȱ 1,28ȱ 0,97ȱ
Populationȱâgéeȱdeȱ
60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ
19,2ȱ 18,5ȱ 18,8ȱ 21,3ȱ 20,9ȱ 19,0ȱ 18,2ȱ 18,0ȱ 18,9ȱ
Espéranceȱdeȱvieȱaȱlaȱ
naissanceȱ
(2001Ȭ2003)ȱȬȱansȱ:ȱ
- Hommesȱ
- Femmesȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,4ȱ
74,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,4ȱ
74,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
66,9ȱ
74,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,2ȱ
74,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,9ȱ
74,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,1ȱ
74,1ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
66,5ȱ
73,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,8ȱ
75,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
69,5ȱ
76,4ȱ
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Annexeȱ3.ȱ
UrbainȱetȱruralȱenȱRoumanieȱ
ȱ
L’urbainȱestȱcomposéȱdeȱvillesȱ(orase).ȱUneȱlocalitéȱreçoitȱlaȱqualitéȱdeȱvilleȱparȱloi.ȱAuȱ1erȱjanvierȱ2005ȱonȱavaitȱenȱ
Roumanieȱ314ȱvilles.ȱLesȱvillesȱlesȱplusȱimportantesȱsontȱdénomméesȱmunicipalitésȱ(96).ȱLeȱruralȱestȱcomposéȱdeȱ
communesȱ(comune).ȱIlȱyȱaȱ2827ȱcommunes.ȱ
ȱ
Villesȱetȱcommunes.ȱNombreȱetȱpopulationȱauȱ1erȱjanvierȱ2005ȱ
ȱ
Lesȱvillesȱ Lesȱcommunesȱ
TailleȱȬȱhabitantsȱ Nombreȱ Populationȱ TailleȱȬȱ
habitantsȱ
Nombreȱ Populationȱ
Ensembleȱ 314ȱ 11901033ȱ(54,9ȱ%)ȱ Totalȱ 2827ȱ 9757495ȱ(45,1ȱ%)ȱ
Moinsȱdeȱ10000ȱ 115ȱ 776506ȱ Moinsȱdeȱ1000ȱ 63ȱ 46693ȱ
10000Ȭ19999ȱ 93ȱ 1244347ȱ 1000Ȭ2999ȱ 1312ȱ 2789446ȱ
20000Ȭ49999ȱ 60ȱ 1812545ȱ 3000Ȭ4999ȱ 980ȱ 3773418ȱ
50000Ȭ99999ȱ 21ȱ 1491949ȱ 5000Ȭ6999ȱ 318ȱ 1833071ȱ
100000Ȭ199999ȱ 14ȱ 1875946ȱ 7000Ȭ8999ȱ 113ȱ 886677ȱ
200000Ȭ299999ȱ 9ȱ 1542213ȱ 9000Ȭ9999ȱ 19ȱ 179663ȱ
300000Ȭ399999ȱ 4ȱ 1230079ȱ 10000Ȭ11999ȱ 17ȱ 183940ȱ
400000ȱetȱplusȱ 1ȱ 1927448ȱ 12000ȱetȱplusȱ 5ȱ 64587ȱ
Tailleȱmoyenneȱ ȱ 37901ȱ Tailleȱ
moyenneȱ
ȱ 3451ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱINS,ȱ2005b.ȱ
ȱ
